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 Chapter 1 
Relativizing the Truth of 
Moral Judgements 
1. 1  Intr oducti o n  
This book investigates the plausibility of relativism in metaethics. In the 
end I will suggest that moral discourse is relativistic in a previously 
unappreciated way. But the discussion leading up to this conclusion 
starts in more common forms of moral relativism. 
The more common forms of relativism are usually defended on two 
grounds. The first is the observation that, when it comes to questions 
about what we are morally allowed or not allowed to do, people just 
don’t seem to be able to agree. This is true of people situated in different 
societies with different cultures, but also of people within the same 
society and with similar social backgrounds. Relativists have argued that 
the nature of moral disagreement gives us reason to doubt that moral 
statements and thoughts have the same content regardless of who makes 
and has them. If different people actually spoke and thought about the 
same thing, couldn’t we expect their moral views to converge, at least to 
a larger extent than they do? On the other hand, if, perhaps contrary to 
first appearance, statements and beliefs about, say, the moral wrongness 
of acts are about different things when made and had by different people, 
it is quite natural that different people reach different conclusions about 
which actions are wrong. Roughly, then, the view that such considera-
tions have been taken to support is that moral judgements made by 
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different people have different content depending on their different 
moralities. 
The second aspect of moral practice sometimes adduced in support of 
this form of moral relativism is the connection between moral judge-
ments and motivation. Thinking that an action is right normally makes 
us more inclined to do it and when we find an act morally wrong we are 
normally to some extent discouraged to do it. This is often thought to be 
hard to explain on theories according to which moral judgements are 
beliefs about objective facts. Such beliefs, it is thought, cannot suffice to 
motivate us. But suppose that what someone’s moral judgements are 
about, depends on what she likes and dislikes, in such a way that her 
moral judgements are in line with her likings and dislikings. (We can 
still think of this view as saying that the content of moral judgements 
depends on people’s moralities. Which morality a person has, then, is 
determined by her likings and dislikings.) If this is so it is not at all 
surprising that I’m inclined to avoid doing what I think is wrong – these 
actions are, after all, actions that I dislike. 
I have described what we might call individualistic forms of moral 
relativism. According to these the content of a moral judgement depends 
on the individual speaker’s own morality. Such views can be contrasted 
with social or cultural forms of relativism. According to these forms, 
when we make moral judgements, the content depends on the morality 
of our culture or society. The focus in this book is almost exclusively on 
individualistic forms. Partly, this is a matter of choice and delimitation 
of subject: I want to talk about the kind of relativism that seeks support 
in arguments from motivation and diversity of moral views. The 
connection that holds between moral judgements and motivation holds 
between the individual agent’s moral views and what she is motivated to 
do. Similarly, the diversity between different people’s moral views ex-
ists between people in different societies but also between people 
within the same society or culture. Partly, I focus on individualistic 
forms of relativism because I think that often what looks like a social 
version of relativism, really isn’t. There is sometimes a confusion be-
tween the idea that an individual’s moral judgements are relative to the 
morality of his culture, and the (very plausible) idea that an individual’s 
morality (to which his judgements are relative) is affected by the values 
and morality (or moralities) in the culture where he lives.  
Individualistic forms of relativism imply that the truth-value of any 
specific moral sentence (whether the sentence is true or false) is relative 
in the sense that it can vary depending on who utters it or believes it (or, 
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according to certain variants, depending on who assesses the sentence). 
This is the claim that binds together the forms of relativism discussed 
in this book, their common core. The discussion in this book thus cen-
tres around views according to which moral sentences are true or false, 
not absolutely, but as spoken or assessed by someone. I will use the expres-
sion ‘moral truth-value relativism’ as a generic term to denote these 
views. The main question of this book is whether any form of moral 
truth-value relativism is correct or plausible. 
Moral truth-value relativism is a position in metaethics. While en-
quiries in normative ethics set out to examine and answer normative 
moral questions – such as, “Is female circumcision morally wrong?” – 
metaethical discussion concerns the nature of morality. What exactly 
characterises moral beliefs and utterances of moral sentences? Can they be 
true? What are the facts like, if there are any, which make these beliefs 
true? Can we have good reason to have such beliefs? In metaethics, then, 
one does not set out to take a stand on normative moral claims, but to 
investigate what characterises such claims.1 The form of moral relativ-
ism we will be concerned with is one view about the characteristics, or 
nature, of moral judgements; they can be true when uttered or believed 
by one speaker, but yet false when uttered or believed by another.  
Though positions of this kind have been represented in metaethical 
discussion for at least the past hundred years, they have never been as 
popular as their rivals. Moral relativism is often discarded in a few 
sentences. Often this is done by reference to the fact that moral relativ-
ism is thought to have a very counterintuitive implication: those situa-
tions that we think of as moral disagreements will often not be cases of 
disagreement at all, since what each of the disputants speaks about is 
determined by her own morality.  
This objection should of course be taken seriously. However, there 
are several reasons to discuss moral relativism more thoroughly. First, 
every metaethical theory has implications that at least some philoso-
phers find counterintuitive. Therefore, it is premature to discard a the-
ory on the basis that it has one counterintuitive consequence. Second, in 
recent years, new variants of moral truth-value relativism have been 
suggested and argued for, theories that have been motivated partly by 
their alleged ability to remove such counterintuitive implications. 
 
1This is not to reject the idea that some metaethical theories might have normative 
implications.  
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Third, when one presents the idea of moral truth-value relativism to 
non-philosophers, a very common reaction is that this view is obviously 
true. Of course, they say, there is not just one true answer to moral ques-
tions and, of course, different people can mean different things by moral 
terms. Some philosophers also share this view on moral truth-value 
relativism as intuitively obvious.2 Others find this form of relativism as 
intuitively unappealing as some find it appealing. However, the mere fact 
that the view is thought to be obviously true by some is a reason to ex-
amine it further. The fact that some find it obviously false makes the 
matter even more intriguing. 
According to the form of moral truth-value relativism sketched out so 
far, the truth-value of a person’s moral judgements depends on his or 
her morality. This is the kind of moral truth-value relativism that has 
been defended and discussed in philosophical literature. Let me call 
such views standard forms of moral truth-value relativism, or for short, 
standard relativism. I examine this kind of relativism in part 1 of the book. 
In three chapters I discuss two central arguments for and one objection 
to this form of relativism.  
I argue that these arguments fail to settle the dispute between relativ-
ists and non-relativists. But the discussion suggests a new form of 
moral truth-value relativism. Traditional forms of relativism and non-
relativism share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that, in 
one sense, the same analysis of moral judgements holds no matter who 
makes the judgement. Remember, according to such moral relativism, it 
holds for every person that the truth-values of her moral judgements 
depend (in a specific way) on her morality. In this sense, there is one 
relativist analysis that holds for every moral judgement.  
The “single analysis assumption”, as we might call it, seems to be al-
most universally accepted in metaethical literature. A more radical or 
fundamental kind of moral relativism would deny this assumption. 
This would be a relativism according to which moral judgements made 
by different people should be analysed in different ways (implying that 
what makes them all moral judgements is something other than how they 
are analysed). Is it possible to question the single analysis assumption 
and defend this kind of radical relativism? In part 2 I argue that it is and 
that, given certain common methodological assumptions, there are good 
reasons to do so. 
 
2See Harman, 2000. 
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The remaining part of this chapter lays the ground for the discussion 
that follows. The next section describes how moral truth-value relativ-
ism fits into metaethics and metaethical discussion. The sections after 
that give a more systematic account of the relativist views in question. 
First, I ask what characterises relativist views in general. After that the 
subject is narrowed down to forms of moral relativism, and then to 
moral truth-value relativism. This position is further characterised, and 
different forms of it are distinguished. 
1. 2  T h e  Pl a c e of M o r al  T ruth -V alu e R el at i v is m i n  
M et a eth i cs  
We all have moral opinions and most of us sometimes express these 
opinions in moral utterances. It has, however, proved very difficult to 
account for exactly what it is we do when we make moral utterances and 
exactly what it is we have when we have moral opinions. This difficulty 
has not manifested itself in hindering philosophers from coming up 
with many complex and ingenious accounts, but in the fact that philoso-
phers are far from an agreement about which of these diverse and con-
flicting suggestions is correct. 
Why is there so much disagreement about the nature of morality? Mi-
chael Smith has formulated one influential answer to this question. 
What we are after when we try to analyse or account for our moral prac-
tice – that is, the business of thinking and talking about the moral right-
ness and wrongness of actions, say, or justice and desert – is an analysis 
or account that captures all of the traits that we take to define or be char-
acteristic of this practice. However, some of the different characteristics 
that we intuitively ascribe to our moral practice seem to pull in differ-
ent directions.3 
On the one hand there are aspects of moral practice that suggest it 
should be construed as a realist practice. Moral realism is often under-
stood as the conjunction of three distinct metaethical positions: 
Cognitivism: Moral judgements have truth-value. 
Ontological realism: Some moral judgements are true. (Or: there 
are moral facts.) 
 
3 Smith, 1994, pp. 4-13. 
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Truth-value absolutism: Moral judgements have their truth-value 
independently of who utters or assesses them.4 
Moral realism, then, as conceived of here, is the position that all of these 
three claims are true. The cognitivist part of realism states that moral 
statements belong to the kind of linguistic expressions that are capable 
of being true and false. Just like ordinary assertions about the world (e.g. 
the assertion that my coffee cup is empty), they represent the world as 
being in a certain way, and are true if and only if the world is in that way 
(like the coffee cup assertion is true if and only if my coffee cup is 
empty). Alternatively it can be stated as the view that moral judgements 
are beliefs. Just like my belief that my coffee cup is empty represents the 
world as being in a certain way, my judgement that it is wrong to lie is a 
belief that represents the world as being such that it is wrong to lie. (The 
latter formulation can also be seen as explaining the former; we might 
think that linguistic expressions have truth-value by virtue of expressing 
attitudes that have truth-value, i.e. beliefs.)5  
Certain aspects of moral discourse make cognitivism seem plausible. 
Moral judgements have the form of declarative sentences, we argue 
about moral matters and we use moral sentences as premises and con-
clusions in logical inferences. This makes moral statements look like 
statements that represent the world as being in some way, thus express-
ing beliefs. In our moral thoughts and discussions we also seem to as-
sume that some of these moral beliefs and statements are true; we are 
convinced that some of them hold rather than others and are ready to 
argue that that is the case. Furthermore, our way of arguing lends prima 
facie support to truth-value absolutism. In some sense we seem to take 
others to talk about the same things as we do: when I have said “it was 
wrong to lie” and someone else says “it wasn’t wrong to lie”, then we 
assume, and argue as if, the other person disagrees with us, saying some-
thing implying that my statement is false. These traits of moral practice, 
then, seem to lend support to something like moral realism. 
 
4 A fourth component is sometimes added:  
Non-scepticism: It is possible to come to know moral truths. 
Since this element will not matter to the discussion here, I leave it out. 
5 Other speech-acts, such as requests, apologies and many more are more plausibly 
characterised as not having truth-values. Requests and apologies cannot be true or false. 
We might think that this is so because these speech-acts do not express beliefs: when I 
make an apology I express regret; when I request something I express a desire that 
someone does something. 
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On the other hand, moral opinions and judgements seem tightly con-
nected to our feelings and desires. If someone thinks that it is morally 
wrong to, say, eat meat, in normal cases he will be more inclined to 
avoid eating meat than if he had not accepted that moral thought. That is, 
our moral opinions can make us act and restrain us from doing so. Ac-
cording to a traditional view of motivation in analytical philosophy, 
often referred to as the Humean view on motivation, in order to be moved 
to act, a person needs a desire or some desire-like attitude. More exactly, 
she needs a desire that a certain state of affairs comes about and a belief 
that the action in question makes that state of affairs come about. De-
sires are then thought of as the moving force making actions happen, and 
they are thus necessary to make someone act or be motivated to act. 
Beliefs on the other hand, on this view, cannot by themselves make us 
motivated to act.  
These considerations lend support to some form of non-cognitivism 
rather than cognitivism. Non-cognitivism (or expressivism) is the denial 
of cognitivism – moral judgements do not express beliefs and thus do 
not have truth-values. Instead, according to non-cognitivism, moral 
judgements express non-cognitive attitudes like emotions, desires or 
acceptance of norms – attitudes that can motivate the one who has the 
attitude.6 (There are also anti-humean cognitivists. They reject the 
Humean view on motivation, thus claiming that moral beliefs can them-
selves give rise to motivation.7) 
Non-cognitivism is also often seen as better equipped than moral re-
alism to explain another trait of moral practice: the large diversity be-
tween people’s moral opinions. If moral judgements express desire-like 
attitudes this seems to be what we can expect, since people have different 
desires. If moral judgements represent absolute facts, on the other hand, 
then why do not people converge in their moral opinions to a higher 
degree?  
 
6 The way metaethics has developed in recent years it has become increasingly hard to 
draw a clear-cut distinction between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories. Non-
cognitivists tend to accept claims about moral practice which were previously thought to 
be defining claims of cognitivism, such as that moral judgements can be true and that 
there are moral facts. (See e.g., Blackburn, 1993, Blackburn, 1998, Gibbard, 2003.) There 
are different ideas about how to formulate a meaningful distinction between cognitivism 
and non-cognitivism in light of this. (See e.g., Dreier, 2004, Ridge, 2006) This will not 
matter to my discussion though. 
7 See e.g. Dancy, 1993, McDowell, 1979. 
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As we have seen, these are exactly the traits of moral discourse that 
have been thought to support also standard forms of moral truth-value 
relativism. If the truth-values of moral judgements depend on our de-
sire-like attitudes, then this seems to explain the connection to motiva-
tion. It also seems to explain the large diversity among moral opinions. 
So, even though moral truth-value relativism is a form of cognitivism 
(since it holds that moral judgements have truth-values and express 
beliefs) it has similarities with non-cognitivism.8 In contrast with abso-
lutist cognitivism, they both start from the subjective aspects of our 
moral practice and in a straightforward way incorporate these in their 
respective analyses of moral judgements.  
This gives rise to the following contrast between absolutist cognitiv-
ism on the one hand, and truth-value relativism and non-cognitivism on 
the other. Let me stipulate a sense of ‘moral claim’ such that two people 
make the same moral claim if intuitively, they make the same moral 
evaluation of the same (type of) thing. So two people who both hold that 
it is morally wrong to lie accept the same moral claim. (I will return to 
this intuitive notion of a moral claim later in this chapter.) According to 
absolutist cognitivism, what characterises any specific moral claim 
(such as the claim that lying is wrong) is that it is made true by certain 
(moral) facts. Two moral statements are used to make the same moral 
claim only if they are made true by the same facts. This is something that 
both moral truth-value relativism and non-cognitivism denies. Another 
way of putting this is that both views imply that whatever it is that keeps 
together the class of moral judgements, no matter who makes them, it is 
not that they are made true by the same (kind of) facts. Rather than being 
made true by the same facts, it is this strong connection to our subjective 
desire-like attitudes towards actions that make the class of moral judge-
ments into a homogenous class. 
This, then, is how standard forms of relativism fit into metaethical 
discussion. On the view underlying Smith’s explanation of metaethical 
 
8 Sometimes ‘relativism’ in metaethics is not reserved for cognitivist theories. Some 
philosophers use the term ‘moral relativism’ as roughly equivalent with moral anti-
realism. In Wong’s terminology, for example, a relativist is one who denies that there is 
one single true morality (Wong, 1984). This makes not only those who deny absolutism 
count as relativists, but also those who reject either Cognitivism or Ontological Realism. 
Non-cognitivism and ontological nihilism (the denial of ontological realism) both imply 
that there is no true morality at all. This, of course, means that there is no single true 
morality. Since I wish to talk about a more narrow class of views, I choose to call the view 
in focus here ‘moral truth-value relativism’. 
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disagreement – what we might call the traditional methodological ap-
proach to metaethical investigations – an analysis of moral judgements 
is supported to the extent that it coheres with what people take to be 
defining traits of moral practice and moral properties. Given this, cer-
tain such traits function as arguments for and others as arguments 
against standard relativism. 
In part 2 of this book, however, I suggest that if we adopt this meth-
odological approach none of the common analyses of moral judgements 
work. People take different traits to be definitional of moral properties. 
This might seem like a trivial point, but I argue at length that, given a 
plausible way of cashing out the traditional methodology, a consequence 
is that different analyses hold for moral judgements made by different 
speakers. The conclusion is that we have to give up either what I have 
called the single analysis assumption, or the traditional methodological 
approach. 
Before we begin to examine the arguments for and against the differ-
ent forms of moral relativism, however, the rest of this chapter gives a 
more systematic presentation of these positions, starting with what 
characterises relativism in general. 
1 .3  R el ati v i s m 
1.3.1  T h e s tr uc t ur e  of  r elat ivi sm 
All kinds of relativism claim that something is relative to something 
else. They hold that a certain property of a certain class of things is rela-
tive to a certain property of another certain class of things. We can 
choose ‘frame of reference’ as our general term for that to which things 
are relative. If we let F stand for frames of reference, any relativism can 
be expressed in the following form:  
The Core of Relativism 
(Rel. 1) For any x that is an I, x is P relative to some F:s – F:s that 
are Q – and x is not P relative to some other F:s – F:s that are not 
Q.  
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(Rel. 2) It is both possible for F:s to be Q and possible for F:s to 
be not Q.9 
(Rel. 1) is the claim that things of a certain sort (I:s) have a certain prop-
erty (P) relative to frames of reference of some kind (F:s). Relative to 
some frames of reference – frames of reference that are in a certain way 
(Q) – these things have P. Relative to other frames of reference – frames 
of reference that are different (not Q) – these things do not have P.  
(Rel. 2) is needed because relativism, as I conceive of it, involves the 
claim that the property that is relative can vary with that to which it is 
relative: whether x is P can be different relative to different parameters. 
(Rel. 1) by itself does not exclude that any possible frame of reference, F, 
necessarily has G – the property that x’s being P depends on. If this were 
the case then whether x is F could not vary relative to different frames of 
reference. 
Depending on what I, P, F and Q stand for we get different forms of 
relativism. Let us see how a couple of forms of relativism fit into this 
formula. It follows from Einstein’s special theory of relativity that two 
events cannot be simultaneous absolutely, but only relative to a frame of 
reference:  
Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not 
simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultane-
ity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; 
unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, 
there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event.10 
This form of relativism holds that the simultaneity (P) of pairs of events 
(I) is relative to reference bodies (F:s) such as a train or an embankment. 
Of course, reference bodies have to be in a certain way (Q) for a certain 
pair of events to be simultaneous (unfortunately I am not able to spell Q 
out). When we express this in the form given by the core of relativism we 
get: For any pair of events, those events are simultaneous relative to 
some reference body (with certain characteristics), but not simultane-
 
9 This way of formulating the common core of all forms of relativism is a variation of 
Kölbel’s: 
(R1) For any x that is an I, it is relative to P whether x is F. 
(R2) There is no uniquely relevant way Pi of fixing P. 
(R3) For some x that are I, and for some Pi, Pj, x is F in relation to Pi but not F in 
relation to Pj. (Kölbel, 2002, pp. 117-18). 
10 Einstein, 1960, p. 26. 
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ous relative to other reference bodies (with other characteristics). We 
also have to add that there are both possible reference bodies relative to 
which pairs of events are simultaneous, and possible reference bodies 
relative to which they are not (Rel 2). 
Next we can consider a radical form of truth-relativism: truth is rela-
tive to what we believe. Any x that is a proposition (I) is true (P) relative 
to persons (F:s) who hold it true (Q) but not true relative to people who 
do not hold it true.  
These two examples serve to illustrate ways in which different forms 
of relativism can differ from one another. First, different properties – in 
our examples simultaneity and truth – of different things – pairs of 
events and propositions – can be held to be relative. Second, the relative 
properties can be held to be relative to different kinds of properties of 
different things. 
Another rather common way to characterise relativism is in terms of 
the arity of the properties in question, that is, in terms of the number of 
places of the properties. A non-relativist view of truth might hold that 
truth is a one-place property of propositions. The truth relativist de-
picted above claims that truth is a two-place relation between proposi-
tions and persons (more specifically their beliefs).11 The intuitive pic-
ture of simultaneity might be that it is a two-place relation between two 
events. But the relativist claims that it is a three-place relation between 
two events and a reference body.  
It thus seems possible to characterise relativism roughly as the idea 
that a certain property has more places than one might have thought. 
However, even if some forms of relativism can be characterised in terms 
of the number of places of a certain relation, we will see later, in section 
5.2.3, that this is not the case for all forms of relativism. 
1.3.2  Lo c al  an d  r es tric t e d  for ms of r elat ivi sm 
The general characterisation of relativism, the core of relativism, pur-
posely leaves certain questions open. Consider for example relativism 
about simultaneity, as we stated it in line with the general characterisa-
tion. It does not claim that it holds for every pair of events that there are 
both reference bodies relative to which those events are simultaneous 
 
11 This is a simplification. On standard views, the truth of propositions is at least a two-
place relation, namely between propositions and circumstances of evaluation (see further 
section 4.5 for an explanation of this notion). Given this, relativism is the view that truth 
is a three-place relation.  
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and reference bodies relative to which those events are not simultane-
ous. We can call relativism about simultaneity that actually makes this 
further claim unrestricted relativism about simultaneity. But it is also 
possible to defend a restricted form of relativism according to which 
some pairs of events are not simultaneous relative to any possible refer-
ence body. In the same way we can distinguish between restricted and 
unrestricted variants of relativism concerning any specific topic. 
Another distinction is that between local and global forms of relativ-
ism. A global form of truth relativism claims that truths of all kinds are 
relative while a local form claims that relativism only pertains to truths 
of a certain kind, such as moral, aesthetic or scientific beliefs. Whether a 
form of relativism counts as local or global in this sense depends on the 
comparison class: an aesthetic relativism may be a global aesthetic 
truth-relativism (it concerns the truth of all aesthetic beliefs) at the 
same time as it is a local truth-relativism (it concerns only aesthetic 
truths). 
 We can use limited relativism to refer to forms of relativism the scope 
of which is limited in any of these ways. Forms of relativism that are not 
limited in any of these ways we call unlimited relativism.  
1 .3.3  Constr ain t  on  c o n tr ov er sial i ty?  
All kinds of relativism can be stated as instances of the core of relativism. 
However, it is not obvious that all instances of the core of relativism are 
forms of relativism. It is sometimes maintained that a constraint on the 
triviality or controversiality has to be added. For example, the view that 
the sentence “I’m 28 years old” has different truth-values when uttered 
by different speakers – or, in other words, that it is true relative to some 
contexts of utterance but not relative to others – is not usually described 
as a form of relativism. However, the same claim about other sentences, 
such as “Abortion is wrong”, is often labelled as a form of relativism. 
The difference seems to be that the first claim is uncontroversial while 
the second challenges at least many people’s previous understanding of 
the type of expressions in question. Similarly, the claim that the truth of 
sentences of the form, “x is to the left of y” is relative to the location of 
the observation, is not ordinarily thought of as a form of relativism. But 
Einstein’s claim that simultaneity is relative questions our ways of 
thinking, and is therefore not trivial.  
Thus one might want to say that trivial or uncontroversial claims ex-
pressible in the form given by the core of relativism are not forms of rela-
tivism. Alternatively, one might choose to say that these are forms of 
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relativism, but not philosophically (or scientifically) interesting forms 
of relativism. The first choice would probably be more in line with 
common usage of the term “relativism”. The second has the advantage of 
making the matter of whether a certain claim counts as a form of relativ-
ism less vague, since it seems to be less than a straightforward matter to 
determine if a certain case of relativity is trivial or not. In any case, I will 
not have to take a stand on this issue here. The types of relativism that 
concern us in this book are both expressible in the form given by the 
core of relativism and are highly controversial.  
1 . 4  M o r al  R el at i v is m 
The kind of moral relativism in focus in this book, what I call “moral 
truth-value relativism”, says roughly that the truth-values of moral sen-
tences are relative to the morality of the speaker of the sentences. Before 
giving it a more precise characterisation let me distinguish it from some 
other forms.  
1 . 4. 1  Desc r ip t ive  mor al  r elat ivi sm 
We have already seen that widespread moral disagreement is taken to 
support moral truth-value relativism. That is, it is based on what is 
sometimes called ‘descriptive moral relativism’: the empirical thesis or 
observation that people’s moral opinions diverge. Moral truth-value 
relativists do not argue that descriptive moral relativism implies moral 
truth-value relativism. But we will see in chapter 3 that they sometimes 
argue that the specific nature of the disagreement there is about moral 
matters justifies some form of such relativism. 
1. 4. 2  Age n t  r e lat ivi sm 
Besides what I call moral truth-value relativism, the most common 
variant of moral relativism is agent relativism.12 According to this view, 
two acts that are in every other aspect exactly similar can have different 
moral status, i.e. one can be morally right and the other morally wrong, 
depending on the morality of the one who is performing the act.13 So 
while moral truth-value relativists accept the following claim: 
 
12 Lyons, 1976) makes the perhaps first systematic distinction between agent relativism 
and a form of moral truth-value relativism (which he calls ”appraiser relativism”). 
13 One could choose to say that any view that implies that some property of the agent, 
whichever property that is, can affect the rightness of the acts she performs is a version of 
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the truth-value of P’s utterance of the sentence “Q ought not to do 
A” depends on P’s morality, 
agent relativists think that  
the truth-value of P’s utterance of the sentence “Q ought not to do 
A” depends on Q’s morality. 
It might seem that this makes also agent relativism a form of moral 
truth-value relativism: the truth-values of moral sentences and beliefs 
are relative, not to the speaker or believer, but to the agent. I choose not 
to call it a form of truth-value relativism, however, since it does not 
imply that the truth-value of the same moral judgement can vary: the 
judgements with different truth-values have to be about different acts. 
Some moral truth-value relativists, e.g. Gilbert Harman and David 
Wong, accept also agent relativism.14 The discussion in this book, how-
ever, will focus on the truth-value relativist part of their theories. 
1 .5 M o r al  T ruth-V alu e R el ati v is m  
The purpose of this section is to characterise the form of moral relativ-
ism we are concerned with in this book. Common to all forms of moral 
truth-value relativism is that they hold that it is the truth-values of 
moral judgements that are relative. According to the most common 
variants, the truth-values depend on who the speaker or believer of the 
judgement is. We will begin by looking at these speaker relativist variants 
and turn to other variants after that.  
1 .5.1  Standa r d  s p ea k er  r elat ivi sm 
For many expressions in natural languages like English, it is essential to 
know the context in which they are uttered even to begin to be able to 
decide if they are true or false. To know the truth-value of an utterance 
of, say, “I am the president of the United States” or “To the left you have 
the Eiffel Tower” we have to know things about the context in which 
 
agent relativism. But this wide characterisation would include many moral principles 
that we normally do not think of as relativist views. Cf. Sturgeon, 1994. 
14 It also happens that philosophers mix up the two positions. See e.g. Levy, 2002 
(especially p. 21 and p. 81) and Ryan, 2003 (see further footnote 128). 
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they are uttered. In other words, sentences like these have different 
truth-values relative to different contexts of utterance.15 
Speaker relativists claim that moral sentences belong to this class of 
expressions (even though they typically don’t hold that this is obviously 
so, as it is with uncontroversial indexicals like ‘I’ and ‘here’). More spe-
cifically, speaker relativism is the view that the truth-values of moral 
judgements are relative to some property of the speaker or believer, 
where this is a property that can vary between different speakers and 
believers. The last clause is in line with (Rel. 2) of the general characteri-
sation of relativism above. Unless the property that the truth-values of 
moral sentences are relative to is one that can vary between different 
speakers, speaker relativism would not imply that the truth-value of 
moral sentences can vary.16 
Speaker relativists standardly hold that the truth-values of moral 
judgements are relative to the speaker’s (or believer’s) morality. (Differ-
ent terms are used to refer to our moralities, for example “moral sys-
tem”17, “moral framework”18 and “moral perspective”19.) Whether my 
statement or belief that it is morally wrong to eat meat is true or false, 
depends partly on my morality. As I have said, I will refer to forms of 
moral truth-value relativism that relativize the truth-value of moral 
sentences to people’s moralities as “standard truth-value relativism” or, 
for short, “standard relativism”. 
Standard relativists typically think that having a certain morality con-
sists in having certain affective states, motivational states, emotions, 
desires, intentions, or the like; that is, attitudes of the sort non-cognitiv-
ists say that moral judgements express. I will not say more about this 
here; different relativists’ views on this matter will emerge as we pro-
ceed in the book. (To make such a view plausible it is important, just as 
it is for non-cognitivists, to specify which sub-set of non-cognitive atti-
 
15 The phenomenon of indexical terms and related notions such as contexts of 
utterance will be properly introduced in chapter 2. 
16 We could of course choose to include theories according to which the truth-value of 
moral sentences depend on properties that all speakers of moral sentences necessarily 
have. The reason for doing this would be that also according to these views, the truth-
value of moral sentences is relative to speakers. (See Dreier, 2006, p. 244 for such a 
claim.) But this would not be in line with standard characterisations of speaker relativism 
in philosophical literature. Neither is it the kind of views I wish to discuss. 
17 Dreier, 1992, p. 27. 
18 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996 p. 4. 
19 Kölbel, 2002. 
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tudes that are distinctively moral attitudes. Some relativists do that 
while others don’t. This issue will not be in focus in this book how-
ever.) 
1 .5.2  Compl exi t ies  in  d e fining s p ea k er  r elat ivi sm  
Moral truth-value relativism is a view both about the truth-values of 
moral sentences, and about the truth-values of moral beliefs. (I use ‘moral 
judgement’ to refer both to utterances of moral sentences and to moral 
beliefs. In contexts where the difference matters I will note this.)20 Fur-
thermore, it can also be expressed as a view about moral words or terms 
(such as ‘morally wrong’) and concepts (such as the concept of moral 
wrongness), saying that the extension of these varies depending on who 
utters the word or has the concept. The extension of a moral term is the 
class of things that have the property referred to by the term, the class of 
things that the term applies to. I will use all of these ways of putting the 
view in this book. In this section I point to some complications with 
these different formulations, and draw lessons from these. 
Two complications arise for simple formulations of speaker relativ-
ism in terms of sentences or beliefs, which do not pertain to formula-
tions in terms of moral words and concepts. First, speaker relativists do 
not claim that logically necessarily true moral sentences (such as “If 
abortion is wrong, then abortion is wrong”) or logically necessarily 
false moral sentences (such as, “Abortion is both right and not right”) 
have relative truth-value. The former are true and the latter false no 
matter who utters them. Consequently, if we think of truth-value 
speaker relativism as a view about sentences or beliefs we should bear 
in mind that it holds only for logically contingent moral sentences and 
beliefs. This complication does not arise if we choose to characterise 
speaker relativism in terms of the extension of moral terms or concepts. 
The other complication arises from the fact that moral sentences and 
beliefs contain non-moral words or components in addition to moral 
ones. And some of these are context-dependent components, such as 
indexicals; that is, components that make sentences and beliefs that 
 
20 For characterisations in terms of moral sentences see e.g. Streiffer, 1999, pp. 9-10. 
Perhaps this is also how Wong, 1984) should be interpreted when he puts his relativism 
as a claim about “A ought to do X” statements. Many writers alternate between statements 
in terms of beliefs and sentences, see e.g. Dreier, 1990 and Kölbel, 2004. Often, as in 
metaethics at large, relativism is stated in terms of moral judgements (see e.g. Harman 
and Thomson, 1996, Prinz, 2006, Sturgeon, 1994).  
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contain them have different truth-values relative to different contexts. 
Because of this, it is uncontroversial that the truth-values of at least 
some moral sentences and beliefs are relative to different contexts of 
utterance. For example, consequentialists might say that “I ought not kill 
my neighbour” is true when most people utter or believe it but not when 
asserted or believed by Hitler’s neighbour. Or, we might think that 
someone who owes John 100 dollars truthfully can utter or think “I am 
morally required to give John 100 dollar”, while this comes out as false 
when uttered or believed by someone without such debts. Thus, every-
one can agree that the truth-values of at least some moral sentences vary 
between different speakers.  
For this reason, if we want to formulate speaker relativism as a view 
about sentences or beliefs, we should keep in mind that the idea is not 
merely that some or even all moral sentences or beliefs have relative 
truth-values. Rather, the speaker relativist view is that moral sentences 
and beliefs have relative truth-values, due to the elements which make 
them moral sentences and beliefs (such as moral terms or concepts). It is 
not due to other elements (such as (non-moral) indexical terms). Again, 
this is a complication that does not arise on formulations in terms of 
extensions of moral terms and words. 
Another complication arises most evidently for statements of speaker 
relativism in terms of sentences or words. Let me state it for formula-
tions in terms of sentences first. What makes something count as a (spe-
cific) moral sentence in a language? I see two alternative answers, both 
problematic. First, we could say that a moral sentence in a language is 
one that is exclusively used to make moral claims in that language. In 
English, this would probably restrict the class of moral sentences to 
those involving expressions such as 'morally right', 'morally wrong', 
'morally good' and 'morally bad'. Indeed, it might be questioned whether 
even such sentences would count as moral sentences on this account: 
there are contexts where such sentences are used in a so-called inverted 
commas sense, merely to report what other people think. One problem, 
then, with this account of what makes something a moral sentence, is 
that it might imply that there are no moral sentences. 
But even if we find sentences that on all occasions are used to make 
moral claims, the problem is that we have excluded the vast majority of 
all moral assertions. Most of the time, we leave out 'morally' and say 
thing like, “That's wrong”. Such a sentence can have a variety of non-
moral meanings. It can be used to say that something is a breach of eti-
quette, that what is done is not the expected or intended way of acting, 
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that some proposition is false etc. We want speaker relativism to cover 
also those moral assertions that are made using sentences that, on other 
occasions, can be used to make non-moral assertions.  
The second alternative is to say that a moral sentence in a language is a 
sentence that most often, or alternatively, at least sometimes, is used to 
make moral assertions. Depending on the exact suggestion, this could 
mean that sentences such as “it is wrong to lie” count as moral sentences 
in English. This view is also problematic, however. Everyone can agree 
that a sentence like “it is wrong to lie” have different truth-values in 
different contexts of utterance, since sometimes the sentence is used to 
make a certain moral claim, but on other occasions it is used to make 
other, non-moral, claims. Thus, on this account, our definition does not 
capture the relativist position of interest here.  
The upshot of this, I suggest, is that we have to operate with some-
thing like an intuitive notion of moral claims. Intuitively, if two people 
think that it is morally wrong to kill, they accept the same moral claim; 
they make the same moral evaluation of the same thing. Given such an 
intuitive notion, two different sentences can be used to make the same 
moral claim. And the same sentence can be used to make different moral 
claims on different occasions of use. The most straightforward solution 
to the problem, then, would be to define speaker relativism as a view 
about moral claims: the same moral claim can have different truth-val-
ues when believed in or made by different speakers. Or, in other words: 
statements that we intuitively think of as involving the same moral 
evaluation of the same thing can nevertheless have different truth-value. 
If we nonetheless want to state speaker relativism in terms of sen-
tences, a qualified statement would have to say something like: When a 
sentence is used to make a moral claim, its truth-value is relative to 
some property of the speaker. This avoids the problems that pertain to a 
statement solely in terms of moral sentences: with the qualification, the 
theory pertains to every expression of a moral claim (not just to those 
that happen to be made using a typically moral sentence); and it is not a 
view everyone can agree with merely on the basis of the uncontroversial 
fact that the same sentence can be used to make different claims. 
In order for the notion of moral claims to do the job we want it to do 
in a general definition of moral truth-value relativism, it must have 
certain characteristics. To begin with, we must not assume that moral 
claims are individuated by their truth-values: one and the same moral 
claim must be able to vary in truth-value depending on who makes it. 
Moreover, we will soon see that truth-value relativists sometimes make 
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further claims: that the content, or even meaning, of any specific moral 
claim can vary. Thus, to be able to characterise any kind of moral truth-
value relativism in terms of moral claims, we should not presuppose 
that moral claims are individuated by their content or meaning. For this 
reason I think we have to work with an intuitive notion of moral claims 
along the following lines. Most often when two people use the sentence, 
“It is morally wrong to kill an innocent” we intuitively think that they 
use it to make the same moral claim. They both make a claim about 
moral wrongness, a claim to the effect that killing an innocent is mor-
ally wrong. This, I think, is the best we can say at this point: two sen-
tences are used to make the same moral claim – in the sense stipulated 
here – if and only if intuitively they make the same moral evaluation (is 
right, is wrong, is good, is evil, is virtuous etc.) about the same thing 
(action, action type, character, person, motives etc.). The disagreement 
between moral truth-value relativists and absolutists, then, concerns 
whether the same moral claim can have different truth-values on differ-
ent occasions. (While we have to use an intuitive notion of moral claims 
in the general definition of speaker relativism, specific forms of speaker 
relativism will include specific views about what makes something a 
specific moral claim and how this is connected to the idea that the same 
moral claim can have different truth-values when believed in or made by 
different people.) 
It should be obvious that the same complication arises for statements 
of speaker relativism in terms of the extension of moral words, and that 
a similar qualification would have to be made for such a statement. A 
word may be used to make moral claims on certain occasions but non-
moral claims on others and two different words can be used to make the 
same moral claim. 
It might not be as obvious that the complication arises if speaker rela-
tivism is stated in terms of moral beliefs or concepts. This is because 
we intuitively think that what individuates moral beliefs are that they 
are beliefs in different moral claims in the intuitive sense above. That is, 
what makes something a specific moral belief is that it makes a specific 
moral evaluation of a specific thing (or kind of things). Nonetheless, I 
think that these considerations are highly relevant for such statements 
as well. One common way of individuating beliefs is in terms of their 
content (their truth-conditions or the propositions they express). How-
ever, when speaker relativism is defined in terms of moral beliefs, one 
has to keep in mind that what makes something a specific moral belief 
cannot be it’s content, since according some forms of relativism the 
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content of a moral belief varies with the morality of the believer. Rather, 
as we have said, one has to use something like the intuitive notion of a 
moral claim to individuate moral beliefs.  
The lesson from this section is that a qualified statement of truth-
value relativism should refer to moral claims. If it is made in terms of 
moral beliefs or sentences it should also be remembered that it holds 
only for logically contingent moral sentences and that the context-de-
pendence holds because of that which makes moral sentences and be-
liefs moral sentences and beliefs. However, for sake of simplicity, when I 
mention and describe the view in this book, I will often use less quali-
fied statements in terms of moral sentences, words, beliefs or concepts. 
I will use more qualified statements when there are special reasons to 
do so.  
1 .5.3  S p ea k er s  an d  assessors , var ying an d  s tabl e  c on t e n t s  
All forms of moral speaker relativism involve the claim that the truth-
value of moral sentences can vary. But the most common versions in-
volve a further claim: the reason that the same moral sentence can have 
different truth-values when used by different speakers is that it can be 
used by different speakers to say different things. Two people who both 
utter the sentence “Abortion is wrong” may have said different things, 
much like two people who utter a sentence containing an ordinary in-
dexical term (such as, “I am in Gothenburg”) have said different things 
(each person has said something about her own location). Expressed in 
philosophical terms, then, speaker relativism is often characterised as 
the view that different speakers’ assertions of a moral sentence may have 
different content (which, in turn, is sometimes cashed out as that they 
have different truth-conditions or express different propositions.) Thus 
Kölbel, Sturgeon and Streiffer describe this view (but under the names 
‘indexical relativism’ and “appraiser relativism”, respectively) in the 
following ways: 
Indexical relativists about, say, morality will hold that moral relativity is essen-
tially a matter of moral sentences expressing different contents on different 
occasions of use. Moral sentences are thus very similar to indexical sentences 
in that the context of utterance determines which content is expressed by 
any utterance of them. Thus the same moral sentence can express one 
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content and be true in one context of utterance, while it may express a 
different content and be false in another context.21 
Appraiser relativism […] sees the truth conditions for moral judgments made 
by a given appraiser as determined by factors essentially including a feature 
that can vary from appraiser to appraiser – such as […] the appraiser’s moral 
norms.22 
Appraiser relativism [is the view] according to which the propositions expressed 
by a moral sentence varies from context to context […]23 
As above, this form of speaker relativism can be stated in terms of 
moral words (or concepts) as well as in terms of moral sentences (or 
beliefs). The idea, then, is that the extension of moral terms differs be-
tween different contexts of utterance because the referent of moral terms 
differs between different contexts of utterance. That is, a moral term 
may refer to one property when used by one speaker and refer to another 
property when used by another speaker, just like “I” refers to different 
individuals when two different speakers use it.  
Recently, this most common variant of speaker relativism has been 
challenged in its own arena. A new kind of moral truth-value relativism 
has been suggested that differs from the common forms of speaker rela-
tivism in two ways. First, the reason that the truth-values of moral sen-
tences are relative, it is suggested, is not that moral sentences have 
different content in different contexts. The reason, instead, is that the 
contents of moral sentences (the propositions that they express) have 
different truth-values relative to different contexts. (Stated in terms of 
moral words instead of moral sentences the idea is that, while the refer-
ence of moral terms stays the same between contexts, their extension 
varies. The term ‘wrong’ for example, always refers to the same property 
– the property of wrongness – but this property has different extensions 
in different contexts.)  
The second new element involved in the new forms of relativism is 
that moral sentences have their truth-values determined, not (partly) by 
the context in which they are used by a speaker (like ordinary indexi-
cals), but (partly) relative to the contexts in which they are evaluated or 
assessed by someone. This means that a specific statement of a moral 
sentence may have different truth-values relative to different people who 
 
21 Kölbel, 2004, pp. 297-98. 
22 Sturgeon, 1994, p. 83. 
23 Streiffer, 1999, p. 9. 
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evaluate that statement. Thus we might call this new form of relativism 
assessor relativism instead of speaker relativism. The main part of the dis-
cussion of truth-value relativism in this book will focus on speaker 
relativism. Assessor relativism will be discussed in parts of chapter 4.  
1 .5.4  Pl uralism an d  mo nism abou t  anal yses  
The forms of truth-value relativism surveyed above are forms of what I 
have called standard relativism – each of them holds that there is a spe-
cific way in which the truth-values of moral sentences are relative to 
moral systems (of speakers or assessors of the moral sentences). All 
moral judgements, they hold, should be analysed so that their truth-val-
ues are relative in this way.  
As I said in the beginning of this chapter, there is another possible 
form of moral truth-value relativism, which I will elaborate and defend 
in the closing chapter. On this view, relativism is not true because the 
analysis that holds for moral judgements is such that it makes their 
truth-values depend, in a certain way, on the context. Instead, according 
to this idea, the reason that moral judgements made by different people 
can have different truth-values is that different analyses hold for moral 
judgements made by different people. This is the kind of relativism I 
introduced earlier as denying “the single analysis assumption”. The 
specific view I will defend is that a standard relativist analysis might 
hold for some speakers’ moral judgements, while an absolutist analysis 
holds for moral judgements made by other speakers.  
While the standard forms of moral truth-value relativism we have 
seen above, the ones usually defended and discussed in the philosophical 
literature, are forms of “analysis monistic truth-value relativism”, I will 
call the present view “analysis pluralism”. 
1.5.5 Tr ut h - val ue  absol u t i sm 
Moral truth-value relativism stands in opposition to moral truth-value 
absolutism. The latter claims that for any given moral sentence (that does 
not contain other, non-moral, context-dependent expressions), the truth-
value is the same no matter who utters (and assesses) it.24 
 
24 Thus defined, truth-value speaker absolutism does not exclude that the truth-value 
of moral sentences vary with other things in the context, such as when or where they are 
uttered. If we want, we can define a stronger absolutism, excluding also such forms of 
truth-value relativism. In practice the distinction between these two forms of absolutism 
is not of much consequence however, since the other forms of relativism are never
defended. 
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Defining absolutism this way makes the distinction between limited 
and unlimited forms of moral truth-value relativism relevant. Accord-
ing to unlimited forms, every moral sentence is true relative to some 
speakers, but false relative to others. We have seen that relativism con-
cerning any subject can be limited in two different ways. Restricted 
forms of moral truth-value relativism hold that certain moral sentences 
are true (or false) relative to all possible moralities, because there are no 
possible moralities of the kind that would make them false (or true).25 
As we said above, any form of relativism can also come in more or less 
local or global forms. Moral truth-value relativism is in itself local 
since it concerns the truth-values of a restricted class of sentences, 
namely moral sentences. But there could also be forms of relativism 
that are local within moral truth-value relativism, holding that only 
certain kinds of moral sentences have relative truth-values. For example, 
one could hold that judgements concerning goodness are relative, but 
not judgements concerning rightness.  
According to the definition of moral truth-value absolutism above, 
this view excludes both unlimited and limited forms of moral truth-
value relativism, since it holds that the truth-value of every moral sen-
tence is absolute. This might strike some as inconsistent. Limited forms 
of truth-value relativism are just as much limited forms of truth-value 
absolutism, since they are mixed views according to which some moral 
sentences have absolute truth-values and others have relative truth-value. 
Nonetheless, I will place such views on the side of truth-value rela-
tivism. I do so since classifying the mixed views this way – as forms of 
relativism and not forms of absolutism – marks what strikes me as the 
most interesting distinction in the context of the discussion in this 
book. Moral truth-value absolutism is the standard view on moral sen-
tences (among those who think that moral sentences have truth-value), 
and any strain of truth-value relativism, however local or restricted, 
stands in opposition to this. 
 
 
25 Cf. Wong, who argues that even though it is “logically possible” for a group to 
develop a system of moral rules that permits, say, torturing people on whim, “[i]n 
practice, a group will be limited in its attempt to develop an adequate system of rules and 
standards that will provide a relatively effective resolution of the conflicts a morality is 
intended to resolve. That is why rules permitting torture on a whim are not found in 
adequate moral systems.” (Wong, 1984, p. 74). 
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1.6  Pla n of the B o o k 
The following two parts of the book deal with the question of whether 
any form of moral truth-value relativism is plausible. The main share of 
the discussion concerns what I have called standard forms of such rela-
tivism: that is, theories according to which the truth-values of moral 
sentences are relative to people’s moralities. As we have seen, standard 
relativism has two main competitors in metaethics, absolutism and 
non-cognitivism. A full examination of relativism would have to be 
pursued in contrast with both. However, my discussion will almost 
exclusively focus on the question of what reasons there are to accept 
relativism or absolutism. This means that the discussion is pursued on 
the assumption that cognitivism is correct.  
As we have noted, on a traditional way of understanding metaethical 
discussion, this is a discussion about which theory or analysis best 
captures the characteristics of moral practice. The three chapters of part 
1 are concerned with the characteristics giving rise to the two most cen-
tral arguments in favour of standard relativism and the most common 
argument against this view. Chapter 2 concerns the argument that stan-
dard relativism can explain the connection between moral judgements 
and motivation in a way that absolutism cannot. In chapter 3 I discuss 
the idea that relativism is supported by the large and pervasive diversity 
there is between people’s moral opinions. Chapter 4 deals with the 
common objection to standard relativism that it cannot account for the 
fact that we disagree over moral matters: if moral terms have different 
extension when different people use them, it seems that we speak past 
each other rather than genuinely disagree.  
I argue that none of these arguments (at least as they stand) can settle 
the battle between relativism and absolutism. This is the general nega-
tive conclusion in part 1: the common arguments in the debate between 
standard relativism and absolutism are inconclusive. 
In the first chapter of part 2, I give my view on where we should go 
from this negative conclusion. While it is indeed true that there is a 
tension between the characteristics we experience moral practice and 
moral properties as having, one thing that has come forth in the discus-
sion in part 1 is that different people also have very different intuitions 
about these characteristics; about the nature of moral properties. Some 
people think that moral properties have to be absolute (in the way abso-
lutism implies) while others think that they are relative (in the sense 
implied by standard relativism). I argue that, given the traditional 
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metaethical methodology, this gives us prima facie reasons to doubt 
both relativism and absolutism: or at least, to defend either of these 
views one has to argue that there is a theory of meaning that (i) is plausi-
ble for moral terms, and (ii) is such that the strong intuitions opposing 
the view in question do not say anything about how we should analyse 
the meaning of moral judgements.  
Chapters 6 and 7 look at different such theories of meaning. I argue 
that, as long as we stay within the traditional methodology, none of them 
can serve to ground either standard relativism or absolutism as an 
analysis of everyone’s moral judgements. The only way of avoiding this 
conclusion is to adopt a methodology that allows what I call radically 
revisionist analyses: analyses of moral judgments that conflicts with 
what some people are disposed to think can or cannot count as moral 
properties. 
The negative conclusion, then, is that certain theories come out as 
false if metaethical discussion is pursued in the traditional manner. 
Chapter 8 considers the positive consequence of this conclusion, still 
within the scope of the traditional methodology. What follows then is 
that we should give up what I have called the “single analysis assump-
tion”, the idea that one analysis holds for moral judgements whomever 
they are made by. Or, in other words, it follows that a form of moral 
analysis pluralism is true. I argue that this is a coherent and plausible 
position. More specifically, the thesis I argue for is that some people’s 
moral judgements should be given an absolutist analysis, while a stan-
dard relativist analysis holds for judgements made by others. In this 
context I also return to the conflict between cognitivism and non-cogni-
tivism; I argue that analysis pluralism gives a way to account for the 
features of moral discourse that non-cognitivism captures, while it 
remains a version of cognitivism. The conclusion, then, is that even 
though standard relativism cannot be upheld, an analysis pluralist rela-
tivism can. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR  
AND AGAINST  
STANDARD RELATIVISM
  
  
Chapter 2 
First Road to Relativism: 
Emotions and Motivation 
2. 1  Intr oducti o n  
Our moral judgements are intimately connected to our emotions and 
desires. Much of the philosophical discussion about this matter focuses 
on the connection between moral judgements and motivation. One of the 
most salient features of moral practice is the role moral judgements 
play in affecting our actions. When someone thinks that some specific 
course of action is morally obligatory in a situation, we normally expect 
her moral opinion to have at least some weight in her practical reason-
ing. She might not necessarily act on her moral conviction, perhaps 
because there are other things at stake in the situation that matter to her 
personally, but she will weigh her moral standpoint against those other 
considerations. In short, she will be more prone to do the thing she 
holds to be morally obligatory, than if she had not accepted that moral 
judgement.  
As we saw in chapter 1, the common variants of speaker relativism 
hold that the content of a moral judgement depends on the speaker’s 
morality, where her morality consists of a sub-set of her non-cognitive 
attitudes, such as emotions, desire-like attitudes or motivational states. 
It has been argued that the special connection such theories see between 
moral judgements and moralities can explain why moral judgements 
motivate. 
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I will separate two different issues concerning how moral judgements 
are connected to motivation and emotions. The first issue concerns the 
contingent connection between moral judgements and emotions and 
motivation. No doubt, moral judgements are often accompanied by mo-
tivation and emotions. In section 2.2 I discuss if speaker relativism can 
gain support from its ability to explain this. But it is also often held that 
there is a necessary or conceptual connection between moral judgements 
and motivation: moral judgements are (at least in normal cases) neces-
sarily accompanied by motivation. This is the issue that the discussion 
about motivational internalism and externalism concerns. The remain-
ing sections discuss whether speaker relativism can be argued for on 
basis of the view that there is such a necessary connection. I argue that it 
can’t: speaker relativism has no special ability to explain this. Relativists 
plausibly can deliver such explanations; but so can absolutists. 
2. 2  C o nti ng e nt C o n n e ct i o n  t o Em oti o n s a nd 
M o ti v at i o n  
It might seem obvious enough that there is an intimate connection be-
tween accepting a moral judgement and having certain emotions or being 
motivated, but there is also more robust evidence for this in empirical 
studies. Jesse Prinz uses results from such studies to argue for a form of 
speaker relativism. In this section I argue that, as it stands, this line of 
argument fails. Depending on which view one takes on what determines 
the content of moral judgements, absolutists can accommodate the re-
sults as well. 
Prinz puts forward different theses about how moral judgements are 
connected to emotions that he thinks are empirically supported. The 
first thesis is that moral judgements and emotions co-occur. This thesis, 
Prinz says, is confirmed by several studies showing that when people 
make moral judgements, areas of their brains that are associated with 
emotional responses are activated.26 For example, when the subjects of 
one study evaluated moral and factual sentences as being right or wrong, 
it was only when they evaluated the moral sentences that the emotional 
areas of their brains were activated.27 As Prinz notes, such “brain scans 
simply add empirical support to a pre-theoretical intuition that emo-
 
26 Prinz, 2006, p. 30. 
27 Moll, Oliveira-Souza and Eslinger, 2003. 
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tions arise when we respond to a wide range of morally significant 
events, including rudeness, unfairness, law-breaking, and saving lives.”28 
Prinz’s second thesis is that emotions influence, and can even be suffi-
cient in the production of, moral judgements. He refers to studies where 
it is shown that which moral judgement a person makes about a case 
depends on that person’s emotional state. In the most remarkable ex-
periment, the subjects were hypnotised to feel disgust when they heard 
the word ’often’. The subjects were then presented with vignettes con-
taining either the word ‘often’ or a synonym, and asked to give a moral 
judgement of the character of the people described, which was either a 
typically reprehensible or admirable character. When the vignettes con-
tained the word ‘often’ the hypnotised subjects judged the morally admi-
rable characters to be morally reprehensible or wrong. This study 
seems to indicate, not only that having certain emotions can influence 
the strength of moral judgements or can direct our attention to morally 
significant properties, but that having these emotions can cause moral 
judgements that we would not have otherwise had: they can be sufficient 
to produce moral judgements. 
The third thesis Prinz puts forward is that emotions are necessary in 
the production of moral judgements, or necessary for moral develop-
ment. First, he takes the way we teach children moral rules to be sugges-
tive in this direction. Prinz cites research29 showing that the three main 
techniques parents use to convey moral rules all involve eliciting emo-
tions in the child: 
One technique is power assertion (physical punishment or threat of punish-
ment), which elicits fear. Another technique is called induction, which elicits 
distress by orienting a child to some harm she has caused in another person 
(‘Look, you made your little brother cry!’). The third technique is love with-
drawal, which elicits sadness through social ostracism (‘If you behave like that, 
I’m not going to play with you!’). Each technique conditions the child to expe-
rience negative emotions in conjunction with misdeeds.30 
Second, Prinz takes research on psychopaths as evidence that certain 
emotions are necessary for moral development. One part of the evidence 
is provided by studies indicating that psychopaths do not make a dis-
tinction between moral rules and conventional rules, which suggests 
that they do not make genuine moral judgements. The other part is that 
 
28 Prinz, 2006, p. 31. 
29 Hoffman, 1983. 
30 Prinz, 2006, p. 32. 
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psychopaths suffer from deficits in negative emotions. Taken together, 
this suggests that it is the deficit in negative emotions that explains their 
inability to make moral judgements.  
Prinz also argues for a stronger claim; that having certain emotions is 
not only causally necessary to develop moral judgements, but that it is 
necessary “in a synchronic sense”. To accept a moral judgement that it is 
wrong to kill one must be disposed to have negative emotions towards 
killing. For this thesis Prinz has no empirical evidence, however. It is 
based on conceptual intuitions to the effect that someone who says that 
it is wrong to kill without having the appropriate emotions is either 
insincere or confused.31 
Prinz takes the empirical evidence to support a form of speaker rela-
tivism.32 According to Prinz’s theory, to have a moral belief is to have a 
sentiment of approbation or disapprobation. Such sentiments are dis-
positions to have certain positive and negative emotions. So, for exam-
ple, to believe that oneself has acted wrongly is to have a disposition to 
feel shame or guilt, and to think that someone else behaves immorally is 
to be disposed to feel anger, contempt, disgust, annoyance or indigna-
tion. This might sound suspiciously similar to some forms of expres-
sivism, but this is not the intended interpretation:  
When I say that moral judgments express sentiments, I do not mean to imply 
that moral judgments are merely expressive. I am not endorsing expressivism 
here. I prefer sensibility theories, according to which moral concepts refer to 
response-dependent properties […]. Moral judgments express sentiments, and 
sentiments refer to the property of causing certain reactions in us. The reac-
tions in question are emotions […].33  
When I say or think that killing is wrong, then, I ascribe to killing the 
property of causing negative emotions in me. This is a form of speaker 
relativism.34  
 
31 Ibid. 
32 It is not very clear how strong evidence he takes it to be; sometimes he seems to 
subscribe only to the weak claim that his form of relativism is one of many competing 
theories that can explain the data (Ibid., p. 33), but sometimes he makes the much 
stronger claim that it provides the best explanation of the data (Prinz, 2006, p. 41). What 
I discuss below is whether the data gives us reason to believe in speaker relativism rather 
than absolutism: if, in the end, Prinz does not think that it does, my objection does not 
concern his argument. 
33 Prinz, 2006, p. 34. 
34 I will not try to sort out how the two descriptions of the theory – (i) moral beliefs 
are dispositions to have emotions, and (ii) moral beliefs refer to the property of causing 
these emotions in us – fit together. I will simply focus on the latter, clearly speaker 
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Do Prinz’s arguments succeed in supporting this relativist position? 
First, part of Prinz’s reasoning can be put to one side here. Remember, 
the purpose of this section is to discuss whether the contingent relation 
between moral judgements and emotions provides reason to accept 
speaker relativism. It seems to me that it is just such contingent rela-
tions that the empirical work Prinz presents can demonstrate. Prinz’s 
claim that it is evidence that moral judgements are necessarily connected 
to emotions seems wrong. The research on moral upbringing says 
something about how parents often actually go about the task of teaching 
children moral rules, but it cannot rule out that moral judgements can 
come about in other ways. And even though Prinz’s considerations about 
psychopaths are partly empirical (the part that psychopaths suffer from 
emotional deficits), they also include a conceptual part: that judgements 
made by psychopaths are not moral judgements. This might be a plausi-
ble conceptual claim, but it is still a conceptual and not an empirical 
claim. Thus it will be treated in the following sections. 
With this said, I think that we should acknowledge that empirical evi-
dence of the sort Prinz puts forward can serve as prima facie reasons to 
think that emotions play a role in the nature or content of moral judge-
ments in the way non-cognitivists and speaker relativists claim. Consid-
ered in isolation, the fact that emotions co-occur with and can cause 
moral judgements, and that they play important roles in moral upbring-
ing, seems to make this a good working hypothesis. If one wants to argue 
that emotions are not involved in the nature or content of moral judg-
ments, one has to point to considerations that disprove this hypothesis.  
The problem for Prinz’s argumentation is that such considerations 
are not hard to come by. We can begin to make this point by looking at a 
response to Prinz’s article by Karen Jones.35  Jones argues that even if it 
were the case that (certain) emotions are sufficient to produce moral 
judgements, this would not show that having (certain) emotions is suffi-
cient to have moral judgements. On her view, genuine moral judgements 
must be reason-responsive. So for P’s J to be a moral judgement, P has to 
let J respond to reasons, and give up J if she thinks there are no good 
reasons to accept it. Thus, for P’s J to be a moral judgement, Jones ar-
gues, P has to be willing to retract J if P finds out that she has J only be-
cause she is hypnotised to feel disgust when she reads the word ‘often’. If 
 
relativist, formulation and discuss if this is supported by the empirical data.   
35 Jones, 2006. 
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P does not give up J on this ground, this would show that P is willing to 
accept J knowing that there is no good reason to accept it.36 
We do not have to accept Jones’ specific view about what it takes to be 
a moral judgement to appreciate the general idea behind her objection to 
Prinz: what a moral judgement is caused by is one thing, the content of 
the judgement is another, and the first does not have to say much about 
the latter. More specifically, that moral judgements are caused by emo-
tions does not have to say much about what moral judgements are 
about.37  
This point is made also by Shaun Nichols. Like Prinz, Nichols cites 
empirical studies to argue that moral judgements are influenced by emo-
tions or sentiments: 
On the account of moral judgment I have suggested, if we had lacked senti-
ments such as reactive distress and concern, we would likely have exhibited a 
much different pattern of judgment about what we currently regard as the 
moral domain. Thus, there is some empirical support for the first Humean 
premise, that creatures who lacked certain emotions would not make the 
moral judgments we do.38 
Nichols, however, is more cautious in drawing metaethical conclusions 
from such empirical results. He specifically argues that we cannot con-
clude that some form of speaker relativism is true. Nichols points to 
empirical evidence that “moral objectivity is a default setting on com-
monsense metaethics”39; that is, children and many adults (college stu-
dents) think of moral properties as being objective or absolute, rather 
 
36 Or that P takes being hypnotised to feel disgust when she reads the word ‘often’ to 
be a good reason to accept J. But then J is not a moral judgement, according to Jones, 
since there are limits on what reasons one can give for J if J is to count as a moral 
judgement: “Moral judgements are answerable to relatively significant human interests, 
or to considerations of equality, respect, flourishing (including perhaps non-human 
flourishing) and their ilk […]” (Ibid., pp. 49-50). 
37 Moore appreciated this point. When he discusses the objection to speaker relativism 
that it implies that we never disagree over moral matters (which I consider in chapter 4), 
he writes: “It seems to me that this argument proves conclusively that, whatever we do 
mean, when we say that an action is right, we certainly do not mean merely that we 
ourselves have a certain feeling towards it. But it is important to distinguish carefully 
between exactly what it does prove, and what it does not prove. It does not prove, at all, 
that it may not be the case, that, whenever any man judges an action to be right, he 
always, in fact, has a certain feeling towards it, and even that he makes the judgement 
only because he has that feeling. It only proves that, even if this be so, what he is judging 
is not merely that he has the feeling.” (Moore, 1912, pp. 64-65). 
38 Nichols, 2004 187. 
39 Ibid., p. 189. 
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than relative.40 (I will not describe these experiments here since this is 
not needed to make the point I want to make.) What is the relevance of 
this to the question we are discussing here: whether the alleged fact that 
moral judgements are caused by emotions is an argument in favour of 
speaker relativism? As Nichols notes, some philosophers take the pre-
supposition that moral properties are objective to be built into our 
moral concepts.41 The best-known example is John Mackie, who argues 
on this basis that our moral concepts are concepts of objective moral 
properties, but since there are no objective moral properties, error-the-
ory is true: all positive moral judgements are false. The possibility that 
the presupposition that moral properties are objective or absolute is 
built into our moral concepts, means that even if it might be the case 
that moral judgements causally originate in emotions, this need not have 
any relativist implication about the contents of these judgements.42 
As Nichols notes, other philosophers (such as Harman) argue that 
even though many people think of moral properties as objective, since 
there are no objective moral properties we can and should interpret 
their moral judgements as being about relative moral properties. On 
this view, then, the absolutist presupposition is not built into our moral 
concepts.  
Which of these views is correct? This depends on two things; first, 
what is the exact nature of the objectivist presuppositions; second, what 
it is that makes a concept (and the words used to express it) have a cer-
tain content. If the correct view about content determination implies 
that the objectivist presuppositions are built into our moral concepts, 
then Prinz’s argument fails. This means that before we have investigated 
these two matters, the empirical evidence that moral judgements co-
occur and are caused by emotions provides no reason to prefer some 
form of speaker relativism to absolutism. 
I will not discuss these questions further here. In part 2, however, this 
matter will be in focus, and I will argue that given certain methodologi-
cal choices, it is plausible to hold that the absolutist presuppositions 
 
40 Ibid., pp. 173-76. 
41 Ibid., p. 190. 
42 The example of Mackie is not intended to suggest that only error-theorists can use 
such an argument. If the absolutist intuition is built into moral concepts, then whether 
any moral judgements are true depends on two things; first, the exact nature of the 
absolutist intuitions, what kind of absolute properties are moral judgements about; 
second, which kind of absolute properties that are instantiated in the world. 
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entertained by at least some people make it the case that they have abso-
lutist moral concepts. This, then, is consistent with the strong but 
contingent relations between moral judgements and emotions and moti-
vation that we have pointed to in this section: absolutism can acknowl-
edge that moral judgements are often affected by emotions, and even that 
they often and perhaps always arise from emotions. 
The contingent but strong relations between moral judgements and 
emotions, then, do not necessarily threaten absolutism. Before I close 
this section, let me argue briefly that absolutism is consistent also with 
plausible and common explanations of why moral judgements stand in 
these relations to emotions. On one level, the explanation lies in the 
ways we teach children moral rules referred to above. Considering how 
we teach our children moral language it is not very surprising that there 
is a strong connection between accepting certain moral judgements and 
having certain emotions and being motivated in certain ways.43 
The fact that we teach children moral thinking and language in this 
way does not, of course, tell us why we do this. One way to approach this 
issue is through the question of why human beings have acquired and 
maintained the faculty of making moral judgements. Why do we have a 
moral practice? A widely accepted story is that the evolutionary function 
of moral practice is that having the ability to think and talk about moral 
questions facilitates cooperation within a group of people, which, in 
turn, gives evolutionary advantages. Thus, Allan Gibbard writes:  
The chief biological function of normative discussion is to coordinate. Norma-
tive discussion allows for common enterprises and adjusts terms of reciprocity 
– both the friendly give-and-take of cooperative schemes and hostile standoffs 
with their threats and mutual restraint.44  
Now, for moral judgements to have this function of coordinating behav-
iour, they need to motivate the person who has them. Gibbard continues 
the passage above: 
For such a mechanism to work, two things are needed: tendencies toward 
consensus, and normative governance. Normative discussion must tend toward 
 
43 This is congenial to Copp’s claim that “The chief reason that we teach our children 
our moral values, and that we want our fellow citizens to share our moral values, is surely 
that we want them to govern their behavior accordingly. Our aim is not primarily that 
people simply agree with us in their judgments.” (Copp, 2001, p. 31). 
44 Gibbard, 1990, p. 76. 
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all accepting the same norms, and acceptance of norms must tend to guide ac-
tion.45  
A bit later he writes: 
there are great gains to be had from coordinating one’s actions and expecta-
tions with those of others. This coordination is fostered if one accepts the 
norms accepted by others, and acts on those norms.46 
If we were not motivated to follow the moral judgements we come to 
accept, having these judgements would not affect our actions, and could 
therefore not serve to coordinate our behaviour. This, then, could ex-
plain why, when we teach our children our moral values and norms, we 
are not content with them coming to accept these values and norms 
without any tendency to act in accordance with them. 
These two explanations of why we tend to be motivated in accordance 
with our moral judgements are equally compatible with absolutism as 
with speaker relativism (and non-cognitivism). Absolutists can either 
say that both function as explanations of why moral judgements, even 
though they are beliefs (that are not caused by emotions), are most often 
attended by motivation. We are simply brought up to care about and act 
in accordance with beliefs of that kind. And the evolutionary function of 
morality explains why parents bring up their children this way (and 
perhaps also why children are sensitive to this kind of upbringing). 
Alternatively, they can adopt the approach above and argue that these 
explanations might make it plausible that the productions of moral 
beliefs often involve emotions and motivating attitudes, but that this is 
consistent with absolutist views about the content of these beliefs.  
2.3  N e c e ss a ry C o n n e cti o n t o Em ot i o n s a nd 
M o ti v at i o n : M ot i v ati o n al  I nte r n alis m 
It is a common view that the motivational feature of moral judgements 
couples more easily with non-cognitivist theories than with cognitivist 
theories. This is a common view because it is thought that moral judge-
ments are not only accompanied by motivation most of the time, which 
is what the explanations above can account for; they are also necessarily 
accompanied by motivation. This is the view of motivational internal-
 
45 Ibid., my italics. 
46 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
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ists, according to whom it holds that, if an agent judges that she is mor-
ally obligated to perform an action, she will necessarily be motivated to 
perform the action.47 Non-cognitivist theories are often designed to 
handle this necessary condition. According to at least some of these 
theories, moral opinions are motivational states of some kind.  
According to cognitivists, on the other hand, moral opinions are be-
liefs. Given the traditional Humean picture that tells us that the relation 
between beliefs and motivation is contingent on the existence of desires, 
cognitivism is often thought to be more readily combined with motiva-
tional externalism than with motivational internalism. Motivational 
externalism denies that there is a necessary connection between moral 
judgements and motivation. The reason that we are most often moti-
vated in accordance with our moral judgements, on this view, is that 
most of the time, most of us want to do the right thing (and avoid to do 
the wrong thing). (An alternative externalist explanation of why most of 
the time we are motivated in accordance with our moral judgement 
would make use of the idea put forward in the previous section: that 
even though moral judgements are beliefs, in standard cases they arise 
from emotions. On this view, the moral judgements themselves would 
play no role in motivating us; it would be the emotions that cause the 
moral judgements to exist that motivate the judge to act.) 
The question in this chapter is whether speaker relativism (or certain 
forms of it) has some special or unique means – means that absolutist 
cognitivism lacks – to explain the way moral judgements are connected 
to motivation. For speaker relativism to have an advantage of this sort 
over absolutist forms of cognitivism, it seems that motivational inter-
nalism has to be correct. Externalist explanations of the motivational 
force of moral opinions are open to cognitivists of all sorts. Thus, if 
 
47 Motivational internalism is sometimes understood as a view about the connection 
between motivation and moral judgements understood as utterances, and sometimes as a 
view about the connection between motivation and moral judgements as mental states. 
Most of the time, I will speak about the connection between moral beliefs (that is mental 
states) and motivation. It is plausible to think that this idea is more basic: the connection 
there is between moral statements and motivation is due to the connection between 
moral mental states and motivation and the fact that moral statements are expressions of 
moral mental states. In general it is therefore also plausible to think that the connection 
between moral utterances and motivation is weaker than that between moral mental 
states and motivation. Even if moral mental states are intimately connected to 
motivation, moral utterances can be made in the absence of moral mental states, due to 
for example insincerity or lack of knowledge of one’s own moral mental states. (Cf, e.g. 
Eriksson, 2006 and Joyce, 2002). 
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motivational externalism is true, speaker relativism is not in a superior 
position to explain the connection. In most part of the rest of this chap-
ter I will therefore assume that internalism is correct, and ask whether 
this gives us any reason to accept speaker relativism. We will return to 
this assumption at the end of the chapter. 
Forms of internalism can be classified depending on how strong a 
connection they posit between moral judgements and motivation. Ac-
cording to the strongest form of motivational internalism, moral 
judgements necessarily lead to a decision to act: if one judges that an 
action is morally obligatory one will necessarily decide to perform that 
act.48 However, it is widely agreed that the connection is in fact not that 
strong. Other motivations can trump the motivation springing from the 
moral judgement. A more modest form of internalism states that the 
necessary connection pertains between moral judgements and motiva-
tion (not action). An agent who holds that an action is morally obliga-
tory need not be enough motivated to decide to perform that action, but 
she will necessarily be motivated to some extent.  
Nowadays it is, perhaps with a few exceptions49, also standardly ac-
knowledged that if we are to accept motivational internalism, we should 
not say that moral judgements necessarily and unconditionally are ac-
companied by motivation. That is, we should accept that in special cases, 
let us call them exception cases, no motivation to do what we judge to be 
right, arises at all. The reason generally given for why we should accept 
this is that it seems that there are, or at least could be, amoralists; peo-
ple who are not motivated in accordance with their moral opinions. The 
most commonly discussed cases are cases where something is psycho-
logically wrong with the agent, for instance that she is depressed. Mi-
chael Stocker introduces this kind of cases in the article “Desiring the 
Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology”: 
Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie, through weakness of 
body, through illness, through general apathy, through despair, through in-
ability to concentrate, through a feeling of uselessness or futility, and so on, 
one may feel less and less motivated to seek what is good. One’s lessened desire 
need not signal, much less be the product of, the fact that, or one’s belief that, 
there is less good to be obtained or produced […]. Indeed, a frequent added 
 
48 Hare, 1952 seems to come close to this position. 
49 See e.g. Lenman, 1999. 
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defect of being in such “depressions” is that one sees all the good to be won or 
saved and one lacks the will, interest, desire, or strength.50 
Stocker gives the following example: 
Recently, I read a story of what might be taken as typical of one course of life. 
It was said of this political figure that, in his youth, he cared a lot about the 
suffering of people in all parts of the world and devoted himself to making their 
lives better. But now he concerns himself only with the lives and fortunes of 
his close family and friends. He remembers his past, and he knows that there is 
still a lot he could do to help others. But he no longer has any desire so to do.51  
Stocker’s point is that it is perfectly conceivable that this politician still 
thinks that it would be right to devote himself to relieve “the suffering 
of people in all parts of the world”, but that he, due to, say, feelings of 
futility, simply cannot bring himself to desire to do so. Stocker’s exam-
ple and reasoning seems convincing enough. As John Eriksson notes: 
Indeed, it does seem conceivable that one may reach a point where any of the 
conditions mentioned by Stocker saps one’s motivation to do what one thinks 
right entirely. Some of us may even have personal experiences of this hap-
pening. When this happens we do not temporarily loose our values. Rather, we 
temporarily just cannot bring ourselves to care about them. Although I judge 
that I now ought to x, it seems possible that I remain wholly unmotivated to x 
due to e.g., severe depression.52 
In my discussion I will take for granted that amoralist cases of the kind 
that Stocker presents are plausible exception cases, and that speaker 
relativists (and others) who seek to explain the phenomenon of moral 
motivation should be able to account for them.53  In other words, I will 
assume that some form of conditional internalism is correct: moral judg-
 
50 Stocker, 1979, p. 744. 
51 Ibid., p. 741. 
52 Eriksson, 2006, p. 33. 
53 I will not take a stand on exactly which exceptions we should accept. For example, 
Dreier also accepts a second kind of case where moral judgements do not motivate, what 
he calls sadists: “The Sadists are a group of people who recognize what sorts of actions, 
states of affairs, characters, their society call “morally good.” They recognize them, but 
they hate them. They find those things repulsive and avoid them at all costs. In general 
they are not in the slightest motivated to perform those actions. Here is the way they put 
it: “We despise what is good because it is good. We believe the things you say are good are 
in fact, and we are never motivated to promote those things. Quite the opposite!” That is 
what the sadists say, and it seems as though it might be true.” (Dreier, 1990, p. 11) I’m 
not as convinced that this is a plausible exception case. It seems to me that it is at least as 
plausible to say that the sadists simply lack moral beliefs. This, however, is not something 
I will argue. 
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ments are necessarily accompanied by motivation under certain favour-
able conditions, such that the judge is not depressed.54 There are several 
reasons to assume here that some form of conditional internalism, 
rather than a stronger form, is true. First, it is the kind of internalism 
most philosophers, including speaker relativists, accept and which I 
find most plausible myself. Second, it is the view on moral motivation 
that makes the strongest case for speaker relativism. Conditional inter-
nalism has been argued to be hard to explain for both cognitivists and 
non-cognitivists (and anti-humean cognitivists). The former seems in-
capable of explaining the internalist part, that moral judgements 
necessarily motivate given certain conditions. Non-cognitivism (and 
anti-humean cognitivism), on the other hand, it has seemed to many, is 
wedded to the non-conditional forms of internalism. If moral judge-
ments were desires (or desire-like states), would we then not always be 
motivated in accordance with them?55 If speaker relativism can find a 
way to avoid both of these problems and accurately account for condi-
tional internalism this counts in favour of the theory. 
In what follows I discuss possible speaker relativist explanations of 
conditional internalism; I discuss the question if any form of speaker 
relativism can explain conditional internalism, and in such case which 
forms this holds for. In this discussion it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween what we can call actual system speaker relativism and ideal system 
speaker relativism. According to actual system speaker relativism, the 
truth-values of moral statements and beliefs vary directly with the mo-
rality of the speaker or believer. Roughly, “A is right” is true when spo-
ken (or believed) by P, only if P’s actual morality is in favour of A. Ideal 
system speaker relativism tells us that the truth-value of moral state-
ments and beliefs depends on the morality the speaker would have if her 
 
54 It might seem that the conditional element makes it unclear what distinguishes 
conditional internalism from externalism: externalists will also say that moral 
judgements necessarily motivate given certain conditions, e.g. given that the judge has a 
desire to act morally. I think we should say that what characterises conditional 
internalism is the following claim: there is a necessary connection under conditions C, 
where C is such that ordinary non-moral beliefs are not necessarily accompanied by 
motivation under C. I will not try to specify what conditions can count as C, but it seems 
clear that it fits the depression cases. A view according to which moral judgements 
necessarily motivate barring depression (and similar conditions) counts as a version 
conditional internalism, since ordinary non-moral beliefs are not necessarily accompanied 
by motivation to act in a certain way even when the believer is not depressed (or in a 
similar condition). 
55 See e.g. Smith, 1994, Smith, 1996. 
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actual morality were somehow corrected. On this view, “A is right” is 
true when spoken by someone whose corrected morality would be in 
favour of A.  
These two forms of relativism offer different ways to explain why 
moral judgements motivate. In what follows we will consider them in 
turn.  
2. 4  Actual  Syste m Spe a k e r  R el ati v i s m a nd M ot i v at i o n  
2. 4. 1  Dr eier ’ s ar gum e n t fr om motivat ion  
James Dreier argues that speaker relativism gains support from motiva-
tional internalism. The intuitive idea is explained in the following sim-
ple argument: 
Moral goodness is such that sincere judgment about it intrinsically motivates. 
But, which properties motivate depends on the psychology of the judging 
agent. 
So, which properties are the moral ones depends on the psychology of the 
agent.56 
Not all beliefs motivate the way moral beliefs about, say, rightness do. 
So they must have a special content; they must ascribe some property to 
actions that motivates us to perform the actions. But different people 
are motivated to do acts with different properties. Consequently, beliefs 
about moral rightness had by different people must ascribe different 
properties to actions. 
The mystery of intrinsic motivation is eliminated, the relativist points out, if 
only we will understand that each person judges morally according to her own 
moral standards. And, having moral standards is, at least in part, caring about 
things in a certain way. 57  
Let us look closer at the form of speaker relativism Dreier claims can 
demystify the intrinsic motivation of moral judgements. According to 
this view, moral terms are indexicals. Dreier handles such terms in 
accordance with Kaplan’s theory of indexicals.58 According to this theory 
the meaning of an indexical term is not to be identified with its content 
since the content varies with the context of the utterance. The content of, 
 
56 Dreier, 2006, p. 259. 
57 Ibid., pp. 259-60. 
58 Kaplan, 1989. 
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say, “it is cold here” uttered by someone in London is different from the 
content of an utterance of the same sentence by someone in New York. 
What is it then that makes ‘here’ have the same meaning in the two utter-
ances? According to Kaplan, what they share is a character. A character is 
a function from the context of the utterance to the content of the utter-
ance. The character of ‘here’ decides what content a statement involving 
‘here’ has in a certain context. It will, given the context, pick out a certain 
location, namely (in most cases) the location of the speaker. According 
to Dreier, what moral terms have in common when uttered by different 
people is their motivational character.  
If a term in some alien language has the character of “good” we can sensibly 
translate it as “good”. The alien community may not have the same motiva-
tions as we have, so the term we translate as “good” may not have the content 
of “good” as we use it. The character – what stays the same between one con-
text and another – determines the content in a context, and then the content 
determines the truth conditions of the sentences in which the term occurs. 59 
The character of moral terms, according to this view, is a function from 
the context of the utterance, of which the motivational system of the 
speaker is the relevant part, to the content of the utterance. The character 
of ‘good’ decides which content a statement involving ‘good’ has in a 
certain context. It will, given the context, pick out a certain property, 
namely a property that motivates the speaker in a certain way. Since 
different people have different motivations – different desires – the 
content of utterances of moral expressions will vary from person to 
person.  
The idea, then, is that when some speaker says, “A is morally right”, 
the reference of ‘morally right’ is a property of actions such that the 
speaker is motivated to perform actions that she believes to have that 
property. Suppose, for example, that the only property of actions that 
makes Torbjörn motivated to perform them is the property of maximiz-
ing wellbeing. When Torbjörn says “Eating meat is morally right”, ‘mor-
ally right’ refers to the property of maximizing wellbeing. The content of 
the sentence in that context of utterance, that is, uttered by a speaker 
with such a motivational setup, is that eating meat maximizes wellbeing. 
When uttered by a speaker with different desires, the reference of the 
moral terms will be different properties, such as being performed from 
a good intent. 
 
59 Dreier, 1990, p. 8. 
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Moral beliefs are connected to motivation in a corresponding manner, 
on Dreier’s view. When Torbjörn believes that eating meat is morally 
right, the content of his belief is that eating meat maximizes wellbeing. 
But the content is not all there is to the belief; it also has a character. 
Here is Dreier’s example:  
On a given occasion of use, “good” has a content equivalent to a certain de-
scriptive, naturalistic predicate. Suppose Max thinks, “to do A would be to do an 
act which is such and such,” where “such and such” is coextensive […] with 
“good” relative to the given context. That he has that thought has no logical 
connection to any action; for any belief with that sort of content, reason for 
action seems to come only with an accompanying desire. Suppose Max now 
comes to believe “to do A would be to do an act which is good.”60 
Internalism tells us that when Max has this belief, he will necessarily be 
motivated to do A (unless the situation is in some way non-normal). But 
how can this be so, given that ‘good’ in the context has the same content 
as an ordinary descriptive predicate? Dreier’s suggestion is the follow-
ing:  
[...] we should think […] that Max came to believe the proposition in a new 
way. Perry distinguishes “the sense entertained” by a person in a certain psy-
chological state from “the thought apprehended.” The latter designates a 
proposition, an object of belief. The former designates a way of believing, a 
mode of presentation. […] When Max comes to believe, “A is good,” he is in a 
psychological state which explains why he decides to pursue A. But “A is good” 
denotes no new object of belief, no new thought apprehended. Rather, Max 
comes to “entertain a new sense,” in Perry's terms; he has a thought with a 
new character, in Kaplan’s.61 
It is the character of moral beliefs, the way in which they are believed, 
and not their content, which explains their connection to motivation. 
Just like the character of the belief “it is hot here” makes it pick out a 
place through the location of the speaker, the character of moral beliefs 
makes them pick out a descriptive property through the motivational 
system of the speaker. 
The simple indexical relativism described this far is a form of actual 
system speaker relativism. On this view there is a very close connection 
between believing an act to be morally obligatory and being motivated. 
So it might seem that it can give us the wanted explanation of internal-
ism. Dreier thinks, however, that the kind of internalism this form of 
 
60 Ibid., p. 18. 
61 Ibid., p. 19. 
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speaker relativism implies is too strong. Relativistic theories of this 
kind seem committed to the view that our moral beliefs always motivate 
us (unless we are wrong about our own motivational states), that is, to 
non-conditional internalism. 
Since Dreier accepts a form of conditional internalism he rejects the 
simple form of indexical relativism, but argues that it can be modified 
to have the right implications regarding motivation. The solution is to 
be found in the fact that indexicals in general have complex characters. 
One example is the term ‘here’.  
Why not let “here” refer always to the position of the speaker at the time and 
world of utterance? But things are not so simple. Imagine that we are looking 
through a pile of papers for a train schedule. “It just isn’t here,” I say. “It’s 
here, it’s here,” you reply, “we just aren’t looking carefully.” Now, if the con-
tent of “here” were the location of the speaker, then, since we obviously have 
different locations, the theory of indexicals would have to tell us that we are 
not really disagreeing. But it is clear that there is a disagreement. So indexicals 
must function in a more subtle and complicated way than the simplest indexi-
cal account would allow.62  
Dreier continues: 
The point is that it is not merely ad hoc to introduce complexities into indexi-
cal semantics for moral terms. Natural language is not designed by logicians, 
and we should not suppose it will be simple and well behaved.63 
Indexicals in general have complex characters, that is, complex functions 
from the context of the utterance to the content. Thus, we should expect 
the same from moral terms, if they are indexicals. In what way does this 
help indexical relativism accommodate the fact that moral beliefs some-
times motivate and sometimes don’t? The idea is simple. The character 
of a moral term is such that sometimes, in the normal cases, it uses the 
motivational system of the speaker to pick out a property, and in other 
cases, the abnormal ones, it uses some other system to pick out the ref-
erent. In depression cases, the motivational system is one that the de-
pressed person has when he is not depressed. There is no reason to 
expect moral terms to behave simpler or more uniformly than this, 
since indexical terms in general don’t. Since the ensuing view claims that 
the truth-values of moral sentences are sometimes relative to the actual 
morality of the speaker and sometimes to an idealised version of it (e.g. 
 
62 Ibid., p. 23. 
63 Ibid. 
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as it would be if the person was not depressed), I will refer to it as mixed 
or complex system speaker relativism, 
At this point, before we go on to discuss Dreier’s view, it might be 
helpful to remind ourselves that what we are doing in this chapter is to 
assess the ability of speaker relativism to explain conditional internal-
ism. Many of us, I think, intuitively find the idea of moral terms as in-
dexicals obviously erroneous. We don’t intend the content of our moral 
statements to depend on our own context in the way we do when we use 
indexicals. For example, if I say, “Abortion is morally permitted”, I feel 
opposed to someone else who says, “Abortion is not morally permitted” 
in a way I do not when I say, “I am a philosopher” and someone else 
replies, “I am not a philosopher”. For sure, this mismatch with our 
intuitions is something every form of speaker relativism has to handle. 
We will return to this problem in chapter 4. What we can note now is 
that this should not directly disqualify the view; as noted in chapter 1, 
every hitherto suggested analysis of moral terms has implications that at 
least some find counterintuitive, and thus has some explaining to do. 
What we do in this chapter is to ask if a certain argument for speaker 
relativism works. If some form of speaker relativism can explain the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation in a good way, 
this seems enough for it to be a serious contender. 
I think that something like Dreier’s indexical relativism can indeed 
provide a plausible explanation of conditional internalism. If the charac-
ters of moral terms make their content depend on the speaker’s motiva-
tion (in normal cases), then we will (normally) be motivated by our 
moral judgements. It seems to me that the view has to be slightly modi-
fied to avoid certain problematic implications about moral motivation, 
however. Let’s turn to that. 
2. 4. 2  Mo di ficat ion  of  Dr eier ’ s  view 
Ordinary indexicals, like ‘I’, ‘me’ ‘here’ and ‘now’, have characters that 
make the content of sentences that contain any of them relative to the 
context of the utterance. If I say, “I am a philosopher”, ‘I’ thus refers to 
Ragnar Francén, the speaker in the context of utterance. Such indexicals 
also keep their character when they are placed in an intentional context, 
such as in a belief clause. So, if I say, “Mika believes that I am a philoso-
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pher”, ‘I’ refers to Ragnar Francén, the speaker in the context of utterance 
(and not to Mika).64 
It seems that a consequence of this is that any view that understands 
moral terms to be indexicals has counterintuitive implications when 
moral terms are used in intentional contexts. Streiffer describes the 
problem as follows: 
[…] if Speaker Relativism is true, then the proposition expressed by  
(S) Lying is immoral  
in a context will be, in part, about the morality of the speaker of that context, 
and this will remain true even if (S) occurs as part of a belief ascription. So 
Speaker Relativism implies that when (S) is embedded into a belief ascription 
such as  
(S) Bertrand believes that lying is immoral  
the proposition that (S) expresses in a context will be, in part, about the 
speaker’s morality. Thus, Speaker Relativism implies that when a speaker as-
serts (S), the speaker thereby ascribes a belief, viz., the belief that Bertrand 
believes that lying is immoral relative to the speaker’s morality, to Bertrand 
that is in part about the speaker's morality. But that seems manifestly false. 
Intuitively, a speaker’s assertion of (S) could be true even if Bertrand had no 
beliefs about the speaker’s morality. 65 
This result is indeed counterintuitive. When I say or think that someone 
else has a certain moral belief, this is not a statement or thought for 
which my own morality plays any role whatsoever in determining the 
content.  
Not only is the result counterintuitive: it also means that indexical 
relativism gets the connection to motivation wrong. This connection can 
be stated in two similar, but slightly different, ways.  
1. If Bertrand believes that lying is wrong, then he is motivated to 
avoid lying (at least in normal circumstances). 
2. If my belief or statement that Bertrand believes that lying is 
wrong is true, then Bertrand is motivated to avoid lying (at least 
in normal circumstances). 
 
64 See for example Kaplan, 1989. 
65 Streiffer, 1999, p. 17. 
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Dreier’s speaker relativism is designed to handle the first statement. 
However, as it stands, it cannot explain the second statement. On 
Dreier’s account, my utterance of the sentence  
(1) Bertrand believes that A is wrong,  
is true just in case 
(2) Bertrand believes that A has properties that make me want to 
avoid it, 
is true. But if this were the correct analysis of my statement, the truth of 
that statement would not in any way ensure that Bertrand is motivated 
to avoid lying. To get the right result (1) should be analysed so that it is 
true only if: 
(3) Bertrand believes that A has properties that make him want to 
avoid it.  
That is, ‘wrong’ in (1) has to refer to a property of actions that makes 
Bertrand, not me, want to do the action. It seems that to get the right 
result, moral terms would have to function as indexicals in non-inten-
tional contexts and as anaphors66 in intentional contexts.  
Consequently we should reject any analysis of moral terms which 
construes them as directly analogous to ordinary indexicals. However, 
contrary to Streiffer, I do not think that it shows that we should reject 
indexical relativism altogether. Dreier emphasizes in several places that 
indexical expressions are more complex than they are often made out to 
be. And even though Dreier does not use this idea to handle the problem 
at hand here, I think this can be done. There are other, more complex or 
flexible, indexical expressions than the standard examples, on which we 
can model moral terms. Consider the following sentences: 
(4) Majornas krog is a local pub.  
 
66 Whereas indexicals have their reference determined by the context of use, anaphors 
inherit their reference from an antecedent. In (3), for example, ’him’ is used as an 
anaphoric pronoun and inherits is reference from ’Bertrand’. 
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(5) These shoes are comfortable. 
At least in many contexts, ‘local’ in (4) refers to the property of being 
located in an area close to the speaker. Similarly, at least when (5) is 
uttered in certain contexts, ‘comfortable’ seems to refer to the property 
of feeling good to wear for a person, namely the speaker in the context of 
utterance. ‘Local’ and ‘comfortable’ thus seem to function like indexicals 
in such contexts. Now, consider the following sentences where these 
expressions figure in an intentional construction. 
(6) Niklas thinks that Majornas krog is a local pub. 
(7) Joakim thinks that these shoes are comfortable.  
At least on one natural reading, (6) ascribes to Niklas the belief that 
Majornas krog is a pub that lies close to him (not close to the speaker or 
believer of (6)). And (7) can express that Joakim thinks that the shoes feel 
good to wear for him (not for the speaker or believer of (7)). (The latter 
is perhaps even clearer in a sentence like, “Joakim hopes that his new 
shoes are comfortable”.) Thus, these terms seem to function like indexi-
cals in (at least some) non-intentional contexts and like anaphors in (at 
least some) intentional contexts.67 
My point is not that moral terms function exactly like ‘local’ or ‘com-
fortable’. The point, rather, is that many indexical expressions are more 
flexible than the standard examples, like ‘I’ and ‘here’. This means that 
there is room for indexical relativists to get the right result, both intui-
tively and regarding the connection to motivation. (The relativist could 
further offer an explanation of why moral terms display exactly the mix 
of indexical and anaphoric traits it does. Such an explanation would say, 
roughly, that the social and evolutionary function of moral terms de-
mand that motivation is connected to the believer of the moral claim: 
 
67 When Dreier illustrates the complexity of indexical terms he uses “nearby” as an 
example (Dreier, 1990, p. 23), a term that is similar to “local”. Dreier does not, however, 
use this terms specific features as a model for how to handle moral terms in belief 
clauses, but to exemplify the fact that indexicals in general do not always pick out their 
reference through the context of the speaker, which, as we have seen, is what allows him 
to say that his speaker relativism can explain conditional internalism. 
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not, for example, to someone who believes that someone else has a 
moral belief.) 68 
There are also forms of speaker relativism that do not treat any of the 
terms in moral sentences as indexicals that fit our intuitions about 
moral expressions in belief clauses. In his early characterisations, Har-
man sometimes describes his speaker relativism as a theory about the 
logical form of moral judgements: though the speaker and her motiva-
tions are not referred to by any of the terms explicitly mentioned in 
moral statements, in saying for example that A ought to do X the speaker 
says that she has certain motivational attitudes.69 One possible way to 
understand this idea is to compare moral sentences to a context-depend-
ent expression like ‘it’s raining’. On most occasions when someone says, 
“it’s raining”, though no term used in the sentence refers to a location, 
what she wants to say is that it is raining at her location. When we say, 
“Malin thinks that it is raining” often the place implicitly referred to is 
the place of Malin and not our own location.70 
The modification of Dreier’s view also allows speaker relativists to 
give what intuitively seems to be a correct statement of their view:  
When people say or think that an action is right, they say or think 
different things; each of them says or thinks that the action is 
such that her own morality (motivational system) allows it. 
 
68 Such a flexible view on context-dependence might also help speaker relativists reply 
the possible complaint that they cannot handle moral questions. Suppose that A asks B, 
(1) “would it be wrong of me to X?”. It might be thought that speaker relativists are 
committed to the view that A asks B whether X is forbidden by A’s morality. This would 
be a strange result. But speaker relativists can reply. First, sometimes such questions are 
used interchangeably with, (2) “do you think it would be wrong for me to X?”. In those 
cases, speaker relativists can use the idea that moral terms work differently in intentional 
contexts to get the wanted result. Second, it seems that we seriously ask someone 
questions like (1) (when we are not merely after (2)), only when we expect that the other 
person has a morality that substantially overlaps our own (at least when it comes to cases 
that are similar to the specific action or action-type at hand). For we ask such questions 
(in that serious way) only when we expect that the other person can give us advice that 
we would find acceptable. 
69 Harman, 1975, pp. 8-11. 
70 There is a large discussion about how we should understand expressions like “it is 
raining” and “local”. The debate basically concerns to which extent the contextual 
dependence is a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon. We need not go into this matter 
here. For some contributions to the debate, see, Perry, 2001, Cappelen and Lepore, 
2005a, Cappelen and Lepore, 2005b, Recanati, 2002, Recanati, 2005, Stanley, 2000. 
First Road to Relativism: Emotions and Motivation 
51 
On Dreier’s original position, this would make as little sense as: 
When people say or think that I am a philosopher, they say and 
think different things; each of them says and thinks that she her-
self is a philosopher. 
On our modified indexical analysis, on the other hand, it is as reason-
able as: 
When people say or think that X is a local bar, they say or think 
different things; each of them says or thinks that X is close to 
herself. 
Or: 
When people say or think that a pair of shoes is comfortable, they 
say or think different things; each of them says or thinks that the 
pair of shoes feels good for herself to wear.  
The modified version of speaker relativism thus seems better fitted to 
account for the way moral statements and beliefs function. I think that it 
also provides a better understanding of Dreier’s way of handling the 
cases where moral beliefs are not accompanied by motivation. Let us 
again compare moral terms to ‘comfortable’. Suppose a sales clerk in a 
shoe store says, “these are our most comfortable shoes”. You look at the 
sales clerk’s shoes and say, “But why don’t you wear them yourself, 
then?”. “I would” she replies, “if I didn’t have exceptionally wide feet”. 
‘Comfortable’, in the clerk’s first statement, should plausibly not be 
taken to mean “feels good to wear for me”, “feels good to wear for us” or 
“feels good to wear for everyone”. Rather, it means something like, 
“feels good to wear for people with normally built feet”. This is analo-
gous to Dreier’s claim about moral terms. In normal situations, situa-
tions where the speaker is not affected by depression or the like, “A is 
right” means roughly “A has properties that makes me want to do it”. 
But when the speaker is affected by depression or the like, she can use 
“A is right” to mean roughly “A has properties that would make me 
want to do it, if I did have normally functioning motivational mecha-
nisms”. 
In this subsection I have argued that if speaker relativism models 
moral terms on ordinary indexicals, it is unable to handle moral terms 
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in intentional contexts. I suggested a way of solving this problem. I also 
argued that modifying speaker relativism in the manner proposed, im-
proves our understanding of Dreier’s way to explain the cases where 
moral judgements do not motivate. 
In the two following subsections I will argue that the kind of explana-
tion Dreier’s indexical relativism gives of conditional internalism 
works equally well for certain other forms of speaker relativism.  
2. 4.3  S ubje c t iv i sm wil l  do as wel l  
Dreier argues that the way his indexical relativism accounts for the con-
nection between moral judgements and motivation, cannot be used by 
the forms of speaker relativism often referred to as “subjectivism”. If 
this is so, it puts a restriction on which forms of speaker relativism that 
can be supported by an argument from motivation. However, I will ar-
gue that it is not so.  
According to the form of subjectivism Dreier considers, which he 
calls Moral Sense Theory, “x is good” means “x is such as to be approved 
of by those who share our moral viewpoint under suitable conditions”. 
Dreier objects to relativist theories of this kind that they cannot explain 
why we are motivated in accordance with our false moral beliefs as well 
as in accordance with our true ones. This indeed seems problematic; 
intuitively it is having a moral belief that makes one motivated to act, 
not that the belief is true. The reason that this problem is attached with 
any such theory, according to Dreier, is that since “it makes moral be-
liefs about our motivations, so it should allow that where the belief is 
false we lose the connection to motive.”71 If my believing that A is right 
is the same as my believing that I desire A, then if my belief is false, this 
is because I don’t desire A. And in that case, I will not be motivated to do 
A.  
According to Dreier, his indexical relativism does not have this con-
sequence. The idea seems to be the following. On his account, the reason 
that moral beliefs are accompanied by motivation is not that these be-
liefs have certain contents. The reason is, rather, the special way in 
which we believe them, their character. And since false moral beliefs 
have the same character as true ones, they are connected to motivation in 
the same way. 
 
71 Dreier, 1990, p. 16. 
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I will argue contrary to this that at least some forms of subjectivism 
and Dreier’s indexical relativism can handle the connection to motiva-
tion equally well. Let us first distinguish between two forms of subjec-
tivism. 
Action-subjectivism: For P to believe that X is right is for P to be-
lieve: P desires X. 
Property-subjectivism: For P to believe that A is right is for P to be-
lieve: A has a property that P desires actions to have.  
These are forms of subjectivism, and not forms of indexical relativism, 
since they make “moral beliefs about our motivations”. It is not clear 
whether “Moral Sense Theory”, as described above, is a form of action-
subjectivism or a form of property-subjectivism. (The differences be-
tween these forms of subjectivism and Moral Sense Theory – that the 
latter makes moral judgements about the desires or approval of those 
who share our moral viewpoint, and that it adds the clause “under suitable 
conditions” – are irrelevant to the question we are now considering.) In 
what follows, when I argue that Dreier fails to establish a difference 
between subjectivism and indexical relativism, I will handle the two 
forms of subjectivism in turn and then return to Dreier’s indexical rela-
tivism.  
Action-subjectivism does indeed have the counterintuitive conse-
quence that all false moral judgements are disconnected from motiva-
tion. Yet, it is not at all clear that Dreier’s argument against this form of 
subjectivism succeeds. What is clear is that action-subjectivism has 
counterintuitive implications about which beliefs are true and which 
are not. Normally when we are engaged in a moral discussion we do not 
think of people’s moral judgements as false on the ground that they con-
flict with the speaker’s own morality. Rather, it seems, intuitively we 
tend to see other speakers’ moral statements as mistaken or false when 
the statement is not in line with our own morality, since this is the moral-
ity we take to be correct. This is something subjectivists have to explain 
in order to defend their view. Now, suppose subjectivists can explain 
away the intuitions in question. If so, they will be able to say that even 
though, on the correct analysis of moral judgements, it is true that false 
moral beliefs are not accompanied by motivation, intuitively false moral 
beliefs are accompanied by motivation just like intuitively true moral 
beliefs are. The real challenge to subjectivism in play here then, lies in 
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the counterintuitive implications it has for true and false moral beliefs. 
Matters like this will be in focus in chapter 4. The main point here is 
that, if subjectivists can handle them, the connection between false 
moral beliefs and motivation poses no extra or independent problem. (It 
might seem that one problem remains though: on subjectivism, moral 
beliefs that are due to false beliefs about our own motivation will not 
motivate. As we will see, this is one way to understand Dreier’s objec-
tion. I will return to this in a moment.) 
Let us turn to property-subjectivism. Theories of this kind do not im-
ply that every false moral belief is disconnected from motivation. On 
these theories, moral beliefs will sometimes be unaccompanied by mo-
tivation because the believer is mistaken about her desires. This will be 
so in situations that have the following features: 
(i) P believes that an action, A, has some properties, E1, E2 and E3, 
and does not believe that it has any other properties.  
(ii) P believes that she desires actions to have at least one of these 
properties.  
(iii) But, as a matter of fact, she does not have any such desire.  
Since P believes that she desires that actions have some of the properties 
she as a matter of fact believes action A to have ((i) and (ii)), she will 
believe that A is right. But she does not have any such desire ((iii)), so 
she will not be motivated to do A. Whether her non-motivating moral 
belief is true or not, depends on whether A actually has some property 
that P actually desires actions to have. If A has some property, E4, that P 
desires actions to have, then her moral belief is true. If A does not have 
some such property, it is false. It is not the case, however, that all false 
moral beliefs fail to motivate on this form of subjectivism. My false 
moral beliefs can be a result of my ignorance of the actual properties of 
the action in question. Even though I actually desire that actions have the 
properties I take A to have, A in fact lacks these properties. In this case, I 
will be motivated to perform A. The problematic cases, then, if they are 
indeed problematic, are not false moral beliefs but moral beliefs that 
are based on false beliefs about motivation.  
Furthermore, the same is true about Dreier’s indexical relativism. 
Suppose that I am wrong about my desires as specified by (i) through 
(iii): I believe that I desire that actions have one of the properties I take A 
to have; but actually, I don’t have any such desire. Since I know how to 
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use moral terms according to their character (and how to form the cor-
responding moral beliefs), I will say (and believe) that A is right. But 
since I actually don’t desire actions to have any of the properties I take A 
to have, I will not be motivated to do A. (And whether my belief is true 
or not depends on whether A has any of the properties I desire actions to 
have.) So, also Dreier’s indexical relativism implies that some moral 
beliefs will not motivate because they are based on false beliefs about 
our desires.  
Here is an example. Peter’s moral standards (the motivational states 
that the truth-values of his moral beliefs are relative to) are such that 
they motivate him to perform actions if and only if he thinks that they 
maximize wellbeing. Peter is aware of this. Now, along comes an evil 
hypnotist and makes Peter believe for one hour that he (Peter) has a 
Kantian moral standard. Peter now falsely believes that his moral stan-
dards are such that they motivate him to perform an action if and only it 
is a way of treating people as an end and not as a mere means. During 
this hour Peter’s actions are still guided by his utilitarian moral stan-
dards. Now suppose that Peter is thinking about whether to tell a lie or 
not. On indexical relativism and subjectivism, since he takes lying to be 
in conflict with the Kantian morality he believes that he has, he will 
think that it would be wrong of him to tell the lie. (Much like I, when I 
believe that I am in Paris but actually am in Gothenburg, hold true the 
sentence “The Eiffel Tower is here, in this town”. We form utterances 
and beliefs involving indexicals on basis of the context we take ourselves 
to be in.) However, since he takes the lie to have good consequences, he 
will not have any motivation to avoid this lying (at least not any motiva-
tion that comes from his actual, utilitarian moral standards). Conse-
quently this is a case where indexical relativism, as well as subjectivism, 
implies that the believer is not motivated in line with his moral belief, 
because he has based the moral belief on a false view about his own 
motivation. 72  
 
72 It might be thought that something must be wrong with my description of this case. 
Since the content of ‘wrong’ is determined by the speaker’s actual morality, the content 
of Peter’s moral belief that telling the lie would be wrong is that telling the lie would not 
maximize wellbeing. This, we have now supposed, is a claim that Peter rejects. This is 
how it should be, however. When we use indexicals and are wrong about the relevant 
aspects of the context of utterance, this is the result we get. The content of my belief that 
the Eiffel Tower is here, for example, is that the Eiffel Tower is in Gothenburg.  
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The conclusion I wish to stress here is that the ability to explain the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation does not distin-
guish Dreier’s indexical relativism from subjectivism, at least not from 
property-subjectivism. That is, if one of these theories gains support 
form its ability to explain internalism, the other does so as well.  
It is another question whether the fact that these theories have the im-
plication pointed to above – that the moral beliefs we have because we 
are mistaken about our motivation are not accompanied by motivation – 
is something that counts against the theories. There are several reasons 
to doubt that this is a serious problem, though. First, the marginal cases 
where moral beliefs are based on false beliefs about our own motivation 
are rare enough to escape our attention: the reason that we do not intui-
tively allow for this kind of unmotivating moral beliefs could be that 
they practically never occur. Second, I doubt that we have clear enough 
intuitions about these cases to ground a strong argument. Thirdly, the 
question of how to describe our beliefs in moral terms in such marginal 
cases (e.g. does Peter believe that telling the lie would be wrong or that it 
would be right?) might not even have a determinate answer. There seems 
to be little reason to think that we have had any interest to develop and 
use a concept of moral beliefs that is definite in this respect. Indexical 
relativism could be construed as the idea that in non-marginal cases where 
the speaker or believer is not mistaken about her morality or motiva-
tion, moral terms function like indexicals of some sort. 
Even though these short remarks hardly settles the question, they 
suggest that the objection under consideration, as it stands, gives us no 
reason to doubt that indexical relativism and subjectivism can give 
satisfactory accounts of motivational internalism.  
2. 4. 4   S i m p le  ac t ual  sys te m r elat iv ism mig h t  d o as wel l  
As we saw, Dreier abandons simple actual system relativism because he 
believes that this view implies a too strong connection between moral 
beliefs and motivation. If the contents of all moral beliefs are relative to 
our actual desires we would always (unless mistaken about our own 
desires) be motivated in accordance with our moral beliefs. This is also 
a standard objection to non-cognitivism. It seems that the view that 
moral judgements are motivational states of some kind cannot account 
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for the exception cases where moral judgements are not accompanied by 
motivation.73  
But perhaps this is not so. At least some non-cognitivists seem to be 
conditional internalists. That is, they accept that moral judgements are 
desires, or motivational mental states of some other kind, but still think 
that there are cases where moral judgements do not motivate, for exam-
ple due to depression.74 
How can this be so? If moral judgements are desires, and not all 
moral judgements motivate, the idea must involve the claim that desires 
do not necessarily motivate. Here is one idea about how this could be.75  
According to a common idea, desires are dispositions to be motivated. 
This might be thought to imply that non-cognitivism does not allow for 
exception cases. This need not be so, however. For example, the fragility 
of a glass is not accurately captured by the simple conditional that the 
glass will break if struck: there will be loads of exceptions to this, for 
example, the glass might not break if it is wrapped in a towel.  
If this is how it is with dispositions in general the same can be ex-
pected to hold for desires. For me to have the desire to drink a cup of 
coffee, according to this idea, is for me to be motivated to drink x if I 
think x is a cup of coffee, under normal conditions (that is, if I am not de-
pressed or similar). The desire is a motivational state of mind, but cer-
tain conditions, such as depressions, can prevent that motivational state 
of mind from actually leading to motivation. 
If we think of desires and other motivational states in this way, there 
is no longer an obvious conflict between non-cognitivism and cases 
where people are not motivated by their moral opinions. Recall 
Stocker’s example with the politician who is no longer motivated to 
help suffering people though he still judges this to be the right thing to 
do. The idea we are considering now allows non-cognitivists to say that 
the politician’s depression prevents his moral opinion, which is a moti-
vational state of mind, from actually motivating him.76 
 
73 See Shafer-Landau, 2003, Smith, 1994, p. 137, Smith, 1996, p. 73. 
74 See Blackburn, 1984, Blackburn, 1998, Gibbard, 1993, pp. 318-19.  
75 Cf. Eriksson, 2006, pp. 172-85 and Björnsson, 2002. 
76 We might see one worry with this account. The way Stocker describes the politician, 
he no longer has the desire to help others. And there seems to be something to this 
description of the case. Intuitively the politician can truthfully say that he still really 
thinks that it would be right of him to dedicate himself to helping others. But if he said 
that he still really desires or wants to do this, we would be more sceptical. The upshot 
seems to be that moral opinions cannot be desires. I will argue later however (in footnote 
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Gunnar Björnsson gives the following argument for this view on 
moral judgements: 
A moral optation is a state that affects action in specific ways under ‘normal’ 
or ‘ideal’ conditions for affecting action, and listlessness is hardly such a condi-
tion. Listlessness and depression are general motivational disorders that lower 
energy levels and one’s motivation to do anything, including mischief. This 
generality suggests that it is not particular optations that are lacking in the 
listless or depressed, but general means for their enactment.77  
If it is not specific motivational states (or “optations”) that are missing 
in the depressed (or people suffering from similar conditions), then the 
fact that depressed individuals are not motivated in accordance with 
their moral judgments is no threat to the view that moral judgments are 
to be identified with motivational states of some sort. So if this is the 
correct view of the connection between depression and motivational 
states, this can be used by actual system speaker relativists as well as by 
expressivists to make their position consistent with conditional inter-
nalism. Instead of saying, as Dreier does, that terms have complex 
characters picking out the referent in different ways in normal and non-
normal (e.g. depression) cases respectively, the relativist might say that 
moral terms always pick out their referent through the actual moral 
motivational states, but that in the non-normal cases, these do not lead 
to motivation in the judge.  
Let us sum up what has been said about relativism and moral motiva-
tion so far. I have argued that Dreier’s form of mixed system speaker 
relativism, if amended in the right manner, can provide an explanation 
of conditional internalism. I have also argued that this seems to hold 
also for certain forms of subjectivism, and suggested that it might hold 
for actual system speaker relativism. We will now turn to ideal system 
forms of speaker relativism. 
2.5 Ide al  Syste m Sp e a k e r  R el ati v i s m a nd M oti v at i o n  
2.5.1  I deal  syst em s p ea k er  r elat ivi sm 
According to ideal system speaker relativism the truth-values of moral 
utterances and beliefs depend on how the speaker or believer’s morality 
 
90), that this need not be a problem. 
77 Björnsson, 2002, p. 336. 
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would be if it were corrected to become more coherent. My belief that 
an action is wrong is true if my system of attitudes would contain a nega-
tive attitude towards the action if the system were corrected.  
Both Harman and Wong defend such forms of relativism. According 
to Harman, the truth-conditions of moral judgements are relative to a 
moral framework that is determined by the judge’s values.78 Harman 
makes clear that we are not to understand this so that the moral frame-
work, 
that is determined by a person’s own values [is] in general […] identified with 
all and only exactly those very values. Otherwise a person could never be mis-
taken about moral issues […] except by being mistaken about his or her own 
values”79. 
Instead moral frameworks are sets of corrected values. A person’s cor-
rected values are, 
values that would result if the person were rationally to revise his or her values 
in the light of the facts, adjusting the values in order to make them more co-
herent with each other and with the facts.80 
Now, according to Harman the process of rationally changing one’s 
values is a conservative business. This means that the values which re-
sult from such a process depends on the values we start out with. This is 
why different people’s moral frameworks can be different, and conse-
quently why Harman’s theory is a form of relativism. (Wong’s form of 
ideal system relativism is described in section 3.3.1.) 
According to theories of this kind there is no direct link between the 
content of a moral belief and the actual motivation of the believer: it is 
not the actual motivational states that determine the content. It is there-
fore less obvious how such theories could help explain that someone 
who has a moral belief actually is motivated in accordance with that 
belief, rather than just explain that she would be motivated if she were 
 
78 Actually, Harman’s statement of relativism is more complex than this. His idea is 
not that the truth-conditions of moral judgements are relative, but that this is how they 
have to be understood for the purpose of assigning truth conditions: “For the purpose of 
assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, it would be morally wrong of P to D, has 
to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to moral framework M, 
it would be morally wrong of P to D. Similarly for other moral judgments.”(Harman, in 
Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 4) This complexity will not matter in this chapter, 
however. I return to the issue of how to interpret Harman’s relativism in chapter 3 and 7. 
79 Harman, in Ibid., p. 13. 
80 Harman, in Ibid., p. 14. 
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more rational. This might be why neither Harman nor Wong uses the 
motivational feature of moral judgements as an argument for their re-
spective forms of relativism. Indeed, I know of no ideal system relativist 
who does this.  
But ideal system relativism shares the idea of an ideal system analysis of 
moral language and thought with some forms of absolutism and it has 
been argued that such theories can account for the connection between 
moral judgements and motivation. Let us consider an argument to this 
effect given by Michael Smith, and see how speaker relativists can use 
this. 
2.5.2  S mit h ’ s  ex p l anation  of c on di t ional  in t er nalism 
Smith offers an ideal system analysis and argues that it implies a version 
of conditional internalism. According to Smith, moral beliefs are be-
liefs about moral reasons and beliefs about moral reasons are one kind 
of beliefs about normative reasons. Judgements about normative rea-
sons, according to his analysis, are judgements about what fully rational 
people would desire that we, less than fully rational people, do. His 
ideal system analysis reads as follows: 
ISA: For P to believe that she has a normative reason to perform a 
certain action, A, under some specific circumstances, C, is for P 
to believe that if she were fully rational she would desire that she 
performs A in C.81 
Roughly (and there is no reason to give a closer description here), ac-
cording to Smith, a fully rational person has no false beliefs, all relevant 
true beliefs, a maximally coherent set of desires and is practically ra-
tional (deliberates correctly in forming new desires). 
 
81 Notice that, according to this analysis, my beliefs about what I have normative 
reason to do are beliefs about what I would, if rational, want myself to do given that I am 
not fully rational. They are not about what I would, if rational, want myself to do given 
that I am fully rational. If we let ‘P’ refer to ‘P as he actually is’, and ‘P+’ refer to ‘P if fully 
rational’, then the analysis states that if P believes that she has a normative reason to do 
A, then P believes that P+ would desire that P (not P+) does A. Another way of putting 
this is to say, with Smith, that the normative beliefs we have in this world, call it ‘the 
evaluated world’, are beliefs about what we in the evaluating world, the world where we 
are fully rational, desire that we do in the evaluated world. 
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Smith argues that this analysis can explain conditional internalism. 
He dubs his preferred version of internalism ‘the practicality require-
ment on moral judgement’: 
If P believes that she has normative reason to do A in C, then 
either it is true that P is motivated to do A in C, or that P is 
practically irrational.  
This is certainly intuitively plausible. Not to be moved by one’s norma-
tive beliefs seems to be a kind of practical irrationality.  
Smith argues that his analysis of moral judgements can explain the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation as specified by 
the practicality requirement. It can, because 
Failing to desire to do x in C, while believing that one’s ideal self would desire 
that one do x in C, is a form of incoherence that signals practical irrational-
ity.82 
To bring forth the intuitive appeal of this idea, he asks us to 
suppose we believe that we would desire to x if we were fully rational and yet 
fail to desire to x. Are we irrational? We most certainly are. And by our own 
lights. For we fail to have a desire that we believe it is rational for us to have.83 
2 .5.3 S mit h ’ s  ex p l anation  an d  s p ea k er  r elat ivi sm  
Smith’s analysis (ISA) as characterised above is neutral between relativ-
ism and absolutism. It says nothing about whether all people would 
desire the same things if rational. Smith argues to the effect that people’s 
desires would converge if they were rational, but what is the conse-
quence if this is not so? In fact, ISA has to be completed if we are to 
answer this question. The analysis as it stands concerns only moral 
beliefs about the believer’s own actions. It could be completed to also 
say something about other-concerning beliefs in two different ways: 
ISA’: For P to believe that Q has a normative reason to perform a 
certain action, A, under some specific circumstances, C, is for P 
to believe that if P were fully rational she would desire that Q 
performs A in C. 
 
82 Smith, 2001, p. 257. 
83 Smith, 1994, p. 177. 
First Road to Relativism: Emotions and Motivation 
62 
ISA’’: For P to believe that Q has a normative reason to perform a 
certain action, A, under some specific circumstances, C, is for P 
to believe that if Q were fully rational she would desire that she 
performs A in C. 
If the desires of fully rational people do not converge, ISA’’ implies 
agent-relativism. What we believe when we believe that some person’s 
action is right is that that person would desire to do that action if ra-
tional. Thus, each agent’s actions would be judged according to her own 
desires. ISA’, on the other hand, results in speaker relativism if the de-
sires of fully rational people do not converge. On this analysis, when I 
believe that some person’s action is right, what I believe is that I, if I 
were rational, would desire that person to act accordingly. If your de-
sires and my desires about P’s actions would be different if we were 
rational, then our utterances (and beliefs) of the sentence “it was right of 
P to do A” could have different truth-values.84 
This means that speaker relativism is consistent with ISA. One con-
sequence of this is that speaker relativists can use Smith’s explanation of 
conditional internalism: motivational internalism concerns self-regard-
ing beliefs and ISA’ (and ISA’’) is equivalent to the original ISA when it 
comes to these beliefs.  
Smith’s view and argument that it can explain conditional internalism 
has been much discussed and criticized.85 We need not get into this dis-
cussion here, however. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
whether speaker relativism can gain support from its ability to explain 
the connection between moral judgements and motivation. And it 
should be obvious that it cannot do that through adopting Smith’s strat-
egy, since absolutists of Smith’s kind can use this kind of explanation of 
conditional internalism as well. 
Let us sum up what we have said so far. In the previous section I ar-
gued that actual-system relativist explanations have a large chance of 
 
84 We will see in chapter 6 that Smith argues that, if it is indeed a fact that the desires 
of fully rational people do not converge, then there are no moral facts at all. In other 
words, in such case, an error-theory is correct. This means that ISA is not a fully adequate 
presentation of Smith’s analysis of moral judgements. The analysis should instead read as 
follows: For P to believe that she has a normative reason to perform a certain action, A, 
under some specific circumstances, C, is for P to believe that if she were fully rational she 
would desire that she performs A in C and that every other fully rational person would desire 
so as well. 
85 See e.g. Arpaly, 2000, Dreier, 1996, Sayre-McCord, 1997b, Shafer-Landau, 1999. 
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working. In this section I have argued that even if it turns out that ideal-
system relativist explanations work, this gives no reason to accept 
speaker relativism, since the explanation works for Smith’s form of 
absolutism as well. In next section I will argue for the latter conclusion 
more generally; the ability to account for motivational internalism is no 
reason to accept speaker relativism, since absolutist theories (not just 
Smith’s view) have this ability as well. 
2.6  A bs olutists C a n D o It T o o -  D e D i ct o I nte r n alis m 
Why is motivational internalism thought to be hard to explain for cogni-
tivists? As we have seen, (humean) cognitivists, as well as non-cognitiv-
ists (and anti-humean cognitivists) can explain why moral judgements 
are accompanied by motivation most of the time. They can refer to the 
fact that when we teach our children moral vocabulary, we do this at the 
same time as we teach them certain moral norms and try to influence 
them to act in accordance with these moral norms. This makes it plau-
sible that even if moral judgements are beliefs, it is only natural that they 
are often accompanied by motivation, simply because parents more or 
less succeed in their moral upbringing. 
But, internalists say, we have the intuition that moral judgements are 
necessarily accompanied by motivation. This is a problem for cognitiv-
ism since ordinary beliefs are not necessarily accompanied by motiva-
tion, not even in normal cases. Therefore, it is generally thought that in 
order to account for these internalist intuitions, cognitivists have to 
argue that moral beliefs are special in some sense: either that their con-
tent or character is special (this is what Smith and Dreier argues) or that 
they are a special kind of beliefs that can also motivate (thus becoming 
anti-humeans). In line with this, motivational internalism is often 
thought of as the idea that it is either due to the nature or content (or 
character) of moral mental states, that these necessarily (at least in nor-
mal cases) are connected to motivation.  
If these are the only ways to account for motivational internalism, 
then it seems that cognitivists of many sorts cannot do that: the content 
they ascribe to moral beliefs is not sufficient to yield such a necessary 
connection. But this is not the only way to think of the necessary connec-
tion. In his article “De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism” Jon Tresan argues 
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extensively to this effect.86 He introduces the idea through the following 
analogy: 
De dicto necessity about planets: Necessarily, planets are accompa-
nied by stars. 
De re necessity about planets: Planets are necessarily accompanied 
by stars.  
De dicto necessity about planets is the claim that if something is a 
planet, it orbits a star. That is, for any object that actually is a planet, it is 
impossible that it actually does not orbit a star. This seems to follow 
from the concept of a planet. De re necessity about planets is the claim 
that if something is a planet it could not have failed to orbit a star. This, 
on the other hand, seems false. For any object that actually is a planet, 
that object could have not orbited a star (in which case, of course, it 
would not have been a planet). That is, for any object that actually is a 
planet and therefore actually orbits a star, there is a possible world 
where that object does not orbit a star.  
De dicto necessity without de re necessity is not a rare phenomenon. 
For example, a skin condition must actually be caused by solar radiation 
to count as an instance of sunburn, but any such instance could have 
been caused by something else, in which case it would not have been a 
sunburn. And firing of a gun has to actually have certain consequences (a 
death) to count as a killing, but that firing of a gun could have not caused 
a death, in which case it would not have been a killing. (If you think that 
a killing consists both of the act that causes the death and the death, then 
this example will not work for you; think of a killing shot instead.) 
The necessity in motivational internalism can also be understood 
either as a de dicto or as a de re necessity. 
De dicto internalism: Necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied 
by motivation.  
De re internalism: Moral beliefs are necessarily accompanied by 
motivation.87 
 
86 Tresan, 2006. 
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De re internalism is the claim that if something is a moral belief, then 
that belief could not have been unaccompanied by motivation. De dicto 
internalism, on the other hand, is the claim that if something is a moral 
belief, then that belief actually has to be accompanied by motivation. 
This claim allows for the possibility that the belief that actually is a 
moral belief, could have been unaccompanied by motivation, in which 
case it would not have been a moral belief.  
It is de re internalism that seems, at least prima facie, hard for cogni-
tivists to explain. According to cognitivism, moral beliefs are regular 
beliefs. It is, for sure, possible for any ordinary belief to be accompanied 
by motivation, but the problem is that, since beliefs are not motivating 
mental states, any such belief could have been unaccompanied by moti-
vation. Thus, de re internalism seems difficult to account for cognitiv-
ism.  
How about de dicto internalism? It seems that any form of cognitiv-
ism can accept this position. Whatever the cognitivist says is the content 
(or character) of a moral belief (say, the belief that an action is morally 
obligatory) she can say that for a belief to be a moral belief it does not 
suffice that it has that content (or character); in addition, it has to be 
accompanied by motivation (in normal cases). Tresan further explains 
this idea. He describes cognitivism as the view that moral judgements 
are representations of certain properties. 
But, for all de dicto Internalist Cognitivism says, we can represent those prop-
erties without having the conations. It just tells us that, then, the representa-
tions would not be moral beliefs. Just for instance, de dicto Internalism is con-
sistent with the property of rightness being a perfectly natural property—e.g. 
optimificity. That property is clearly not intrinsically action-guiding: represen-
tations of it can exist unaccompanied by the relevant pro-attitudes. De dicto 
Internalism tells us not that such representations are impossible, but that they 
aren’t moral beliefs. Likewise, wishful beliefs require conations but are about 
modally uninspiring properties. Those properties could be represented without 
the relevant conations, though such representations would not be wishful be-
liefs.88 
De dicto internalism thus tells us that the reason that there is a neces-
sary connection between moral beliefs and motivation does not have to 
be that moral beliefs have a special content (or character) or are of a 
 
87 Where I describe internalism as the view that moral beliefs (or judgements) are 
accompanied by motivation, Tresan describes internalism as the view that moral beliefs 
are accompanied by conations. 
88 Tresan, 2006, p. 147. 
First Road to Relativism: Emotions and Motivation 
66 
special nature; the reason can be that our concept of moral beliefs de-
mand of any moral belief to actually be accompanied by motivation. A 
belief does not count as a moral belief if it is not accompanied by moti-
vation. This is analogous to the planet example. The reason that there is 
a necessary connection between being a planet and orbiting a star is not 
that planets have some special properties that make them orbit stars; 
rather, the reason is that our concept of planet is such that something 
that does not actually orbit a star is not a planet.89 
 What de dicto internalist cognitivists say, in effect, is that to have a 
moral belief is to have a motivation-accompanied-belief that x is the case, 
where what x stands for depends on what the preferred form of cognitiv-
ism says is the content of moral beliefs. A belief that x can be 
unaccompanied by motivation; but of course, a motivation-
accompanied-belief that x cannot actually be unaccompanied by motiva-
tion.90  
It should be noted that de dicto internalism can take the form of 
conditional internalism, as well as non-conditional internalism. One 
 
89 Frank Jackson seems to suggest something like de dicto internalism in a brief 
comment.  He says that cognitivists can accommodate internalism “by refusing to call 
something a moral belief unless it is accompanied by the relevant pro-attitude”. (Jackson, 
1998a, p. 161) 
90 It seems that also non-cognitivists (and actual-system relativists) can use that same 
approach to avoid a problem we touched upon before. In the previous section we 
considered a non-cognitivist position according to which moral judgements express 
motivational attitudes (desires) such that having an attitude of this kind does not 
guarantee that motivation actually arises. We pointed to a potential problem with this 
view in footnote 76. In at least some of these cases where people are not motivated in 
accordance with their moral judgements we intuitively think that the agent does not have 
a desire, even though we want to say that she has a moral judgement. If we are sceptical 
about saying that moral judgements constitute a special kind of motivational attitudes, 
distinct from desires, how can someone have a moral judgement without having a desire? 
Here is one solution along the lines of de dicto internalism. Suppose we think that both 
desires and moral judgements are motivational states, and that motivational states are 
dispositions to be motivated that allows for a range of exception cases, that is, cases 
where they lead to no actual motivation. The idea, then, would be that the concept of 
moral judgements can explain why moral judgements allow for exactly the exception 
cases it does. And the concept of desires can explain that desires allow for exactly the 
exception cases they do. The different limits built into the concepts of moral judgements 
and desires respectively (and more basically: what we have needed these concepts for) 
could thus explain why, even though they are the same kind of motivational states, it is 
possible that Stocker’s politician does not desire to help the suffering while he thinks that 
it would be right to do so. The motivational state he has is correctly classified as a moral 
judgement but not as a desire because of the differences between the concept of desires 
and the concept of moral judgements. 
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way to get this result would be to say that the conditional element is 
built into the concept of moral judgements. Another way is through 
arguing that the concept of moral beliefs is such that necessarily, moral 
beliefs are accompanied by desires, and in addition accept the disposi-
tional view on desires discussed in 2.4.4. 
I argued in the beginning of this chapter that, at least given certain 
views of what gives a judgement its content, it need not be a threat to 
absolutist views about the content of moral judgments that they often 
co-occur with and are caused by motivational states like emotions. So, 
absolutists can accept that there is a strong contingent relation between 
moral judgements and motivation. The de dicto internalist idea allows 
absolutists to make an additional move. They can hold that our concept 
of moral judgements is such that those beliefs with the relevant absolut-
ist content that are not accompanied by motivation do not count as 
moral judgments.  
It also seems to make sense that we would come to have such a con-
cept of moral beliefs. We tend to use concepts that have extensions that 
are salient or interesting for us in some sense, and which it is therefore 
important for us to be able to refer to. Tresan makes this point through 
an analogy to other concepts that give rise to de dicto necessities: 
Some people have kids, others don’t; to us, that’s a very salient relation; so it’s 
no surprise that the concept parent has the currency it does (even if few other 
concepts further entail kids). Some large rocks are in independent orbit around 
a star, others aren’t; to us, that’s a salient relation; so it’s no surprise that the 
concept planet has the currency it does (again, even if few other concepts fur-
ther entail stars). If we turn to moral beliefs, the explanation to expect, at the 
broadest level, is that moral beliefs’ conative relations are many orders of mag-
nitude more salient to us than the conative relations of nonmoral beliefs.  
Intuitively that’s true. Even Externalists grant it; indeed, they are apt to call 
upon it to explain (away) Internalist intuitions (the Internalist incautiously 
posits a necessity when, in fact, there is only a strong contingency). 
Internalists should begin by considering the actual relations moral beliefs bear 
– relations posited even by Externalists – and there find the explanation of the 
salience, which in turn explains why our standard concepts of these represen-
tations, but not others, are further entailers.91 
One of the fundamental functions of moral beliefs is to motivate us. So 
we are more interested in the class of such beliefs that are accompanied 
by motivation than in beliefs that are in other respects exactly like these 
(that is their character and content) but are not accompanied by motiva-
 
91 Tresan, 2006, pp. 159-60. 
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tion. Thus it is not strange that our concept of moral beliefs has come to 
have that class as its extension.  
Now, the purpose of this discussion in the present chapter is to exam-
ine the relative merits of speaker relativism’s ability to explain motiva-
tion. In the previous section I argued that ideal system relativism cannot 
gain support from its ability to explain internalism, since ideal system 
absolutism can use the same explanation. What is of most interest here, 
then, is how the actual system relativist explanations (such as Dreier’s) 
stand in comparison to absolutist explanations. Let us therefore com-
pare de dicto internalism to these speaker relativist explanations of 
internalism. 
2.6 .1  De d ic to  in t er nalism c om par e d  to  Dr e ier ’ s  in t er nalism 
Interestingly, de dicto internalism has large similarities with Dreier’s 
internalism. Also on Dreier’s internalism, “we can represent [the prop-
erties we represent through moral beliefs] without having the conations. 
It just tells us that, then, the representations would not be moral be-
liefs.”92 On both views the necessary connection is guaranteed because it 
is not only the content that makes a belief a moral belief; it also has to 
be connected to the speaker’s motivation in a certain way.  
The difference between the theories lies in the how the necessary con-
nection is ensured. According to de dicto internalism it is ensured by 
the concept of moral beliefs. On Dreier’s view it is guaranteed by the 
character of moral terms. On de dicto internalism, then, it is neither the 
content nor the character (how they are believed) of moral beliefs that 
gives the connection to motivation. On indexical relativism it is the 
latter but not the former. This actually makes it unclear whether the 
internalism implied by Dreier’s view is a form of de re or de dicto in-
ternalism. Regarding indexical beliefs, ‘same belief’ can be understood 
either as ‘belief with same content’ or ‘belief with same character’: 
De dicto understanding: P, who has a moral belief, could have 
had the same belief (same content) without motivation (under 
normal situations), but then it would not have been a moral be-
lief.  
 
92 Ibid., p. 147. 
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De re understanding: P, who has a moral belief, could not have
had the same belief (same character) without motivation (under 
normal conditions). 
The difference between Tresan’s de dicto internalism and Dreier’s rela-
tivism, then, is that the latter makes an extra claim. (For simplicity I will 
continue to refer to Tresan’s view as ‘de dicto internalism’, even though 
Dreier’s view can be given a de dicto understanding.) De dicto internal-
ism makes it a sufficient condition that a belief with the right kind of 
content is accompanied by motivation for it to count as a moral belief. 
Dreier’s internalism doesn’t. According to the latter view, they must be 
accompanied by motivation because of one of their internal traits, their 
motivational character. This is why the internalism implied by Dreier’s 
view can be given a de re understanding. What we should ask then, is 
whether the fact that de dicto internalism does not make this extra claim 
is an advantage or a disadvantage of the view.  
It is not a disadvantage. Tresan argues convincingly that the intuitions 
used to support motivational internalism do not promote de re inter-
nalism over de dicto internalism. If we want to test (a conditional form 
of) de dicto internalism, we should ask whether some belief can be both 
a moral belief and unaccompanied by motivation (in a normal case) at 
the same possible world. If there can be such beliefs, then de dicto in-
ternalism is false; if there cannot, it is true. To test de re internalism, on 
the other hand, we would have to ask whether some belief that is a 
moral belief in a certain possible world (say, the actual) could be unac-
companied by motivation in some other possible world. But it is the 
former test, and not the latter, that describes the thought experiments 
actually used to test motivational internalism in metaethical literature: 
When we consider Patrick [the amoralist] we consider only whether he has 
states which are, at that world, moral beliefs. Nowhere in the literature is the 
possibility even considered whether some amoralist like Patrick might have 
states which, though not moral beliefs at that world, are moral beliefs in the 
actual world. It is because we don’t consider whether such states are present, 
but only whether there are states which are at that world moral beliefs, that 
our intuitions can at best favor de dicto Internalism. The strong tradition of 
Internalist intuitions about amoralists, then, supports only de dicto Internal-
ism.93 
 
93 Ibid., p. 149. 
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The internalist intuitions about amoralists give no support to the extra 
and stronger de re internalist claim that a belief that is a moral belief 
could not have been a non-moral belief in which case it might not have 
been accompanied by motivation. Therefore, it is at least no disadvan-
tage of de dicto internalism that it does not make this claim. 
On the contrary, I think it could count as an advantage. From the phi-
losophical discussion on moral motivation, it is clear that different 
people have different intuitions about the matter, e.g. about amoralist 
cases. Those with non-conditional internalist intuitions think that a 
judgement cannot count as a moral judgement if it is not accompanied by 
motivation even if the lack of motivation is due to some non-normal 
condition such as practical irrationality. Others, who have conditional 
internalist intuitions, think that such judgements can count as moral 
judgements, but not judgements unaccompanied by motivation even 
under normal conditions. And those with externalist intuitions think 
that even judgements of the latter kind can count as moral judgements. 
The traditional versions of internalism (and externalism) according to 
which moral judgements necessarily motivate (do not necessarily moti-
vate) as a consequence of their special nature, content or character, have 
to explain away some of these intuitions as being mistaken. The de dicto 
approach, according to which the necessary connection is ensured by the 
concept of moral judgements, need not do that. Instead we can say that 
the conclusion to draw is that different people have slightly different 
concepts of moral beliefs (the extension class of the term ‘moral belief’ 
is slightly different when different people use it). In the “borderline 
cases” that the amoralist examples point to, some concepts of moral 
beliefs do count the beliefs as being moral beliefs while other concepts 
don’t. 
This is an advantage of de dicto approach. For other forms of internal-
ism (and externalism), the divergence of people’s intuitions about 
amoralist cases is an irritation that makes the views unstable. At least 
this is so when these forms of internalism and externalism are, as they 
often are, founded on intuitions about such cases to begin with; when 
they are, the fact that some people don’t share these intuitions is a rea-
son to reject the theories. By contrast, the de dicto approach allows that 
the connection between moral judgements and motivation might be 
differently strong given different concepts of moral beliefs. The fact that 
people have different intuitions simply supports the idea that they have 
different concepts of moral beliefs, and the fact that many of us have 
unstable and unclear intuitions about some amoralist cases, supports 
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the idea that our concepts of moral beliefs is vague in this respect. This 
means that the de dicto approach can explain, not only why a certain 
connection between moral judgements and motivations that some peo-
ple find intuitive holds, it might also explain why people have different 
intuitions. It allows us to not explain away certain people’s intuitions 
about the connection, and instead explain them in a straightforward way. 
(The divergence in intuitions also seems to be what we should expect. 
There has been no pressure for us to develop clear and precise concepts 
of moral beliefs regarding the connection to motivation, and there has 
been no pressure to reach an exact convergence between different peo-
ple’s concepts of moral beliefs.) This ability to account also for the dif-
ference between people’s intuitions through the claim that people have 
slightly different concepts of moral judgements in this respect, then, is 
an advantage for de dicto internalism over Dreier’s speaker relativism. 
2.6 .2  A c on fl ic t  wi t h  t h e  way we  tal k  abou t  moral  ju dg e me n ts  
One further thing should be noted before we leave the subject of de dicto 
internalism. De dicto internalism goes against the appearance of moral 
beliefs and statements – that is, the way we talk about and express moral 
beliefs – in a certain way. The surface form of the expressions we use to 
refer to moral statements and beliefs suggests that these statements and 
beliefs are characterised solely by having a certain content. We say, for 
example, “that is a statement/belief about moral rightness”, or “that is a 
statement/belief that it is morally wrong to lie”. The entire specification 
of what kind of judgements we are after comes after about and that (in 
contrast to the surface form of e.g. “wishful belief that I will finish my 
dissertation in time” or “motivation-accompanied-belief that if I hit you 
you will feel pain”). However, de dicto internalism implies that moral 
beliefs, e.g. the belief that it is morally wrong to lie, are not character-
ised solely by what follows after ‘that’: it is not characterised only by 
being a belief with a special content (or character). In order to be the 
belief that it is morally wrong to lie, a belief also has to be accompanied 
by motivation. What is special about, say, the belief that it is wrong to 
lie, then, is not merely the content or character of the term ‘wrong’ or of 
the belief.  
I find this idea interesting and suggestive about moral practice. I will 
return to it in chapter 8. There I will argue, not only that having a certain 
content (or character) is insufficient for being, say, the belief that it is 
wrong to lie, but also that there is no single content (or character) which 
it is necessary to have to be the belief that it is wrong to lie.  
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2.7  C o n clusi o n 
I have argued that speaker relativism does not gain support from its 
ability to explain the connection between moral judgements and motiva-
tion. This is so since absolutists have the resources to explain it equally 
well. Ideal system absolutists can explain conditional internalism in the 
manner ideal system relativists can. And even though I argued that sev-
eral forms of actual system relativism can explain conditional internal-
ism, I also argued that moral absolutism can explain it as well, through 
the idea of de dicto internalism. Through connecting motivation to the 
concept of moral beliefs (rather than to the content or character of them 
as relativists do) absolutists can give explanations that are very similar 
to, and seem to be as good as, the ones relativists can give. 
The conclusion of this is that relativists need something other than 
motivational internalism to support the view that the truth-values of 
moral statements and beliefs are relative to our own motivations or 
moralities. We now turn to such an argument: the argument that relativ-
ism best explains that people’s moral opinions diverge in the way they 
do.
  
Chapter 3 
Second Road to Relativism: 
Explaining Diversity 
3.1  Intr oducti o n  
It is not hard to see how speaker relativists come to accept the view that 
among all the many different moralities there are, none is the single 
correct one. After all, we clearly see that people have different values and 
accept different moral principles, but we have no clear idea how to show 
that one of these combinations of values and principles is the correct 
one. I think that this – the obvious and large divergence of people’s 
moral opinions in combination with the difficulty of seeing how to 
settle such moral conflicts – is the intuitive foundation for the view of 
most speaker relativists. It is also the starting point of the most com-
mon arguments for speaker relativism in the philosophical literature.  
Arguments that use the diversity between people’s moral opinions as 
a premise have not only been used to support speaker relativism but 
also more generally as arguments to the effect that moral realism is false 
and that some form of anti-realism, such as non-cognitivism, error-
theory or speaker relativism, is true. In a common form, the conclusion 
of the argument is that there are no absolute moral facts.  
What we are interested in here, however, is whether considerations 
about moral diversity support speaker relativism specifically. In this 
chapter I will discuss two arguments to this effect. The most straight-
forward argument makes use of the plausible idea that if two speakers 
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use a term sufficiently differently from one another, it is reasonable to 
say that they use the term to refer to different things. The idea, then, is 
that the nature of moral disagreements is such that this conclusion is 
warranted for moral terms. We may call arguments of this sort, semantic 
arguments from diversity for speaker relativism. In the second kind of 
argument, diversity plays a different role. According to this argument, 
the nature of moral diversity forces the absolutist into a dilemma. She 
has to accept either that there are no moral facts (error-theory) or that 
there are moral facts but that these are unknowable. Both positions are 
implausible and therefore, given cognitivism, relativism is the only 
alternative. Instead of directly making relativism plausible, diversity 
makes absolutism implausible.  
In what follows I will first describe the specific idea about the nature 
of moral disagreements that both of these arguments rely on: the idea of 
radical moral disagreements. After that I discuss the semantic argument 
and the dilemma argument from diversity in turn. I will argue that even 
if we grant that moral disagreements are radical – a claim I will not take 
a stand on here – these arguments are not convincing. 
Before we enter this discussion, it should be emphasized again that 
the discussion here concerns whether to accept an absolutist or a rela-
tivist form of cognitivism. The arguments from diversity we consider 
are supposed to give us reason to prefer the latter. Arguments from 
diversity should not be seen as giving us reason to prefer speaker relativ-
ism to non-cognitivism, and to my knowledge no one has proposed this. 
Theories of the latter kind seem equally fit to explain the fact that peo-
ple’s moral opinions diverge. The arguments are meant to support 
speaker relativism given that we have independent reasons to believe in 
cognitivism. 
3.2  R ad i c al  M o r al  Dis ag r e e m e nts 
No doubt, there is much disagreement over moral matters. Arguments 
from diversity for speaker relativism (or other forms of moral anti-
realism) standardly take off by giving examples of this. Harman, for 
instance, starts by giving a number of examples of disagreements be-
tween different societies: 
Members of different cultures often have very different beliefs about right 
and wrong and often act quite differently on their beliefs. […] In some [socie-
ties], a man is permitted to have several wives, in others bigamy is forbidden. 
More generally, the moral status of women varies greatly from one society to 
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another in many different ways. Some societies allow slavery, some have caste 
systems, which they take to be morally satisfactory, others reject both slavery 
and caste systems as grossly unjust.94 
After giving a few more examples, Harman moves on to consider moral 
disagreements that exist also within societies; about vegetarianism, 
euthanasia, abortion, the relative value of artefacts compared to human 
life, killing and letting die, liberty versus equality, moral egoism etc.95 
Other writers have their own favourite examples. Often it is not specific 
moral disagreements that are described, but clashes between the moral 
opinions or moralities of different groups, such as; utilitarians and 
Kantians96, utilitarians and priests97, rights-centred and virtue-centred 
moralities, Nozick and Rawls98, etc. 
Now, the mere existence of disagreements over some issue does not 
imply that there is no absolute truth about who is right.99 Consider the 
following case: 
John: Peter is in Gothenburg. 
Sarah: No, Peter is still in London.  
Disagreements like this are common. And we do not take this to show 
that there are no absolute truths about the whereabouts of people. Why? 
Because we think that we can explain each such disagreement in one of 
the two following ways. 
First, John and Sarah might talk about two different people named Pe-
ter. In that case, what we have is a merely apparent disagreement: when 
the misunderstanding is sorted out, it would be wrong to say that they 
disagree about where Peter is. Furthermore, if John and Sarah find out 
that they have two different Peters in mind, they will stop seeing them-
selves as being in disagreement. This apparent disagreement is not in 
conflict with there being absolute truths about who is in Gothenburg or 
London: as it turned out, John and Sarah made distinct but not contra-
dicting claims about the same realm of absolute facts.  
 
94 Harman, in his part of Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 8. 
95 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
96 Tersman, 2006, p. 85. 
97 Blackburn, 1984, p. 168. 
98 The two last examples are from Wong, 1984, pp.160-75 and pp. 146-53 respectively.  
99 Philosophers who employ some sort of argument from diversity standardly 
acknowledge this. See e.g. Mackie, 1977, p. 36, and Harman in Harman and Thomson, 
1996, p. 18. 
Second Road to Relativism: Explaining Diversity 
76 
Second, it might be that either John or Sarah is wrong about where Pe-
ter is (or that both are). Perhaps John has not read Peter’s email saying 
that he postponed his trip to Gothenburg. Or maybe he mistook 
someone else for Peter in a dark nightclub. If so, this explains why the 
disagreement arises in a way that is compatible with there being an ab-
solute fact about where Peter is. The explanation is that at least one of 
the disagreeing parties has formed her belief from a less than optimal 
cognitive position or that she has a “cognitive shortcoming”100. She 
might have formed it on basis of false background beliefs, malfunction-
ing perception processes, bad reasoning, or wishful thinking etc. Let us 
call any such factor that can stand in the way of someone’s getting true 
beliefs a distorting factor. The presence of any distorting factor, then, 
makes the cognitive position less than optimal. 
If all moral disagreements could be explained in the same ways as the 
disagreement over Peter’s whereabouts – if they are, that is, always ei-
ther the effect of that differing moral opinions are judgements about 
different aspects of the same realm of absolute moral facts or the effects 
of distorting factors – considerations about moral disagreement could 
not be used to object to moral realism, the idea that there are absolute 
true answers to moral questions. However, if none of the two explana-
tions can be given for disagreements in some area – such as morality, 
aesthetics, religion or matters of taste – this has been thought to spell 
trouble for realism about that area. In the subsequent sections we will 
see more in detail how it is thought to be problematic for realists, and 
especially how speaker relativists have taken it to support their view. In 
this section we shall consider the claim that moral disagreements can-
not be fully explained in the two ways outlined above.  
Can some moral disagreements be explained in the first way? This 
would be the case if what seems to be two conflicting moral judgements 
really are two different but consistent judgements about the same realm 
of absolute moral facts. It is sometimes claimed that some apparent 
moral disagreements are like this; they are, it is held, the effects of ap-
plying one and the same general moral principle differently under dif-
ferent conditions. We can call this ‘non-fundamental disagreements’. 
Here is an example from Edvard Westermarck: 
[…] differences of ideas may arise from different situations and external con-
ditions of life, which consequently influence moral opinion. We find, for in-
 
100 Wright, 2001 introduced this notion. See also, Tersman, 2006. 
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stance, among many peoples the custom of killing or abandoning parents worn 
out with age or disease. It prevails among a large number of savage tribes and 
occurred formerly among many Asiatic and European nations, including the 
Vedic people and peoples of Teutonic extraction; there is an old English tradi-
tion of “the Holy Mawle, which they fancy hung behind the church door, 
which when the father was seaventie, the sonne might fetch to knock his fa-
ther in the head, as effete and of no more use.” This custom is particularly 
common among the nomadic hunting tribes, owing to the hardships of life and 
the inability of decrepit persons to keep up in the march. In times when the 
food-supply is insufficient to support all the members of a community it also 
seems more reasonable that the old and useless should have to perish than the 
young and vigorous. […] What appears to most of us as an atrocious practice 
may really be an act of kindness, and is commonly approved of, or even insisted 
upon, by the old people themselves.101 
The idea is that a general moral rule, when put into practice in different 
societies, can manifest itself differently, both in action and in the de-
rived moral principles that are accepted. To the extent that the existing 
differences of moral opinion can be explained in this way, such differ-
ences do not, of course, count against there being general moral princi-
ples that everyone accepts. In that case, the existing disagreements would 
give us as little reason to doubt that there are absolute true answers 
about what is morally right and wrong in every specific circumstance, as 
the merely apparent disagreement over Peter’s whereabouts gives us 
reason to doubt that there is a true answer about where any specific 
person named Peter is located. 
However, it seems unlikely that all differences can be explained in this 
way. Many moral disagreements exist within societies, that is, between 
people that live under what seems to be relevantly similar circum-
stances. Furthermore, it is not clear to which extent this kind of explana-
tion works even in the cases where it seems most plausible. Take 
Westermarck’s example: in which sense do we accept the same funda-
mental moral rules as the nomadic people who think that it is right to 
kill one’s old parents? Many people in our society would, I suppose, say 
that the moral rule against killing applies also to killing one’s parents in 
nomadic societies. It is a fact that people do criticize acts performed in 
other cultures and societies from a moral standpoint: we think that they 
act wrong even though they do not appreciate this themselves. This 
means that different people accept moralities that give different verdicts 
in the same circumstances. Considerations of the same sort makes it 
 
101 Westermarck, 1970, pp. 184-85. 
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highly unlikely that there is one underlying moral principle accepted by 
all forms of Utilitarians, Kantians, Virtue-ethicists and by Rawls and 
Nozick. Proponents of these views generally extend their principles to 
all possible circumstances. Consequently we cannot say that they start in 
the same general moral rule, but arrive at different derived rules as a 
result of having different circumstances in mind when applying the 
general rule. For sure, some moral disagreements may turn out to be 
mere misunderstandings, say, where the disagreeing parties talked about 
the moral status of killing in different circumstances. But the majority 
of moral disagreements are fundamental disagreements in the sense that 
they are not merely different applications of the same underlying prin-
ciple. 
The crucial point, then, is whether the remaining majority of moral 
disagreements can be explained in the second way outlined above. That 
is, do they arise when and because at least one of the disputing parties is 
in a less than optimal cognitive position in relation to absolute moral 
facts? Is it plausible to think that they would disappear if all distorting 
factors were removed from the disagreeing parties? If this is the case, all 
diversities of moral opinion can be fully accounted for by there being 
distorting factors for at least one of the disputants, stopping her from 
seeing the absolute moral facts, and there is no friction between these 
diversities and that moral judgements are about absolute moral facts. 
All moral disagreements would be resolvable at least in principle, even 
though it might be difficult in practice to remove all distorting factors 
in every case.  
Do we have reason to think that this is how it is? Some philosophers 
think not. They believe that many moral disagreements are “radical 
disagreements”, that is, disagreements that would survive even if the 
disagreeing parties were in perfect cognitive positions. Thus, after enu-
merating his examples of moral disagreements, Harman concludes that, 
“It is hard to see how to account for all moral disagreements in terms of 
differences in situation or beliefs about nonmoral facts”102. The idea is 
that intuitively, it is simply hard to see that all disagreements between 
vegetarians and non-vegetarians, utilitarians and Kantians, cannibals and 
missionaries, people with right-based moralities and people with vir-
tue-based moralities, etc, would disappear if everyone just acquired 
correct background beliefs, made their moralities consistent and had 
 
102 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 11. 
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perfect moral perceptual mechanisms. Moral disagreements are persis-
tent – they survive extensive discussion and argumentation – in a way 
that makes it implausible to think that they can be explained by there 
being a true answer to them that the disputants are unable to see due to 
distortions of their moral judgements. What is special about moral 
disagreements on this view, then, is that many such disagreements 
would not be solved even if we removed all distorting factors. As I 
noted, this view on moral disagreements has been used to argue against 
moral realism, and in the following section we will consider arguments 
of this sort.  
Moral realists are typically more inclined to deny that moral dis-
agreements are radical.103 They argue that moral disagreements are ef-
fects of irrational distortions of our ways of getting true moral beliefs, 
e.g. influence of religion and other social and cultural factors on moral 
thought.104 Realists have also developed strategies to explain how it can 
be that moral thought is so much influenced by such irrational fac-
tors.105  
I am sympathetic to the view that it remains to be shown whether 
there are any successful realist explanations of disagreements of this 
sort. Realists have not conclusively shown that there are (but rather 
pointed to theoretical strategies that might be developed into such ex-
planations), and anti-realists have not shown that there aren’t.106107 In any 
case, I will not take a stand on whether there are any radical moral dis-
 
103 At least that most moral disagreements are not radical, see footnote 132. 
104 See, e.g. Boyd, 1988, pp. 212-13, Smith, 1994, pp. 188-89. 
105 For example the idea that observations in general are theory laden. See Loeb, 1998 
for a good exposition of such  realist explanatory strategies. 
106 See Ibid. for an extensive argumentation to this effect. 
107 One reason to remain agnostic about the existence of radical moral disagreement is 
that the issue seems to hinge on other unsettled matters. Consider for example the 
intuitionist view on moral knowledge associated with moral non-naturalism. On this 
account, (some) moral truths are self-evident and we gain knowledge of them through 
appreciating their truth through intuition. (See for example, Ewing, 1947, Moore, 1903, 
Moore, 1912, Ross, 1930; for more recent treatments, see the papers in Stratton-Lake, 
2002) It seems that in order to hold radical disagreement against intuitionists, one has to 
show that it is not the case that on every occasion when two people differ in moral views, 
one of them has failed in her ability to intuit self-evident truths. This is hard to show as 
long as we do not have a precise picture of the mechanism involved in moral intuition 
and an independent way of testing whether someone’s mechanism falters on some 
occasion. Before we have taken a stand on the possibility of giving a precise description of 
this kind, both the intuitionist view itself and the idea of radical moral disagreements 
remain uncertain. 
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agreements. In the following sections I will argue that the arguments 
from diversity for speaker relativism building on the idea of radical 
moral disagreements fail even if we assume that there are such dis-
agreements. 
3.3 S e m a nt i c A rgum e nts fr o m D i v e r s ity 
According to one line of reasoning, the existence of radical moral dis-
agreements implies that people use moral terms so differently from one 
another that we should conclude that they use moral terms to refer to 
different things.108 We can call this the semantic argument from diversity 
for speaker relativism. The most elaborate argument of this kind has 
been given by David Wong. In this section I will first consider his spe-
cific form of the argument and then discuss arguments of this kind 
more generally. 
3.3.1  Won g ’s  seman tic  ar gume n t  fr om d iv er si ty   
Wong’s semantic argument from diversity starts in his analysis of moral 
judgements. In this analysis the notion of rules is central. Rules, on 
Wong’s view, can be the content of various imperatives or intentions, 
and are expressed on the form “A is to do X” (simple rules) or “If C then 
A is to do X” (conditional rules). 
A morality, or moral system, is a system of such rules. To accept a 
moral system is to accept the rules it contains, which in turn is to have 
the desires or intentions for which the rules specify the content.109  
According to Wong, when people first began to formulate and rec-
ommend ways of acting to each other, this was done by means of simple 
rules. When people became more “sophisticated and reflective about the 
use of their rules”110 they started formulating and using conditional 
rules and more general rules applying not only to actions of specific 
individuals but to everyone. People wanted to be able to say things like, 
 
108 In the next chapter we will discuss the objection to speaker relativism that it 
implies that moral disputes are not real disagreements at all, since people talk past each 
other. In light of this objection one might think that if speaker relativism is true, there 
can’t be radical moral disagreements. Perhaps, then, it would be better to speak of radical 
moral diversity in this context. I will stick to the standard terminology, however, and 
speak of radical disagreement. 
109 Wong, 1984, p. 75. 
110 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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“That person breaks some general rule given the conditions that obtain”. 
This, roughly, is the function of “A ought to do X” statements.  
Now, societies develop rules for many different purposes. The distin-
guishing characteristic of moral systems is that they contain rules that 
are for “resolving internal conflicts of requirements (stemming from an 
individual’s different needs, desires, and goals) that affect others and for 
resolving interpersonal conflicts of interest in general”.111 
However, this is not yet sufficient to ground an analysis of moral 
judgements according to Wong. On his view, what we do when we make 
an “A ought to do X” statement is not merely to say that X is in line with 
any system of moral rules, however incoherent or influenced by false 
beliefs it may be. Rather, we say that it is in line with, or recommended 
by, an adequate moral system. The idea is that we not only have moral 
rules for action, but also standards for systems of such rules. Standards 
for moral systems are of the form “M is to be F” where M is a moral 
system and F a property of moral systems. When we accept a moral 
system we accept it with the implicit presupposition that it is adequate. 
Thus, to be true, a moral “A ought to do X” statement has to be in line 
with some moral system that is adequate with respect to an ideal of 
moralities.  
From these considerations, Wong analyses moral “A ought to do X” 
statements as follows: 
By not doing X under actual conditions C, A will be breaking a 
rule of an adequate moral system.112 
This analysis is not in itself speaker relativistic. If there is only one 
adequate moral system, every person who utters or believes “A ought to 
do X” will refer to the rules of that system. However, Wong argues that 
this is not so. What opens up for the possibility of speaker relativism, 
according to Wong, is that, “[t]he extension of ‘adequate moral system’ 
could vary, as the term is used in different groups and societies”.113 
 
111 Ibid., p. 38. 
112 Actually, Wong adds another clause to his analysis. The complete statement of the 
analysis reads: ”By not doing X under actual conditions C, A will be breaking a rule of an 
adequate moral system applying to him or her”. (Ibid., p. 40, my italics) The ”applying to 
him or her”-part serves to open up for agent relativism. We can leave this out, since we 
are here only interested in Wong’s theory as a form of speaker relativism. 
113 Ibid., p. 44. It should be noticed that Wong does not think that people in general 
use the expression ‘adequate moral system’. He writes that, “the term is a modest 
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A speaker B may say of A that he ought to do X under conditions C. A speaker 
D may say of A that he ought not to do X under the same conditions C. If 
‘adequate moral system’ has different extensions in the idiolects of B and D, 
both statements may be true, and there is no conflict between the statements 
generated by their truth-conditions.114 
Wong proceeds to try to show that this is the case; that different speak-
ers refer to different systems of moral rules by ‘adequate moral system’. 
The basic idea is that some of the descriptions that speakers associate 
with ‘adequate moral system’ are more basic or stronger than other such 
descriptions. These strong descriptions are reference-fixing descrip-
tions. And, since people associate different reference-fixing descriptions 
with ‘adequate moral system’, the term will refer to different moral 
systems when different people use it.  
The following example serves to illustrate the idea. “Early Chris-
tians”, Wong writes, “laid down at the core of their conceptions of the 
moral ideal rule that all human beings are to be treated as beings with 
worth and dignity.”115 However, this has not always kept Christians from 
holding slaves. 
There is inconsistency here, and those who desired to maintain slavery tried to 
justify its existence in various ways. There were the claims about the natural 
inferiority of enslaved races that are still made to this day. In the southern 
United States, there was an attempt to justify slavery as a form of paternalism. 
Involuntary labor was transformed into legitimate return for the protection 
and direction of masters. It was claimed that slaves acquiesced to their faith, 
that they willingly became part of the “family” of which the white master was 
the father.116 
The moral systems of Christians who justify slave holding in these ways 
contain at least two rules. First, there is the rule that all human beings, 
irrespective of race and skin colour, are to be treated as beings with 
dignity. Second, there is the rule that permits holding certain people as 
slaves. There is an important difference between these rules in the sys-
tem: the first is more basic. This is displayed in the fact that the second 
rule is measured against, or justified in light of, the first: the various 
justifications of slave holding in the quote above make it clear that, in 
 
idealization of in the sense that I have chosen it as a more explicit rendering of what 
people have in mind when they use terms such as ‘the right moral rules’.”(Wong, 1984, p. 
40). 
114 Wong, 1984, p. 45. 
115 Ibid., p. 58. 
116 Ibid. 
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order to defend the second rule, the Christian slave-holders thought that 
they had to show that holding slaves is consistent with the rule that all 
human beings are to be treated as beings with dignity. Thus, they implic-
itly acknowledged that they would have to give up the rule permitting 
slavery, if any of the, mainly empirical, beliefs used to justify it turned 
out to be false. They are thus willing to admit that there are circum-
stances under which that rule would not be in an adequate moral sys-
tem. This, however, Wong argues, is not true of the more basic rule 
against treating people differently only on basis of their skin colour.  
[…] there are substantive moral beliefs that we cannot conceive to be false. 
Do we doubt that a person’s skin color (in and of itself) is irrelevant to how we 
ought to treat him or her? This indubitability is explained by saying that we 
have a reference-fixing description that connects the adequacy of a moral sys-
tem with a consideration of the interests of human beings regardless of their 
skin color.117 
Our actual moral systems contain a bunch of moral rules. Some of these 
rules we would be prepared to give up if we were informed (or misin-
formed) that certain non-moral beliefs we have are false; it can be be-
liefs either about the consequences of certain actions, or beliefs that link 
the rules to more basic rules. Other rules we are not prepared to give up. 
The latter serve as reference-fixing descriptions of ‘adequate moral sys-
tem’. 
This is where radical disagreement comes into the argument. One way 
of spelling out the idea that there are radical disagreements about moral 
questions is to say that some differences between people’s moral opin-
ions are such that their moral opinions would not converge even if we 
were to remove all distorting factors, such as false non-moral beliefs 
and incoherencies. In other words, people have different moral beliefs 
that they are not prepared to give up. Now, given Wong’s view on refer-
ence fixing, this implies that people associate different reference-fixing 
descriptions with ‘adequate moral system’, and therefore that people 
refer to different moral systems when they use this term. Since Wong 
analyses moral judgements as judgements about which actions are al-
lowed and not allowed by rules in an adequate moral system, the result 
is that people refer to different things when they make moral judge-
ments. In other words, the result is speaker relativism.  
 
117 Ibid., p. 59. 
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Is this a good argument? I think that it can be questioned in a rather 
simple way. The argument hinges on that Wong’s analysis of moral 
judgements is correct and that it allows for the possibility of speaker 
relativism. But many people have absolutist intuitions that go against 
the analysis. “Insofar as we refer to, or intend to refer to, adequate moral 
systems at all when we make moral judgements” they will say, “we refer 
to, or intend to refer to, the only adequate moral system”. In effect, an 
analysis that fit the intentions of such people better is the following. 
By not doing X under actual conditions C, A will be breaking a 
rule of the only adequate moral system. 
But if we analyse “A ought to do X” statements in this way, it seems that 
speaker relativism is no longer a viable option. Or at least, more has to 
be said to argue that it is. The problem, then, with Wong’s argument for 
speaker relativism and against absolutism is that it presupposes a non-
absolutist analysis of moral judgements.  
Wong has one argument that might seem to question that we, or some 
of us, really have such absolutist intentions. The moralities that are 
accepted in societies, he notices, are not constant but change constantly. 
He writes that in light of this, “it is not plausible to say that members of 
a moral tradition simply resolve to use a term such as ‘adequate moral 
system’ or ‘the right moral rules’ with the intention of preserving the 
reference of the past”118. I think that this argument misses its target. It is 
a good argument against the claim that we intend to refer to the morali-
ties others accept or think of as being the correct morality, either in the past 
or now, because we know that others have accepted moralities that we 
do not. But it does nothing to threaten the idea that we, or some of us, 
intend to refer to the morality that others refer to, and everyone refers to, 
namely the single true morality. We can do this because we can think 
that others have referred to the absolute moral facts we take ourselves to 
refer to even though they have had many false beliefs about these facts 
and thus have accepted other moralities as being true.  
Another speaker relativist, Gilbert Harman, is more responsive to the 
absolutist intentions some speakers have. Harman draws the conclusion 
that; 
 
118 Ibid., p. 57. 
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[…] moral relativism is not by itself a claim about meaning. It does not say 
that speakers always intend their moral judgments to be relational in this re-
spect. It is clear that many speakers do not.119 
I will return, both in this chapter and later, to discuss how we can un-
derstand Harman’s claim that relativism can and should be understood 
as something other than a thesis about meaning. My point here is not 
that the absolutist intentions of some speakers finally precludes that 
speaker relativism is true as a theory about the meaning of moral terms, 
or even that it precludes Wong’s argument for it. In my opinion, Harman 
draws this conclusion too swiftly. My point is that the speaker relativist 
cannot ignore the absolutist intentions many of us have in using moral 
terms and the descriptions we associate with them. This is a potential 
problem for their view. As a consequence I think that Wong’s argument 
is less straightforward than he appreciates. Especially so since Wong 
himself builds his argument for speaker relativism to a large extent on 
the intentions speakers have in using a term (‘adequate moral system’) 
and the descriptions they associate with it.  
3.3.2  A mor e  d ir ec t  seman tic  ar gum e n t f rom d iver si t y  
We saw that Wong’s argument is problematic because it presupposes 
that a certain controversial analysis of moral judgements is correct. 
What the relativist needs then, it might seem, is an argument from di-
versity that does not presuppose a specific and controversial analysis of 
moral judgements. To my knowledge, no speaker relativist has used a 
direct semantic argument like this. But it has been suggested that they 
could do so.120 And more commonly, non-cognitivists have used it to 
show that cognitivists are committed to speaker relativism, which, in 
turn, with the additional premise that speaker relativism for some rea-
son is implausible, has been intended to show that cognitivism is false. 
However, speaker relativists of course reject this additional premise, 
and think that they have good reason to do so. If they are right about this, 
there is no reason to think the direct semantic argument could not be 
used to support speaker relativism.  
The argument, at least when properly worked out, is very similar to 
Wong’s argument, with the exception that it does not presuppose any 
specific analysis of moral judgements. The best-known presentation of 
 
119 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 17. 
120 Loeb, 1998, p. 292. 
Second Road to Relativism: Explaining Diversity 
86 
the argument is given by Richard Hare, in his famous thought experi-
ment where a missionary comes to an island inhabited by cannibals. 
Coincidently, the cannibals use the same moral terms as we do, and the 
terms have the same function in their language; ‘good’, for example, is 
used as “the most general adjective of commendation”. However, the 
missionary and the cannibals apply the word ‘good’ to totally different 
things.  
The only thing they [the cannibals] find odd is that he [the missionary] applies 
it to such unexpected people, people who are meek and gentle and do not col-
lect large quantities of scalps; whereas they themselves are accustomed to 
commend people who are bold and burly and collect more scalps than the av-
erage.121 
Hare draws the conclusion that, insofar as ‘good’ (and other moral 
terms) has a descriptive meaning, this meaning is not the same for the 
cannibals and the missionary. Being a non-cognitivist, Hare then moves 
on to argue for the further conclusion that moral terms must also have a 
different kind of meaning than a descriptive one. Since the descriptive 
meaning varies, this part of the meaning cannot account for the fact that 
there is a genuine disagreement between the parties of moral disagree-
ments, such as the cannibals and the missionary. (We will return to this 
argument against speaker relativism in the next chapter.) Other non-
cognitivists have used basically the same kind of examples to argue for 
the same conclusion; that cognitivism is bound to speaker relativism, 
and then, of course, further argued that this is a reason to believe in non-
cognitivism.122 As I said above, however, this further step is not neces-
sary, and the first part of the argument, that cognitivism is committed to 
speaker relativism, could thus be held in favour of speaker relativism.  
Let us examine the argument closer. One way to spell it out is in terms 
of the principle of charity. Loeb puts it loosely as follows:  
If people have widely differing beliefs about a number of moral questions, per-
haps charity requires that we interpret them as referring to different proper-
ties, or using moral language in some entirely different, non-referring way (as 
non-cognitivists contend). That way, at least, we could avoid holding that peo-
ple are so often in error about what morality requires.123 
 
121 Hare, 1952, p. 148. 
122 See, e.g. Blackburn, 1984, p. 168, Stevenson, 1963, pp. 48-51. 
123 Loeb, 1998, p. 292. 
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However, a reasonable principle of charity does not let us conclude that 
two people refer to different properties by the term ‘E’ directly from the 
fact they apply ‘E’ differently. As we have seen, in many cases divergences 
of this sort are results of that it was less than perfect cognitive processes 
that produced the belief of at least one of the parties, such as false back-
ground beliefs, bad reasoning or malfunctioning perception. If that is 
the case, we have no reason to conclude that the parties use the term to 
refer to different things. Suppose you say, “that’s a goat” and I say, “no, 
that’s not a goat, it’s a chair”. If this can be explained by the fact that you 
have taken some hallucinogenic drug that makes you see goats where 
there are none (a case of malfunctioning perception), our diverse appli-
cations of the term ‘goat’ does not indicate that we use it to refer to dif-
ferent things. Or if I say, “that’s a bottle of wine” and you say “that is not 
a bottle of wine” this need not indicate that we use ‘bottle of wine’ (or 
‘that’) to refer to different things, it might simply be that I am unaware 
of the fact that someone has replaced the wine with water. If such expla-
nations are at hand, we cannot conclude from the divergence that the 
parties refer differently by the term in question. The parties diverge 
regarding about which objects they say “that object is E”, but they might 
agree exactly on what it takes for something to have property E, under 
which conditions it is correct to apply the term ‘E’.124  
This is why, just like in Wong’s argument, the question of whether 
there are radical moral disagreements is relevant to the direct semantic 
argument. It seems that it is only if there are radical moral disagree-
ments – cases where two speakers apply moral terms differently and 
where this cannot be explained by any cognitive shortcoming of any of 
the parties – that we can draw the conclusion that the parties use moral 
terms to refer to different properties.  
I will soon argue that this argument fails to establish speaker relativ-
ism. First, however, let me say something about the form of speaker 
relativism that emerges from this argument. It is both similar to and 
different from the form Wong defends. It is similar in that what a 
speaker refers to when she uses moral terms depends on her morality, 
and that the relevant morality is determined by the speaker’s strong 
moral beliefs. Thus, according to the form of speaker relativism under 
discussion here, “X is right” can be analysed roughly as, “X is allowed by 
the norms in (the corrected version) of my moral system”.  
 
124 Cf. Tersman, 2006, p. 91. 
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On the other hand, it differs from Wong’s view in that we do not ar-
rive at the analysis from the content of intentions of the speakers. 
Speakers do not, or at least need not, intend to talk about their own 
morality or a morality at all. Different speakers have different referen-
tial intentions, in the sense that their uses of moral terms are ultimately 
governed by different considerations, i.e., that the speakers apply the 
terms to different kinds of acts and would do so even if they were rid of 
all cognitive shortcomings. It is consistent with this that they believe 
that they refer to the same properties as everyone does, and believe that 
there is one unique true answer to every specific moral question. This is 
what I mean when I say that the analysis is not a description of the con-
tent of the intentions or intuitions that speakers have when they use 
moral terms. (Depending on which theory about meaning we accept, this 
view might be taken to further imply that moral terms have different 
meanings when different speakers use them. If we say this, then the rela-
tivist analysis would not capture the meaning of moral judgements ei-
ther.) Rather, it is a way of formulating truth-conditions of moral 
judgements in a general form that holds for every speaker’s moral 
judgements. Since according to this form of speaker relativism, the rela-
tivist analysis does not emerge from a common relativist feature of 
people’s use of moral terms, but from people’s divergent use, we can call 
it divergence relativism. 
This is congenial to some of the ways Harman describes his view. As 
we saw above, according to Harman, speaker relativism should not be 
understood as a claim about the meaning of moral terms, since many 
speakers have absolutist intentions. Rather, Harman writes, the relativ-
ist analysis is a way of spelling out how a moral judgement has to be 
understood “for the purposes of assigning truth conditions”125. This 
seems to fit the form of speaker relativist analysis we are currently con-
sidering.126 
Is this argument more successful than Wong’s? In the previous sec-
tion I argued that Wong’s argument is problematic since it presupposes 
an analysis of moral judgements that seems to be in conflict with the 
absolutist intuitions of many speakers. The direct argument does not 
 
125 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996. 
126 In chapter 7 we will see that there are other ways in which Harman describes his 
theory that fit less well with this form of speaker relativism. However, since Harman’s 
view is quite underdescribed, the current form can be seen as one of several possible 
interpretations. 
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presuppose such an analysis. Instead the relativist (and thus non-abso-
lutist) analysis is the conclusion of the argument. I think that this argu-
ment is also problematic, however. 
Let us make a comparison. Alexander uses the word ‘witch’ about all 
people wearing a hat and only about people with hat. Joakim uses the 
word about all people with a moustache and only about people with a 
moustache. Does this mean that they refer to different properties by the 
word? No. Both agree that someone is a witch if and only if he or she has 
magical powers. They agree (i) that if there are no people with magical 
powers, then there are no witches (even if there are people with hats and 
moustaches), and (ii) if all and only people with hats have magical pow-
ers then people with hats are the witches and if all and only people with 
moustache have magical powers, then it is people with moustache who 
are witches. If this is the case, we do not want to say that they refer to 
different properties by the word ‘witch’. Their belief that someone is a 
witch if and only if he or she has magical powers is stronger than their 
beliefs that it is people with hats or moustaches that are witches. Since 
they share the former and stronger belief, the reasonable conclusion to 
draw is that they refer to the same property.  
Can it be like this in the case of moral disagreements as well? Let us 
take an example. We have a utilitarian who think that an action is mor-
ally right if and only if it maximizes well-being. And we have a Kantian 
who maintains that many acts that do not maximize well-being are mor-
ally right. Can we conclude that they refer to different properties by 
‘right’? Not so fast. Many of us have strong absolutist intuitions about 
moral properties. We think that an action is morally right only if it has 
an objective or absolute reason-giving property. (I will expand more on 
how to spell out and understand this intuition in chapter 5 and 6.)  
Assume that the utilitarian above has this intuition or belief. He has 
two beliefs about what it takes for a an act to be morally right: 
(i) An action is right only if it maximizes well-being. 
(ii) An action is morally right only if it has an absolute reason-
giving property.  
Assume further that for our utilitarian the second belief is stronger than 
the first. He thinks (i) that if no actions have absolute reason-giving 
properties, then no actions are right, even if they maximize well-being (a 
la Mackie’s error-theory), and (ii) that if the absolute reason-giving facts 
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there are, are Kantian in nature, then actions can be morally right even if 
they do not maximize well-being. Then it seems that our utilitarian is 
not using ‘morally right’ as co-extensive with ‘maximizes well-being’ 
after all: there are scenarios in which he is ready to separate his use of 
‘is right’ from his use of ‘maximizes well-being’. 
Assume furthermore that the Kantian has the corresponding beliefs. 
Then the situation is structurally identical to Alexander's and Joakim’s 
beliefs about witches. Now it does not seem plausible to say that their 
beliefs in utilitarianism and Kantianism fix the referents of ‘morally 
right’ as they use it respectively. So their disagreement is no evidence of 
speaker relativism.127  
The argument here is to the effect that, even if we assume that suffi-
ciently divergent use is evidence of difference in extension, radical dis-
agreement need not indicate sufficiently divergent use. Whether or not 
the disagreement between the utilitarian and the Kantian is radical 
depends on whether it would be solved if they were deprived of all cog-
nitive shortcomings. If removing all cognitive shortcomings would 
make them see the nature of absolute moral facts, then it is not a radical 
disagreement. If it would not, this means that their moral controversy is 
cognitively irresolvable. But, and this is my point, they would still agree 
about the possible scenarios as described above.  
My point here is not that the absolutist intuitions or beliefs of people 
like our utilitarian above do serve to determine the meaning or reference 
of their moral judgements (even though I will argue that they do in part 
2). Rather, the point is that even given the assumption behind the seman-
tic argument from diversity – that people’s strong beliefs can serve to 
determine the meaning or reference of the their moral judgements – we 
cannot conclude that divergence in people’s normative moral beliefs 
implies speaker relativism; this move would ignore the possibility that 
people’s absolutist beliefs about moral properties are stronger than 
their normative views. To deal with this issue, speaker relativists have 
to address meaning theoretical questions and argue from them that the 
absolutist intentions are indecisive. We will consider different possible 
ways for speaker relativists to argue along this line in part 2.128 
 
127 The corresponding holds for Wong’s argument from diversity. That is, Wong’s 
argument is questionable not only because it presupposes a non-absolutist analysis of 
moral expressions, but also because the absolutist intentions that many speakers have 
make it unclear what their divergent use of moral terms imply. 
128 In ”Moral Relativism and the Argument from Disagreement” James Ryan purports 
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Neither is my point that every speaker would respond to the scenario 
like the imagined utilitarian in the example above. But some, perhaps 
many, would. And this is a problem for the direct semantic argument 
from diversity, since it is supposed to be an argument for a general 
speaker relativism, according to which the truth-value of every speaker’s 
moral judgements depends on which morality she accepts. 
3.4  A bs olutism’s  Dil e m m a  
I have argued that the fact that many speakers have absolutist intentions 
when making moral judgements is a problem for the semantic argu-
ments from diversity for speaker relativism. This, however, does not 
mean that considerations about the diversity of moral opinions do not 
tell against absolutism. If they do, this constitutes an indirect argument 
for speaker relativism. 
According to the argumentative line against absolutism we will con-
sider in this section, the existence of radical moral disagreements pre-
sents moral absolutism with a dilemma. The absolutist will have to 
accept either an implausible form of realism or error-theory.  
Consider first the consequence of radical moral disagreements for re-
alism. The existence of such disagreements would not directly demon-
strate the falsity of moral realism. However, it would commit the realist 
to the view that there is no method or mechanism for getting in contact 
with the moral facts there are, the use of which would make it more 
probable that one acquires true moral beliefs. If there is such a method 
or mechanism, even though the use of it does not guarantee true belief, 
there will be conditions under which it leads to true belief. These are 
cognitively optimal conditions. Thus, if there is such a method, then 
there are no radical moral disagreements – disagreements will either be 
the effect of that at least one of the disputants lack the method or fail to 
apply it under cognitively optimal conditions.129 The existence of radical 
 
to give another direct semantic argument for moral relativism. However, in Ryan’s 
discussion “moral relativism” alters between being a speaker relativist and an agent 
relativist position. In formulations such as, ”When I say, “Communism is wrong,” I mean, 
“Communism violates the (largest and most coherent set of) standards of my society.” 
(Ryan, 2003, p. 381), it sounds like a form of speaker relativism is under discussion. The 
conclusion of his argument, however, is agent relativism: “The conclusion of the 
argument is that it is possible for an act to be morally permissible in one society while an act of 
the same kind would be morally impermissible in another society”. (Ryan, 2003, p. 383). 
129 I am assuming determinism here: if indeterminism is true, then a method that gives 
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moral disagreements thus commits moral realists to the position that 
there is no method to reach the moral facts there are.130 This is a posi-
tion realists generally do not want to hold. And the position does indeed 
seem problematic: why posit the existence of moral facts that we have 
no reliable way of tracking? 
This line of reasoning is no doubt to short and rough to establish that 
the existence of radical disagreements would constitute a real threat to 
realism.131 But in what follows I will simply assume that it is not a 
viable option for realists to accept that there are radical moral dis-
agreements.132 And I will argue that even if this is so, and even if we 
assume that there are radical moral disagreements, this does not 
threaten absolutism. It doesn’t since the objection against error-theory 
in the second horn of the dilemma can be answered, at least given prem-
ises that speaker relativists need to grant. So let us turn to this second 
horn of the dilemma. 
If absolutists cannot be realists, since there are radical moral dis-
agreements (which I assume for the sake of argument), the only alterna-
tive for them is to accept an error-theory; that absolute facts of the kind 
moral judgements are about do not exist. And most people find error-
theory very counterintuitive. Wong writes as follows about Mackie’s 
error-theory: 
 
rise to true moral beliefs with high probability, might fail to do so in situations that are 
just like the situations where it succeeds. 
130 Whether radical moral disagreements also commit realists to the view that moral 
facts are unknowable seems to depend on which view of epistemic justification one has. It 
does not, for example, preclude that someone has true moral beliefs that fit nicely 
together in a coherent system. It does, however, preclude that this coherence is a method 
of getting in touch with moral truths: if it were, under cognitively optimal conditions it 
would lead to true moral beliefs.  
131 I can see two possible ways to defend realism from the threat of radical 
disagreement. First, one could argue that radical disagreements do not imply that there is 
no method to get in contact with moral facts. Or second, one could argue that there is no 
such method, but that it is still possible to justify the idea that there are facts of the kind 
we have no method to reach.  
132 It has been argued that realists can accept a certain amount of radical moral 
disagreements since they can hold that some moral propositions are vague so that some 
moral questions have indeterminate answers. (See for example Brink, 1984, Shafer-
Landau, 1994, Sturgeon, 1994 and Tersman, 2006, p. 66) It is not clear, however, that 
reference to indeterminacy or vagueness can help realists. Loeb puts this doubt as 
follows: ”If we continue to disagree a great deal about borderline cases, rather than 
recognize that they are irresolvable because they are indeterminate, then we still have 
genuine disagreement of the sort that threatens moral realism.” (Loeb, 1998, p. 291). 
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Mackie’s explanation of why people err in believing in a single true morality 
has a severe cost. He has built into the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘ought’ a false 
presupposition that makes all moral statements containing these terms false 
[…].133 
The cost of error-theory, Wong seems to think, is that it makes all 
moral judgements come out false. It cannot be denied that this is a 
deeply counterintuitive consequence of error-theory – that every posi-
tive moral judgement, saying that an action is morally right or wrong or 
that a person or event is morally good or bad, is false. This is, as Dreier 
puts it, “violently contrary to common sense”134. One way to spell this 
counterintuitivity out in philosophical terms is to refer to some princi-
ple of charity. Is it not very uncharitable and therefore implausible to 
say that beliefs constituting a large sub-set of our belief system, beliefs 
that every one of us have every day, are all false without exception? Is it 
not more reasonable to assume that those beliefs have some other con-
tent that makes at least some of them come out as true? 
Why does it seem so implausible that all positive moral beliefs are 
false? One way to bring out what seems mysterious about this is that, if 
it is true, we form our moral beliefs on grounds that are totally irrele-
vant. If we do not observe or stand in some other contact with moral 
properties, which we cannot since they are not there, why do we believe 
that they exist? Why would we form our moral judgements from con-
siderations that give no support to them? Or, in other words, if moral 
judgements were beliefs about a kind of facts that do not exist, could we 
not rather expect that we did not have positive moral beliefs, or at least 
that such beliefs were not had by more or less everyone? If error-theo-
rists cannot answer these questions, this casts doubt on the absolutist 
analysis they accept. If, on the other hand, they can answer the questions, 
they have explained why we come to believe that actions have properties 
such as moral rightness and wrongness when in fact they do not. This 
would be a way to rid the claim that all positive moral beliefs are false 
from the implausibility it initially seems to have.  
 
133 Wong, 1984, p. 78 In full length the last sentence in the quote reads: “He has built 
into the meaning of ‘good’ and ‘ought’ a false presupposition that makes all moral 
statements containing these terms false or without truth-values.” (My italics.) However, 
the view that moral statements lack truth-value is part of non-cognitivism and not error-
theory. 
134 Dreier, 2006, p. 241. 
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I will not argue here that error-theorists can answer the questions 
above. Instead I will argue that what error-theorists need to say in order 
to make their theory plausible in light of these considerations, is some-
thing that speaker relativists also need to say. If I am right about this, the 
objection to error-theory at hand is not an objection speaker relativists 
can use. 
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume with speaker relativists that 
what guides people in making the specific moral judgements they make 
is not that they observe absolute moral facts, but rather the moralities 
they have somehow acquired (the set of values, principles, desires, moti-
vations, or something similar that they have), together, of course, with 
their beliefs about the properties of the actions they evaluate. Speaker 
relativists have to hold that this does not exclude that people also have 
absolutist intuitions and beliefs about what these moral judgements are, 
intuitions to the effect that they are beliefs about absolute moral proper-
ties. They have to accept this since many people actually do have such an 
absolutist understanding of moral judgements. They also have to accept 
that people do keep forming moral judgements, even though (i) people 
think that moral facts are absolute moral facts and (ii) there are no such 
facts. Suppose now that these absolutist intuitions about moral proper-
ties came to have a central enough place in the system of beliefs that 
these people have to actually fix the reference of their moral beliefs, so 
that the beliefs concern absolute moral properties. Why would this fact 
make it harder to explain that people with these intuitions keep forming 
moral judgements? 
The potential problem for error theory we are considering is that it 
seems strange that people have moral beliefs if all of them are false. But: 
if people can maintain their belief that moral properties are absolute 
properties and still form moral judgements even though there are no 
absolute moral properties (which obviously they can if speaker relativ-
ism is correct) why would they not be able to do that if the absolutist 
belief was reference-fixing? There should be no difference with respect 
to this: plausibly, it is the mere presence of the belief that our moral 
judgements are beliefs about absolute moral properties that would 
make it strange that we actually accept moral judgements in light of the 
fact that there are no such absolute moral properties, not that it is refer-
ence-fixing. The upshot is the following: since also speaker relativists 
have to accept the claim that people keep having moral beliefs even 
though that which they take these beliefs to be about does not exist, they 
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cannot object to error-theory on the ground that this claim is implausi-
ble.  
This argument can be further supplemented by the following reason-
ing. The fact that the assumed inexistence of absolute moral facts is a 
non-transparent fact (which it must be since people who think that 
moral facts are absolute keep forming moral beliefs), means that the 
evolutionary pressure to accept moral judgements has more of a free 
scope to exercise its force on us. In the previous chapter I introduced the 
idea that at least part of the social and evolutionary function of moral 
thought and language is to make it easier to cooperate and co-ordinate 
actions in groups of people. For moral judgements to have this function, 
people must let their moral opinions guide their actions. This means, of 
course, that people also must have moral opinions; if they do not, there 
is nothing for them to be guided by. This function of moral thinking has 
formed us into the moral thinkers we are. If this is true, we can expect 
that people form moral judgements in much the way we do, at least as 
long as they do not come to think that there is good reason to believe 
that moral thinking is in some way flawed. The inexistence of absolute 
moral properties, together with the intuition that moral judgements 
concern absolute moral properties, could perhaps have constituted a 
good reason to think that moral thinking is flawed; had it not been for the 
non-transparency of this inexistence. So, given this non-transparency, we 
should expect exactly that people continue to have moral beliefs, even if 
error-theory is correct. 
(There is one possible objection to the argument: could people’s be-
liefs in moral absolutism really serve to fix the reference of their moral 
beliefs in such a way that they refer to absolute moral properties? I will 
argue that they can and sometimes do in chapter 6-7.) 
The conclusion is that the dilemma argument against absolutism 
fails. Even if considerations about moral diversity push the realist into 
an infeasible position – a claim I have not taken a stand on – absolutist 
error-theory remains a viable option. At least, the objection to absolutist 
error-theory discussed in this section – that it is implausible to ascribe 
so much error – cannot be used by speaker relativists.  
3.5 C o n clusi o n 
I have argued that there is no simple argument from the existence of 
moral diversity to speaker relativism. First, the semantic arguments 
from diversity for speaker relativism are problematic due to the abso-
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lutist intentions of many speakers. Second, as we have just seen, the 
argument that aims to make speaker relativism plausible through forc-
ing absolutism into a dilemma fails, since it is possible to argue that 
error-theoretical absolutism can find a way out of the dilemma on 
premises that speaker relativists need to accept. This means that some-
thing else is needed to decide between speaker relativism and absolut-
ism. 
In the previous chapter we also saw that the argument from motiva-
tion for speaker relativism fails, because absolutists can explain the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. The conclusion 
so far, is that the decision between speaker relativism and absolutism 
has to be settled on other grounds. In the next chapter we will discuss 
one such argument, the most common argument against speaker relativ-
ism: that this theory cannot account for the fact that in many moral 
disputes, the parties are in genuine disagreement and are not merely 
speaking past each other. 
  
 
Chapter 4 
Trouble for Relativism: 
Explaining Disagreement 
4. 1  Intr oducti o n  
If speaker relativism is true, moral terms have different extensions 
when speakers with relevantly different moralities use them. One con-
sequence of this seems to be that in situations where one person says 
about an action, “it is right” and another says about that action, “it is not 
right” they need not disagree. If ‘right’ in the two statements have differ-
ent extension, as might be the case on speaker relativism, it is fully pos-
sible that both statements are true. The action might fall within one of 
the extensions, but not within the other.  
In large parts of the metaethical literature, this consequence is taken 
as decisive evidence that speaker relativism is false. Obviously, it is 
thought, when two people make claims like those above, there is a dis-
agreement. Consequently, any theory that implies that there isn’t must 
be wrong. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss this objection. In the follow-
ing section we will look closer at it. After that, we consider replies to 
the effect that relativism does indeed imply that there are moral dis-
agreements in the sense that the objection presupposes. First I consider 
speaker relativist attempts to use this kind of reply and argue that these 
fail. But recently a new form of truth-value relativism, which I call asses-
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sor relativism, has been suggested to do better in this respect. I argue that 
it doesn’t. 
This, however, need not be a large problem for relativists, if they can 
explain why we have these intuitions about moral disagreement even 
though they are false; or alternatively, if they can argue that these are not 
the intuitions we have about moral disagreements. I argue that it is plau-
sible to think that explanations of these two sorts are available. 
4. 2  Sp e a k e r R el at i v is m a nd M o r al  D is ag r e e m e nt 
As we have seen in previous chapters, speaker relativism is motivated by 
what we might call subjective features of morality: the connection be-
tween having a moral opinion and being motivated, and the large differ-
ences between different people’s moral opinions. Speaker relativists 
take these features to be indicators that moral terms refer to different 
things when used by different speakers. What the many philosophers 
who use the objection from disagreement against speaker relativism 
point to, is that we have intuitions that morality is not subjective in this 
way. More specifically, we have intuitions to the effect that when people 
are involved in moral disputes they disagree in a way that is consistent 
with moral absolutism but not with relativism.  
The objection to speaker relativism that the theory has counterintui-
tive implications about moral disagreements has been on the metaethi-
cal scene at least since G. E. Moore:  
If, when one man says, ‘This action is right’, and another answers, ‘No, it is not 
right’, each of them is always merely making an assertion about his own feel-
ings, it plainly follows that there is never really any difference of opinion be-
tween them: the one of them is never really contradicting what the other is 
asserting. They are no more contradicting one another than if, when one said, 
‘I like sugar’, the other had answered, ‘I don’t like sugar’. In such a case, there 
is, of course, no conflict of opinion, no contradiction of one by the other: for it 
may perfectly well be the case that what each asserts is equally true; it might 
quite well be the case that the one man does like sugar, and the other really 
does not like it. The one, therefore, is never denying what the other is asserting. 
And what the view we are considering involves is that when one man holds an 
action to be right, and another holds it to be wrong or not right, here also the 
one is never denying what the other is asserting. It involves, therefore, the very 
curious consequence that no two men can ever differ in opinion as to whether 
an action is right or wrong. And surely the fact that it involves this conse-
quence is sufficient to condemn it. It is surely plain matter of fact that when I 
assert an action to be wrong, and another man asserts it to be right, there 
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sometimes is a real difference of opinion between us: he sometimes is denying 
the very thing which I am asserting.135 
More modern writers make the same point. Crispin Wright complains 
about indexical relativism that 
it seems destined to misrepresent the manner in which, at least as ordinarily 
understood, the contents in question embed under operations like the condi-
tional and negation. If it were right, there would be an analogy between dis-
putes of inclination and the ‘dispute’ between one who says ‘I am tired’ and 
her companion who replies, ‘Well, I am not’. […] There are the materials here, 
perhaps, for a (further) disagreement but no disagreement has yet been ex-
pressed. But ordinary understanding already hears a disagreement between 
one who asserts that hurt-free infidelity is acceptable and one who asserts that 
it is not.136  
And Mark Timmons: 
[…] it is clear that some modes of discourse are properly understood as involv-
ing terms and concepts for which a relativist treatment is entirely plausible. 
However, let us say that a version of relativism, for a certain class of terms and 
concepts, is chauvinistic just in case it entails that in cases where two indi-
viduals or groups really do seem to be thinking or uttering contradictory judg-
ments employing those terms and concepts, the judgments in question are not 
really contradictory at all. Typically, an important source of evidence that 
some version of relativism is chauvinistic is when there is a mismatch between 
what the theory says about certain cases on the one hand and what pre-theo-
retic common sense says about those cases on the other. In particular, we 
have evidence of chauvinism when common sense says that certain judg-
ments really are contradictory and we have a genuine case of disagreement, 
whereas the theory says that there is a lack of genuine disagreement […].  
Now I submit that relativistic treatments of moral terms and concepts are 
chauvinistic and thus we have reason (defeasible, of course) to reject versions 
of moral relativism.137 
These are just a small selection of more or less similar formulations of 
the objection from the metaethical literature.138 I will call this objection 
to speaker relativism ‘the objection from intuitive disagreement’. The 
charge it holds against speaker relativism is that the theory implies that 
 
135 Moore, 1912, pp. 63-64. 
136 Wright, 2001, p. 51. 
137 Timmons, 2003, pp. 406-07. 
138 For a few other examples, see: Horgan and Timmons, 2000, Horgan and Timmons, 
Forthcoming, Kölbel, 2002, Smith, 1994, pp. 34-35, Streiffer, 1999 and Brink, 1989, pp. 
29-35. As noted in the previous chapter, non-cognitivists have used this kind of argument 
to argue against cognitivism generally, after arguing that cognitivists are committed to 
some form of relativism; see footnotes 121 and 122. 
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people who are involved in moral disputes of the kind exemplified in 
the quotes above, are not disagreeing with each other in a way that we 
intuitively think that they are disagreeing. Timmons refers to this intui-
tion as ‘commons sense’ and Wright as ‘ordinary understanding’.  
There are also other ways to put basically the same objection. One is 
Max Kölbel’s claim that the theory faces a problem regarding denials of 
moral utterances.139 We can use a simple version of speaker relativism 
to illustrate: “X is wrong” has the same meaning as “My morality for-
bids X”. Now, assume that we have a moral dispute between a Kantian, 
we can call him Kant, and a utilitarian, Smart: 
Kant: (S1) It is wrong to punish innocent Irwin. 
Smart: (S2) No, that’s not true.  
Now, on the one hand we expect Smart’s statement to be equivalent to  
(S3) No, punishing innocent Irwin is not wrong  
and therefore, on the relativist picture, equivalent to 
(S4) No, my morality does not forbid punishing innocent Irwin 
On the other hand we expect it to be a denial of Kant’s statement, that is, 
a denial of that Kant’s morality forbids punishing innocent Irwin, and 
therefore equivalent to  
(S5) No, your morality does not forbid punishing innocent Irwin 
Speaker relativism faces a dilemma. If the speaker relativist says that 
(S2) is equivalent to (S5) she will in effect implausibly maintain that 
denials of moral statements (such as (S2)) are not moral statements 
themselves. According to speaker relativism, moral statements are 
statements about the speaker’s own morality, not about other people’s 
moralities. 
On the other hand, it would be equally implausible for speaker rela-
tivists to say that (S2) is equivalent to (S4). This would commit them to 
the view that moral denials or negations work differently than denials 
 
139 Kölbel, 2002. 
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or negations in other cases: “the move involves a separate treatment of 
the denial of indexical utterances when matters of taste are involved. 
Normally denials of indexical utterances function differently. In order 
to appreciate the absurdity of the special rule in non-taste cases, con-
sider a situation where I say ‘Hello, my name is Max.’, addressing Paul. It 
would be very strange indeed if Paul were to answer ‘No, it’s Paul.’ – 
unless he wanted to accuse me of pretending to be someone I am not.”140 
I think that the power of the dilemma argument basically comes from 
the objection that moral relativism clashes with our intuitions about 
moral disagreement. The implausibility of the first horn of the dilemma 
pushes the relativist into the second horn, which in its most plausible 
form should be interpreted as a version of the intuitive disagreement 
objection. It is not the fact that the word ‘no’ is used in moral disagree-
ments that make it implausible to say that (S2) is equivalent to (S4). 
This word is regularly used to indicate our own negative attitude to 
someone else’s desires or intentions. For example: when your only 
friend at a boring party says to you “I want to leave now” and you say 
“No, please can’t you stay a bit longer”, you don’t use ‘no’ to negate what 
your friend has said; you use it to emphasize your dislike or disapproval 
of her intention. What is implausible about interpreting (S2) as (S4) is 
that we have the intuition that there really is a genuine disagreement, in 
the sense that (S2) is used to negate (S1).  
Before we turn to relativist replies to the objection from intuitive dis-
agreements, we can note that different forms of speaker relativism have 
slightly different implications for disagreement. We saw that Moore 
objected to the variant of speaker relativism he considers that it involves 
“the very curious consequence that no two men can ever differ in opin-
ion as to whether an action is right or wrong”. The claim that speaker 
relativism has the consequence that people can never disagree over 
moral matters is true for some forms of relativism but not others. The 
form of speaker relativism Moore discusses, a version of subjectivism, 
does have this consequence. It does because it says that moral judge-
ments are about the speaker’s morality. If different speakers always talk 
about different moralities, they will always speak past each other rather 
than disagree (or agree). There are other forms of speaker relativism, 
however, that imply that two individuals can disagree (and agree) if their 
moralities are sufficiently alike but not otherwise. According to 
 
140 Ibid., p. 40. 
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Dreier’s speaker relativism, for example, which as we have seen treats 
moral terms as indexicals, moral terms refer (roughly) to natural prop-
erties that the speaker likes or dislikes. If two speakers share the 
relevant likings and dislikings they can therefore refer to the same prop-
erties, and as a consequence they can disagree (and agree) on moral mat-
ters. If their likings and dislikings are not similar in this way, however, 
it is true that they cannot disagree (or agree). It should be clear that this 
is enough for the objection from intuitive disagreement to get a hold: 
our intuitions that people who are involved in moral disputes actually 
disagree is equally strong when the two parties do not share morality or 
likings, as the example with Kant and Smart shows. 
4.3  W ays of Ans w e r i ng the O b j e cti o n  
The objection we are considering is that speaker relativism clashes with 
our intuitions about moral disagreement. This means that it can be 
replied in two different ways. One kind of reply is to admit that the 
preferred relativist theory clashes with our intuitions about disagree-
ments, but that it is the intuitions that are flawed and that we can explain 
why we have them. That is, we can explain away our intuitions about 
disagreement.  
Replies of the other kind deny that the preferred relativist theory, 
when properly specified, clashes with our intuitions about disagree-
ment. The theory implies that people do disagree in the way we intui-
tively think they do. If this is true, we can say that the theory in question 
confirms our intuitions about disagreement. 
Replies to the objection might also involve another move. Consider 
the following dispute: 
Kant: It is wrong to punish innocent Irwin. 
Smart: It is not wrong to punish innocent Irwin. 
We intuitively think that Kant and Smart disagree. This intuition seems 
to constitute a threat to speaker relativism since this view implies that 
the propositions expressed by Kant’s and Smart’s respective statements 
are consistent with each other. One way for speaker relativists to 
counter the objection would be to question the interpretation of the 
disagreement intuitions that this objection presupposes: our intuitions, 
it might be claimed, are not to the effect that Kant and Smart express 
inconsistent propositions. 
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In what follows I will first, in 4.4 and 4.5, consider the perhaps most 
straightforward kind of relativist replies: replies according to which 
relativism can confirm our disagreement intuitions, and that it can do 
this even if the intuitions are not reinterpreted. After that I discuss re-
plies that involve reinterpreting the intuitions or explaining them away.  
4. 4  D is ag r e e m e nt A b out a C o m m o n  M o r al ity 
We saw in chapter 2 that Dreier accepts a form of speaker relativism 
according to which moral terms are indexicals which pick out different 
properties depending on the morality of the speaker. We also saw that 
Dreier points to the fact that the ways in which indexicals depend on the 
context often are quite complex. The point is that this can be used to 
handle some problems a more crude view on moral terms as indexicals 
would have. Dreier thinks that the objection from genuine disagreement 
is one such problem. Imagine again a situation where one person says, 
“X is right”, and another says, “No, X is not right”.  
In brief, the reply is that in contexts like the one imagined, two speakers who 
we think are disagreeing are assuming that there is a substantial area of over-
lap between their moral systems. The situation, I believe, is parallel to one in 
which you and I are together looking through a pile of papers looking for an 
important document. You say, “It just isn’t here,” and I say, “Yes, it must be 
here.” If we took a crude view of ‘here’, thinking it referred directly to the 
place of the speaker, we’d have to admit that we were not really disagreeing. 
But in fact, our uses of the indexical ‘here’ should be taken to refer to a com-
mon area of overlap between us. Just so with the moral indexicals, or so I 
would argue.141 
There are two ideas in this passage. One is that there actually is a sub-
stantial area of overlap between the moral systems of any two parties to 
a moral dispute. Their respective moralities, we have to suppose, are 
such that an action cannot have the property one refers to by ‘right’ un-
less it has the property the other refers to by that term (for example that 
the term refers to the same property when used by each of the two 
speakers). If speaker relativism is true, however, this idea is false. 
Speaker relativism implies that the same moral sentence can be true 
when uttered by one speaker and false when uttered by another.  
The other idea in the passage is that the speakers we think of as dis-
agreeing assume that there is a substantial area of overlap between their 
 
141 Dreier, 1992, p. 31. 
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moral systems. This could explain why the parties to moral disputes of 
the kind in question standardly think of themselves as disagreeing. This 
is similar to one of Harman’s replies to the objection from disagree-
ment: 
When a relativist makes a simple moral judgment, expressing a moral demand, 
saying that a certain sort of act is morally wrong, for example, making no ex-
plicit reference to one or another morality, the speaker makes this judgment in 
relation to a morality he or she accepts, presupposing that this morality is also 
accepted by anyone to whom the judgment is addressed […].142 
This response is also problematic, however. First we can notice that it is 
not a response to the effect that speaker relativism implies that moral 
disputes actually are disagreements in the intuitive sense, but an expla-
nation of why we falsely have this intuition. Harman recognises this: 
They presuppose that they are making these judgments in relation to the same 
relevant moral demands. Of course, they may be mistaken about that, in 
which case they really are talking past each other despite their intentions.143 
Furthermore, the response fails as an explanation of our intuitions as 
well. In some situations the two disputing parties do not think of them-
selves as having moral systems that overlap in the relevant sense; they 
know that the other person has a morality that allows (disallows) some 
act that their own morality disallows (allows). And even if the idea that 
the parties to a moral dispute always mistakenly think that there is an 
overlap could be defended, this would not explain why others who think 
about their dispute and know that there is no relevant overlap think of it 
as a disagreement. 
In another place Dreier acknowledges these limitations to the re-
sponse: there are cases where the parties to a moral dispute ”may not 
accept enough of the same norms, and they may even know that they 
don’t.”144 In such cases, Dreier says, there are other ways for the relativ-
ist to explain disagreement. We will return to these in 4.6. 
The common-morality solution just discussed fails, but there is a 
similar idea that might seem more promising. Let us first consider the 
idea as it is put by DeRose.145  His discussion is focused on what con-
textualists about knowledge should say about situations where people 
 
142 Harman, 1978, p. 158. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Dreier, 1999, p. 569. 
145 DeRose, 2004. 
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with different standards for knowledge are involved in a discussion in 
which they make seemingly conflicting claims about whether a person 
knows something. The general idea, though, is applicable to other con-
text-dependent expressions.  
DeRose uses David Lewis’ influential metaphor of “conversational 
scorekeeping”.146 On this picture, in any conversation there is a conver-
sational scoreboard that changes depending on the assertions (or “con-
versational moves”) made by any of the speakers. The scores on the 
board at any moment represent roughly the presuppositions of the 
conversation at that moment, and it is in light of these that the next 
assertion is to be interpreted. 
DeRose’s idea is that this picture can be used to handle disagreements 
for contextualism. Applied to moral speaker relativism, the idea would 
be the following. When two people discuss moral matters the reference 
of the moral terms they use is not determined by the moral systems they 
accept respectively, but by a common moral standard that in some way 
depend on the shared scoreboard in that conversation. DeRose discusses 
various alternative views on how the conversational moves and mental 
states of the participants to the conversation determine the standard that 
in turn determines the reference of the context-dependent terms they 
use. We do not have to go into these details, however. No matter which 
of these views we choose, as long as the truth-values of both speakers’ 
assertions are determined by the same standard, the speakers will dis-
agree when one says, “x is right” and the other says, “x is not right”. 
On the present view, even though the truth-values of a moral sentence 
will not vary within a conversation (at least not as long as the relevant 
part of the conversational scoreboard has not changed), relativism will 
still hold between conversations. And the view seems to avoid the prob-
lems we saw with Dreier’s common-morality solution above: there is 
room for saying that the morality which determines the truth-values 
need not be an actual overlap between the speakers’ actual moralities.147 
 
146 Lewis, 1979. 
147 The view does not imply that in every dispute between two persons, such as a moral 
dispute between a Kantian and a Utilitarian, there is a common scoreboard that 
determines truth-value so that one of them speaks truly and the other falsely. On the 
specific view DeRose defends, when each of the two disputants refutes the other’s 
presuppositions, there is a gap in the scoreboard, so that the statements that concern 
cases where there is no overlap lack truth-value. But since the truth-values (or lack 
thereof) of both speakers’ statements are determined relative to the same scoreboard, 
they will still be disagreeing. 
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This is actually how one moral relativist, David Phillips, argues that the 
problem of intuitive disagreement should be handled: 
In typical moral conversational contexts, or anyway those that are brought to 
mind by the objection [from disagreement], the purpose of the parties is to 
come to practical agreement on an issue. Such agreement will not be forth-
coming if moral terms are taken to refer to standards or norms known to be 
accepted by one party but to be rejected by others. […] Hence, in such con-
versational contexts, standards shared by all parties tend to be invoked.148 
Thus, according to Phillips’ form of relativism, “the chief determinant 
of the standards invoked on a particular occasion”, that is, that which 
determines the system relative to which moral statements get their 
truth-value”, “are the contextually indicated interests and beliefs of the 
parties and their conversational purposes”.149  
The form of conversational relativism suggested by DeRose and Phil-
lips has the means to explain some of our intuitions about disagreement 
– those about conflicting utterances within the same conversation. But 
since these are not the only cases of moral disagreement, the view is still 
problematic. First, even though the view that the truth-values of utter-
ances of moral sentences vary with a shared conversational scoreboard 
might have some intuitive plausibility, speaker relativism is a view 
about the truth-values of moral beliefs as well as utterances. It seems 
highly implausible that the content of our moral beliefs depends on 
which conversation we are involved in for the moment. This is a prob-
lem since we have the intuition that there is a disagreement between one 
who believes that x is right and another who believes that x is not right. 
A second problem with applying conversational relativism to moral 
disputes is that it works at most for assertions made in the same con-
versation. Phillips seems to suggests that these are the only cases about 
which we have we have intuitions about disagreement: ”It is in cases of 
moral differences without disagreement, where there is no conversational con-
text linking the parties, that we are much moral likely to see utterances of 
the same moral terms as invoking distinct standards.”150 I think it is 
obvious, however, that we think that we sometimes disagree over moral 
matters with people with whom we are not involved in a conversation. 
For example, I take myself to be in moral disagreement with Hitler, even 
 
148 Phillips, 1997, p. 403. 
149 Ibid., p. 401. 
150 Ibid., p. 404. 
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though I have never been in a discussion with him.151 Since the conversa-
tional account does not give us this result, it does not, after all, help to 
make speaker relativism consistent with moral disputes being dis-
agreements in the way they intuitively are. 
4.5 Ass ess o r R el at i v is m 
This far, the discussion in both in the previous chapters and the present 
one, has focused on the most common form of moral truth-value rela-
tivism, namely moral speaker relativism. The idea that speaker-
relativism has counterintuitive consequences for moral disagreements 
has generated new forms of moral truth-value relativism. Speaker rela-
tivism builds on the well-known phenomenon that certain expressions, 
such as sentences containing indexicals, have their contents and (there-
fore) truth-values determined partly by the context in which they are 
uttered or used. Moral speaker relativists hold that moral sentences 
belong to that kind of expressions.  
According to the new forms of relativism, the truth-values of certain 
expressions are context-dependent in another way. On this view, applied 
to moral expressions, any moral sentence (which does not contain other, 
non-moral, context-dependent terms) expresses the same proposition 
no matter who utters it, but the truth-value of moral propositions are 
relative to the context in which the propositions are assessed or evalu-
ated. More specifically, moral propositions have different truth-values 
relative to different assessors of the sentences, depending on the moral-
ity of the assessor. We can call this view moral assessor relativism.  
 
151 MacFarlane makes this point by exemplifying with other supposedly context-
dependent expressions (‘delicious’ and ‘funny’):  
“1. When I was ten, I used to go around saying ‘‘fish sticks are delicious’’ (and meaning 
it!). Now I say ‘‘fish sticks are not delicious.’’ It seems to me that I disagree with my past 
self. But I am not involved in a conversation with my past self.  
2. Similarly, when I overhear a group of ten-year-olds chattering about how ‘‘funny’’ 
certain knocknock jokes are, I may think that they are wrong. These jokes just aren’t that 
funny. But the kids certainly don’t think of themselves as involved in a conversation with 
me—they may not even know I’m there. Nor do I think of myself as conversing with 
them.” (MacFarlane, 2007, p. 20)  
It seems to me that the point is stronger in the moral case: I do not have as strong 
intuitions about disagreement when it comes disputes about taste and humour as I do for 
moral disputes. See section 4.5.4 for more discussion of this.  
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It has been argued that assessor relativism can account for genuine 
disagreements in a way that speaker relativism cannot. In this section I 
will evaluate this claim.  
4.5.1   R e l at iviz ing pr oposi t ion - tr u t h  
Assessor relativism goes against the traditional picture in a way that 
might seem puzzling: it claims that what is said by a specific assertion – 
that is, a specific content or proposition – can have different truth-val-
ues relative to different contexts of assessment. Can we make sense of 
this? Actually, the idea is not that revolutionary. As John MacFarlane 
puts it, this idea  
might not be as wild as it sounds. On standard views, propositions have truth 
values relative to ‘‘circumstances of evaluation.’’ These are typically taken to 
be possible worlds, but a minority tradition takes circumstances of evaluation 
to be world/time pairs.152 
MacFarlane continues with a quote from Kaplan: 
A circumstance will usually include a possible state or history of the world, a 
time, and perhaps other features as well. The amount of information we re-
quire from a circumstance is linked to the degree of specificity of contents, 
and thus to the kinds of operators in the language.153 
If we wish to isolate location and regard it as a feature of possible circum-
stances we can introduce locational operators: ‘Two miles north it is the case 
that’, etc. ...However, to make such operators interesting we must have con-
tents which are locationally neutral. That is, it must be appropriate to ask if 
what is said would be true in Pakistan. (For example, ‘It is raining’ seems to be 
locationally as well as temporally and modally neutral.)154 
On the standard Kaplanian view, sentences express propositions relative 
to contexts of use: sentences containing context-dependent expressions 
such as indexicals express different propositions relative to different 
contexts of use, and sentences without such expressions express the 
same propositions relative to every context of use. In turn, the proposi-
tions expressed have their truth-values relative to different circum-
stances of evaluation. The circumstances of evaluation are usually 
thought to be possible worlds (but, as MacFarlane points out, there are 
ideas according to which other things, such as times, should be included 
 
152 Ibid., p. 21. 
153 Kaplan, 1989, p. 502. 
154 Ibid., p. 504. 
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here155). Thus, every contingent proposition (such as the proposition 
that there are cars in year 2007) is true relative to some possible worlds 
(such as our actual one) but not relative to others (worlds where there 
are no cars in 2007). So already here we have the notion of relative truth-
values for propositions: before we can say whether a proposition is true 
or not, we have to know relative to which circumstance of evaluation, 
which possible world, we are to evaluate it.  
The claim that assessor relativism holds for certain expressions is the 
claim that the intuitively relevant circumstances of evaluations for the 
propositions expressed by these expressions are not possible worlds 
but something more fine-grained (in the sense that they can differ within 
possible worlds), such as moral standards or standards of taste.  
It is important to note one way in which assessor relativism does not, 
or at least need not, differ from speaker relativism. Though assessor 
relativism involves the idea that what we say (the proposition we ex-
press) when we utter an assessor relative sentence is true relative to 
some circumstances of evaluation but false relative to others, those who 
defend this form of relativism accept a non-relative idea about what we 
should aim at when we utter such sentences: we should aim at asserting 
sentences that express propositions that are true relative to our own 
circumstance of evaluation.156 Exemplifying with relativism about taste, 
if I don’t like the taste of x then I should say, “x is not delicious”, but the 
right thing to say for someone who likes x would be “x is delicious”. In 
this regard this view is no different from an ordinary speaker relativism 
about ‘delicious’. Indeed, given the way assessor relativism is analogous 
to the ordinary relativization of propositions to possible worlds, this 
idea about what we should assert is what we could expect. You should 
assert that there are cars in 2007 only if there are cars in 2007 in the 
possible world where you make the utterance. 
Now to the real issue here: can relativism account for our intuitions 
about disagreement? MacFarlane argues that assessor relativism as it 
stands cannot, but that it can if complemented in the right way. In what 
follows I will first argue that MacFarlane is right about non-comple-
 
155 For discussions of this topic, see the papers in Jokic and Smith, 2003. 
156 See e.g. Kölbel, 2002, p. 125 and Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson, 2005. 
MacFarlane has criticized this formulation of the truth norm (MacFarlane, 2005). 
However, his objection does not seem to be that the norm is false or does not hold, but 
that it cannot explain the difference between expressions that are assessment relative and 
those that are merely use-relative. 
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mented assessor relativism. Looking at the reason why it fails is relevant 
because it helps understanding the subsequent discussion of MacFar-
lane’s supplemented version.  
4.5.2  R el at ive  tr u t h  of  moral  pr oposi t ions  an d  moral  
d i sagr eem e n t  
One of the most developed accounts of assessor relativism is found in 
Kölbel’s defence of moral relativism.157 On Kölbel’s view, moral sen-
tences express propositions whose truth-values are relative to the 
morality (“moral perspective”) of the person who evaluates or assesses 
the propositions. Kölbel’s main argument for moral assessor relativism 
is that it is the only theory that can account for the nature of moral dis-
agreements. According to Kölbel, moral disputes often are “faultless 
disagreements”; it holds both (i) that the disputants are in a disagree-
ment, and (ii) that neither of them has made a mistake. On the one hand, 
moral realism implies that one of the disputants have made a mistake. 
On the other hand, expressivism and speaker relativism implies that 
there is no real disagreement.  
How, then, can assessor relativism account for (i), the claim that 
moral disputes are real disagreements? Kölbel writes as follows on the 
difference between how speaker relativism, which he calls ‘indexical 
relativism’, and assessor relativism, which he calls ‘genuine relativism’, 
can account for disagreements:  
Another difficulty of indexical relativism was the fact that it had to give a 
counterintuitive account of moral disagreements. According to SIR [a version 
of indexical relativism], when I sincerely utter (B)[‘Blair ought to go to war’] 
and you sincerely utter ‘It’s not the case that Blair ought to go to war’, what I 
said is not incompatible (in the right way) with what you said. I can just come 
to believe what you said without needing to change my mind. There is no such 
problem in the case of genuine relativism. However, I shall need to introduce 
one further, normative aspect of this theory in order to show how this works: 
every thinker possesses a perspective, and moreover everyone ought not to be-
lieve contents that are not true in relation to their own perspective. On this 
basis, it is clear why I can’t come to believe what you said without needing to 
change my mind: what you have said and what I have said cannot both be 
true in relation to the same perspective. Thus, given that I ought not to be-
lieve something that is not true in relation to my perspective, I should not 
come to believe what you have said without changing my mind.158 
 
157 See, Kölbel, 2002, Kölbel, 2003, Kölbel, 2004, Kölbel, 2005. 
158 Kölbel, 2004, p. 307. 
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At other places, Kölbel describes the kind of disagreement assessor 
relativism implies in terms of the propositions expressed by the parties 
to a moral dispute: 
the two propositions in question are inconsistent in the following straightfor-
ward sense: they cannot be true relative to the same perspective. In other 
words, no one person could correctly believe both, for to believe correctly is to 
believe what is true relative to one’s perspective.159 
So on Kölbel’s view there are two ways in which moral disputes can be 
said to be disagreements. First, one disputant cannot come to accept 
what the other says without changing her mind. Second, the disputants 
disagree in the sense that they express (or accept) propositions that can-
not both be true relative to the same perspective. Now, is this sufficient 
to capture the sense in which we intuitively think that they disagree?  
It is not. Moral perspectives in Kölbel’s theory serve the same pur-
pose as possible worlds in the traditional Kaplanian picture; they are 
circumstances of evaluation. Two people who have different moralities 
thus make their moral assertions in different circumstances of evalua-
tion, like we can imagine that ordinary (non-assessor relative) asser-
tions can be made in different possible worlds. MacFarlane illustrates 
the latter phenomenon as follows: 
Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and June, her coun-
terpart in another possible world. Jane asserts that Mars has two moons, and 
June denies this very proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way. Jane’s 
assertion concerns our world, while June’s concerns hers. If June lives in a 
world where Mars has three moons, her denial may be just as correct as Jane’s 
assertion.160 
The propositions Jane and June express cannot be true relative to the 
same possible world. But they have not in any way indicated that they 
have different views about whether Mars has two moons in any specific 
possible world. For all we know from their utterances, they may very 
well agree that Mars has two moons in Jane’s possible world and that 
Mars does not have two moons in June’s possible world. To really dis-
agree they would have to be in the same circumstance of evaluation, or at 
least intend their judgements to hold for the same circumstance of 
evaluation. In MacFarlane’s terms, the assertions would have to concern 
the same possible world, the same circumstance of evaluation. 
 
159 Kölbel, 2007 
160 MacFarlane, 2007, p. 23. 
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The claim that for some propositions the circumstances of evaluation 
is something other than possible worlds doesn’t change this. Kölbel is 
right that on his view, when Kant says that punishing innocent Irwin is 
wrong and Smart says that that this is not so, the propositions they 
assert cannot both be true at any one circumstance of evaluation (moral 
perspective). But this does not mean that they disagree. In analogy with 
Jane’s and June’s assertions, Smart’s and Kant’s assertions concern dif-
ferent circumstances of evaluation, different moral perspectives. It 
might very well be that they agree that punishing innocent Irwin is 
wrong at Kant’s moral perspective and that punishing innocent Irwin is 
not wrong at Smart’s moral perspective.  
This is very similar to the problem speaker relativism has with dis-
agreements. The problem for moral speaker relativism is that it makes 
moral assertions made by speaker’s with different moralities be about 
different things (express different propositions), and that they therefore 
do not disagree in the intuitive sense when they are involved in moral 
disputes. Kölbel’s variant of relativism makes moral assertions made by 
speakers with different moralities concern different moralities.  
MacFarlane criticizes assessor relativism on what I take to be the 
same grounds as I have. (In fact, he does not want to call it ‘relativism’ at 
all, since formally it is no different from the traditional Kaplanian 
view.) I quoted MacFarlane saying that in a situation where the same 
proposition is asserted by one speaker and rejected by another, the two 
do not disagree if their assertions concern different circumstances of 
evaluations. MacFarlane connects this idea of which world an assertion 
concerns to an idea of when assertions are accurate. (MacFarlane speaks 
of accurate and inaccurate assertions and utterances instead of true and 
false ones, since he thinks that assertions and utterances are not the kind 
of things that can be true. I will follow him in this, without taking a 
stand on whether assertions or utterances can be true.) For ordinary 
propositions holds what MacFarlane calls use-centric accuracy: an asser-
tion of a proposition is accurate if the proposition is true at the possible 
world where the assertion is made. Though June rejects the proposition 
Jane asserts, both the rejection and the assertion are accurate if they are 
made in possible worlds where the propositions they express are true. 
The idea seems to be (though MacFarlane does not explicitly say so) that 
it is the truth-value of the proposition expressed by an assertion at the 
possible world of the assertion that determines the accuracy of the 
assertion, since it is this possible world that the assertion concerns. 
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Kölbel’s variant of relativism imports this kind of use-centric accu-
racy though it changes the picture of what are the relevant circumstances 
of evaluation for the expressions in question. Thus, though Smart as-
serts a proposition Kant rejects, both the rejection and the assertion can 
be accurate, since they are made in circumstances of evaluations (moral 
frameworks) in which the propositions they express are true respec-
tively.  
This serves as the basis for MacFarlane’s objection to Kölbel-style 
relativism. A necessary condition for two assertions (such as an asser-
tion and a rejection of the same proposition) to constitute a disagree-
ment, MacFarlane holds, is that both cannot be accurate at the same 
time. So, since Smart’s and Kant’s assertions can be accurate at the same 
time, they do not constitute a disagreement. Thus, this form of assessor 
relativism does not account for our intuitions about moral disagree-
ments.  
4.5.3 R el at iv izing asser t ion  ac c ur ac y 
MacFarlane argues that assessor relativism can be complemented to 
handle this problem. Assessor relativism as described above is a view 
about the truth of propositions; the truth of certain propositions is 
relative to something more fine-grained than a possible world (such as a 
moral perspective). What relativists need in order to account for dis-
agreement, MacFarlane argues, is to also relativize the accuracy of asser-
tions to contexts of assessment, and not to contexts of use as on the tra-
ditional, use-centric, picture. MacFarlane calls the new idea perspectival 
accuracy. According to this idea an assertion is accurate as assessed from 
a context of assessment if, and only if, the proposition expressed by the 
assertion is true at the circumstance of evaluation of the assessment.  
To illustrate, consider the effect if this view were true for Jane’s asser-
tion that Mars has two moons. Jane’s assertion is accurate as assessed by 
(or relative to) Jane and anyone else in her possible world (where Mars 
has two moons). As assessed by (or relative to) June, on the other hand, 
who lives in a possible world where Mars does not have two moons, 
Jane’s assertion is inaccurate. Now, this is obviously not the intuitively 
correct account of the accuracy of this assertion, but MacFarlane argues 
that for some expressions it can give the wanted result.  
Let us apply it to moral relativism. As assessed by (or relative to) Smart, 
Smart’s own assertion that it is not wrong to punish innocent Irwin is 
accurate while Kant’s rejection of that proposition is inaccurate. This is 
so since the proposition in question is true at Smart’s moral perspec-
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tive, which is the circumstance of evaluation of the assessment. As as-
sessed by Kant, on the other hand, Smart’s assertion is inaccurate and 
Kant’s rejection is accurate. On this view, then, we can legitimately 
evaluate other people’s moral assertions as accurate or not accurate on 
basis of our own moral perspective, and not, as on Kölbel’s view, on 
basis of the speaker’s perspective. (Another way to put this view it 
seems, though MacFarlane does not say so, is that it tells us that which 
moral perspective moral assertions concern is relative to a context of 
assessment. When Smart assesses Kant’s assertion as inaccurate, this is 
correct since relative to Smart’s context of assessment, Kant’s assertion 
concerns Smart’s moral perspective.) 
How is this supposed to save disagreement? The idea is that as 
assessed from any context of assessment, it will hold that Smart’s and 
Kant’s assertions cannot be accurate at once. Thus, relative to every per-
spective, we have a disagreement in this sense. MacFarlane illustrates 
through relativism about matters of taste:  
Since no proposition can be both true and false at the same circumstance of 
evaluation, Abe’s acceptance of the proposition that apples are delicious and 
Ben’s rejection of this proposition cannot both be accurate. As assessed from 
CA [a context of assessment], then, Abe and Ben disagree. It should be clear 
that this result will hold equally for any choice of CA. Thus, although techni-
cally we have made disagreement perspectival, there is little cost to this, as it 
will never happen that two parties disagree as assessed from one context but 
not as assessed from another.161 
We can apply this to Smart and Kant’s dispute. MacFarlane’s relativism 
implies that relative to every context where their assertions are assessed, 
their assertions contradict each other. For any person who considers 
their assertions it will be correct for her to see it as a disagreement, it 
seems, since relative to her context of assessment their assertions actu-
ally concern her moral perspective and at any moral perspective at most 
one of the propositions expressed by the two assertions can be true 
(which means that at most one of the assertions is accurate as assessed 
from her context of assessment). 
I still think this view fails to account for our intuitions about moral 
disagreements, however. It is true that assessor relativism implies that 
it is correct for any assessor to see the assertions made by Smart and 
Kant as conflicting. The view thus accounts for our intuitions that there 
 
161 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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is disagreement between the assertions in question. But we do not 
merely think of the assertions as conflicting, we also intuitively think that 
Smart’s and Kant’s assertions show that they, Smart and Kant, disagree 
about whether it is wrong to punish innocent Irwin. Assessor relativism 
cannot account for this. So, if the relativist analysis was in fact correct 
and we were aware of this fact, we would not think of moral disputes in 
this way. On this view, Smart’s and Kant’s assertions do not indicate in 
any way that there is a circumstance of evaluation for which they dis-
agree about whether the proposition that it is wrong to punish innocent 
Irwin is true at that circumstance. They may indeed agree about the 
truth-value of that proposition at every circumstance of evaluation. This 
is not how we experience moral disputes.  
Remember that circumstances of evaluations are the “things” at which 
propositions are true: if for every such thing we agree about the truth of 
some proposition, such as the proposition that it is wrong to punish 
innocent Irwin, then there is no room for us to disagree about the truth 
of that proposition. Thus, if we knew that moral assessor relativism 
was true, then we would not see Smart’s and Kant’s assertions as evi-
dence of a real disagreement between Kant and Smart: we would know 
that their assertions are fully compatible with the possibility that they 
agree about the truth-value of the debated proposition at any moral 
framework, that is, at any circumstance at which it can be evaluated. 
Here’s another way to put my objection. For ordinary non-relative 
propositions, the possible worlds that our assertions concern (the 
worlds that make them accurate or not) are the possible worlds (cir-
cumstances of evaluations) we intend our assertions to hold for and 
think that the propositions they express are true at. When someone 
sincerely says, “Mars has two moons” she does so because she thinks 
Mars has two moons in the possible world where she is. This is why 
there is a disagreement between one person who rejects and another 
who accepts the same proposition, where the acceptance and rejection 
concern the same possible world (that is, two people whose assertions 
cannot both be accurate at the same time): that they do so shows that one 
of them thinks, and the other thinks not, that the proposition is true at 
the same possible world. This is not the way things are on the perspecti-
val view on concern and accuracy. On this view, relative to Smart’s 
moral perspective, Kant’s assertion that punishing innocent Irwin is 
wrong concerns Smart’s moral perspective (and is accurate if it is wrong 
to punish Irwin at Smart’s moral perspective). So this view licenses 
Smart to think that at most one of his and Kant’s assertions can be accu-
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rate (since it licenses him to think that they concern the same (his own) 
moral perspective). But it does not license Smart to think that there is 
any real disagreement between him and Kant: for all we know (and for 
all Smart knows), Kant might very well believe (and know) that Smart’s 
moral perspective is not such that punishing Irwin is wrong at it. So as 
far as Smart knows from Kant’s assertion, Kant and himself may well 
agree for every circumstance of evaluation (every moral perspective) 
about the truth-value of the proposition that it is wrong to punish inno-
cent Irwin at that circumstance. That is, on the perspectival accuracy 
view, the fact that two assertions cannot both be accurate (as assessed 
from some or all contexts of assessment) is no indication of a disagree-
ment between the speakers.  
It might seem that my objection must rest on a mistake somewhere. I 
agree that MacFarlane’s relativism implies that any one is correct in 
seeing Kant’s and Smart’s assertions as concerning the same circum-
stance of evaluation, and therefore correct in claiming that at most one 
of them can be accurate at once. Do I not also have to agree, then, that the 
view predicts and licenses our experiences of Kant and Smart as dis-
agreeing? No: What I have argued is exactly that the last conclusion is 
unwarranted. The theory does license us to see the assertions as con-
cerning the same circumstance of evaluation, but it does not license our 
intuition of the assertions as expressing or displaying a disagreement 
between the speakers. In order to experience moral disputes as dis-
agreements between people, we would have to think both (i) that the 
assertions in question concern the same circumstance of evaluation, and 
(ii) that this shows that there is one circumstance of evaluation for 
which the disputants disagree about whether the disputed proposition 
is true at that circumstance. MacFarlane’s relativism implies (i) but not 
(ii).  
Can the view be salvaged if we change the perspective from assertions 
to beliefs? MacFarlane’s relativism could be construed as a claim about 
the accuracy of beliefs as well as assertions. Relative to Smart, Kant’s 
belief that it is wrong to punish innocent Irwin concerns Smart’s moral 
perspective. So Smart is licensed to think that Kant and himself have 
conflicting beliefs concerning the same circumstance of evaluation. So, 
it seems, he (and anyone) is licensed to think of Kant and Smart as dis-
agreeing.  
But things are not that simple. It is true that if MacFarlane’s relativ-
ism is true, then Smart is licensed to think of Kant’s belief as concerning 
his own moral perspective (and as accurate if it is true at that perspec-
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tive). But he cannot draw any conclusion from that as to whether Kant 
believes that the proposition expressed is true at Smart’s moral perspec-
tive.162 Kant might very well say, “At Smart’s moral perspective it is not 
wrong to punish Irwin” and have the corresponding belief. And Smart 
might very well know this. Indeed, the fact that Smart and Kant have 
their beliefs about the wrongness of punishing Irwin is consistent with 
the possibility that they agree about the truth of the propositions they 
express at every circumstance of evaluation. And, again, since circum-
stances of evaluations are the “things” at which propositions are true, 
nothing remains for them to disagree about.  
4.5.4  S tabl e  an d  u ns tabl e  in t u i t ions  about  d i sagr eem e n t  
To be fair, when MacFarlane argues that his form of assessor relativism 
can explain our intuitions about disagreement, he does not discuss moral 
assessor relativism. He applies his view to disagreements about humour 
and taste. And I think there might be a difference in our intuitions about 
disagreements about such matters on the one hand, and disagreements 
about moral matters on the other hand, such that MacFarlane’s view is 
more suited to account for the former. Let us take some examples: 
Erica: Jim Carrey is funny. 
Jacob: What? He’s not funny, he’s just annoying. 
Erica: This pie is delicious. 
Jacob: You think? I think it tasted quite bad. At least it’s not deli-
cious. 
Intuitively, these small conversations are disagreements about who is 
funny and what is delicious. I think, however, that these intuitions are 
unstable in the following sense: even though we sense disagreements 
here, on reflection we (or most of us at least) also think that they really 
are not disagreements over some matter of fact. We think instead that 
what is displayed in conversations like these are differences in stan-
dards of taste and senses of humour. Jim Carrey amuses Erica but not 
Jacob. Erica likes the taste of the pie, Jacob doesn’t. We think that there 
is no difference over and above that: the conversations do not signal that 
 
162 One might think that this suggests that something is wrong with the relative 
notions of concern and accuracy, but my aim here is not to criticize this or any other 
aspect of MacFarlane’s relativism, just to object to and problemize the idea that it can 
account for our intuitions about disagreement. 
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Erica and Jacob disagree about whether the pie has some property inde-
pendent of the relation it stands in to their standards of taste; neither 
does it signal that they disagree about the relation it stands in to their 
standards of taste respectively. So, we feel on reflection, there is nothing 
they really disagree about, in the sense of having conflicting beliefs – 
they merely differ as to what pleases their palates. Suppose, for example, 
that the conversation above continues as follows: 
Erica: What? This is the best pie I have tasted ever, how can you 
say that it is not delicious? 
Jacob: Well, I guess we simply have different tastes. Just as we 
seem to have different senses of humour.  
Erica: You don’t see my point, do you? The pie is delicious and 
you obviously cannot see that. Just as you don’t see that Jim Car-
rey is funny. 
I think that most of us find Erica’s insistence that the pie really is deli-
cious and that Carrey really is funny (whether or not Jacob can appreci-
ate this) quite silly. Jacob’s attitude, on the other hand, seems sensible. 
What they discovered was that they like different things in comedy and 
in food. Once this is established there is not much more to be said about 
that; there is no fact about Carrey or the pie they disagree about. In this 
sense our intuition that this is a disagreement is unstable.  
Our intuitions about moral disagreements are different, however. 
Consider again the dispute between Kant and Smart: 
Kant: It is wrong to punish innocent Irwin. 
Smart: No, it is not wrong to punish innocent Irwin. 
Many of us, at least, are not ready to retract or modify our judgement 
that there is a disagreement about some property of the act in question, 
not even on reflection. We know that Kant and Smart have (accept) dif-
ferent moralities, and that the act in question stands in different rela-
tions to these moralities respectively. But we do not think that this is 
the only difference displayed by their conversation; they also disagree 
about the wrongness of the act. Many of us, then, have stable intuitions 
that moral disputes are disagreements about some matter of fact. In this 
sense we experience moral disagreements like disagreements over “ob-
jective”, non-evaluative, facts. If I think that man has landed on the moon 
and you think that man has not landed on the moon, then we think of us 
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as disagreeing about some fact. We do not think on reflection that, when 
we have established that in my conception of the world man has landed 
on the moon while in your conception man has not been on the moon, 
there really is nothing more to quarrel about. The disagreement does 
not dissolve upon closer inspection. We still think that we disagree 
about some fact, and this is what we (or many of us) think about Smart 
and Kant as well.  
I think this amounts to a difference in how well MacFarlane’s relativ-
ism accounts for our intuitions about moral disagreement and our 
intuitions about disagreement concerning taste and humour. What gives 
relativism about matters of taste credibility is that on reflection we 
retract our judgements that taste disputes are signs of any real disagree-
ments between the disputants; they merely have different standards of 
taste, we think. This is what we should expect if relativism is true. On 
reflection we should understand that there is no proposition that we 
disagree about whether it is true at some specific circumstance of 
evaluation. So even though relativism cannot account for – in the sense 
of confirming – the intuitions we initially have that people do disagree 
over matters of taste, it does confirm the way we think on reflection.  
As for moral conflicts, many of us are not ready to retract our judge-
ments that Kant and Smart really do disagree about the wrongness of the 
act in question. Assessor relativism thus cannot account for – or con-
firm - such stubborn or stable intuitions about disagreement. 
4.6  R e i nt e rp r eti ng o r Expla i n i ng Aw ay Intuiti o ns  
In the two previous sections I have considered attempts by moral truth-
value relativists to show that such relativism, when properly specified, 
does indeed imply that we disagree in the sense that the disputants ex-
press conflicting propositions. I have argued that these attempts fail. So 
let us consider other ways to reply to the argument from intuitive dis-
agreement.  
There is a sense in which speaker relativists can always claim that 
people in moral disagreements disagree: they disagree in the sense that 
their moralities recommend different courses of action. Thus, Smart’s 
morality recommends punishing innocent Irwin, while Kant’s morality 
recommends not punishing him. If moralities are systems of motiva-
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tional attitudes, this disagreement will also be of a straightforwardly 
practical kind: the disputing parties will be motivated to act in opposed 
ways.163 This is how Dreier accounts for those disagreements where the 
parties do not have sufficiently overlapping moralities for it to be a 
factual disagreement: 
the indexical theorist may say just the same thing that the expressivist says, 
namely, that there is real disagreement in norms, or in attitude.164 
Is this enough to account for our intuitions about moral disagreements? 
Not by itself, I think. Most of us, at least, intuitively think that people 
involved in moral disputes disagree not only in the practical sense. We 
don’t experience these disputes as mere clashes between people’s de-
sires. We also think that at most one of the disputing parties (or their 
statements) can be correct. If what Kant said is correct, then what Smart 
said is not. In this sense, it seems, we experience moral disagreements 
just as we experience disagreements over absolute facts. If A says, “Mars 
has two moons”, and B says, “Mars does not have two moons”, then they 
disagree because if what one said is right then what the other said cannot 
be right: if Mars has two moons it cannot be that Mars does not have 
two moons. It seems, then, that our moral disagreements are as if moral 
statements made by different people are about the same thing and that 
therefore both statements in a moral disputes cannot be true at once.165 
There are things relativists can say to accommodate this, however. 
First, they can say that when we intuitively think that Kant’s and Smart’s 
statements cannot be correct (or right or true) at the same time, we are 
using ‘correct’ (or ‘right’, or ‘true’) in a minimalist sense. According to 
minimalism, to say,  
 
163 And even if moralities are not systems of motivational states, speaker relativists can, 
as anyone else, use de dicto internalism to maintain that moral opinions are necessarily 
accompanied by motivation (se 2.6), why moral disputes can be claimed to involve 
motivational clashes. 
164 Dreier, 1999, p. 569. 
165 This seems to be the point Mark Schroeder makes with his distinction between ”the 
hard” and ”the shallow” version of ”the disagreement problem” for relativism. The 
shallow problem is that relativism implies that moral disputes are not disagreements. It is 
to this problem, Schroeder says, that relativists can respond that they are disagreements 
in attitude (though he does not take a stand on whether it is an adequate response). The 
hard problem cannot be responded to in this way. This problem is that relativism implies 
that the parties to a moral dispute must allow that what the other says is true. It is the 
hard problem I discuss in what follows. (Schroeder, Forthcoming) 
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 ”A is morally wrong” is true 
is just to say, 
A is morally wrong. 
And to say,  
”A is morally wrong” is not true 
is just to say  
A is not morally wrong.  
The reply to the objection from intuitive disagreement, then, would be 
that our intuition that, say, Kant’s and Smart’s assertions cannot both be 
true, involves such a minimalist sense of true. To think that both Kant’s 
assertion of “it is wrong to punish innocent Irwin” and Smart’s asser-
tion of “it is not wrong to punish innocent Irwin” are true, would be the 
same as thinking that it is wrong to punish innocent Irwin and that it is 
not wrong to punish innocent Irwin. But that cannot be right! So if that 
is how our intuition is to be interpreted, then speaker relativism has the 
means to accommodate it. (It should be noted that according to this 
reply, it is in our spontaneous intuitions about moral statements and 
disagreements that we make use of the minimalist sense of true. When 
the speaker relativist describes here metaethical standpoint as the view 
that the truth of moral statements depends on the speaker’s morality, or 
as implying that two seemingly conflicting moral statements both can be 
true, she is not using true in this sense.) 
This reply involves the following move. The objection from intuitive 
disagreement assumes that speaker relativism implies that when some-
one, P, evaluates some speaker’s (Q’s) statement (or belief) that act A is 
morally wrong as correct or incorrect, what P does is to evaluate 
whether A is recommended or not by Q’s morality. But according to the 
present reply, speaker relativists can say that when P evaluates Q’s 
statements, she evaluates whether A is recommended or not by her own, 
P’s, morality. This seems to be Wong’s view of how we should explain,  
the fact that we criticize as false the morality of another group of language 
users, even when that morality is a coherent system of moral beliefs very dif-
ferent from ours. When we criticize that morality, we take the group’s re-
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commendations for action, state them in our moral language, and evaluate 
them as false according to our standards for the adequacy of moral systems.166 
This indeed seems to give the intuitively right result: it is clear that 
when we evaluate other people’s moral judgements, we do not take into 
account how well the judgements fits with the speaker’s judgement. And, 
as we said above, it also gives the intuitive result about disagreement: 
Kant’s and Smart’s statements cannot both be right.  
It is not enough for speaker relativists to simply say that this is how it 
works, however. We do not evaluate statements of sentences containing 
other indexical expressions in this way. Minimalism about truth (or 
correctness etc.) does typically not hold for such sentences. When Smart 
says, “Kant’s statement of “I am a Kantian” is correct” this is not just 
another way for Smart to say, “I am a Kantian”. For this reason, speaker 
relativists who use the present reply have to explain why, when it comes 
to statements of sentences containing moral indexicals, we do not evalu-
ate the statements as true or correct based on their content. 
I think there are such explanations at hand. We have previously re-
ferred to the social and evolutionary function of moral thought and 
language. This function could also be an essential part of a relativist 
explanation of our intuitions about moral disagreement. One of Allan 
Gibbard’s main points is that moral discussions must tend towards 
consensus:  
The chief biological function of normative discussion is to coordinate. Norma-
tive discussion allows for common enterprises and adjusts terms of reciprocity 
– both the friendly give-and-take of cooperative schemes and hostile standoffs 
with their threats and mutual restraint. For such a mechanism to work, two 
things are needed: tendencies toward consensus, and normative governance. 
Normative discussion must tend toward all accepting the same norms, and accep-
tance of norms must tend to guide action.167  
Given that tendencies towards consensus is important for the social and 
evolutionary role of moral practice, I think that relativists can explain 
our ways of evaluating people’s moral judgements. It is central to the 
purpose of serving this role that we are able to say to others (and that we 
can think that) they are mistaken in their moral statements and beliefs 
even if they are correct according to their own moralities. In this way we 
can put pressure on them to change their opinions, and come closer to 
 
166 Wong, 1984, p. 73. 
167 Gibbard, 1990, p. 76, my italics. 
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consensus about what to do and thus be able to coordinate our acts. The 
important thing is that we reach some form of agreement about how to 
act in certain situations; so moral discussion should focus on acts and 
their features. This is, the relativist can say, why we evaluate other peo-
ple’s moral judgements that an act is, say, morally right, through focus-
ing on the act and projecting our own morality on it: if I find that the act 
is right (i.e. recommended by my morality), then I think that her judge-
ments is correct. She has made the same evaluation of the act as I do, so 
her judgement is correct. This is how we can expect it to work, since 
what is important is to reach a (common) conclusion about what to do, 
not to discuss what to do on this or that morality. 
This speaker relativist reply works partly through questioning the 
construal of our intuitions about moral disagreements assumed by the 
objection from intuitive disagreement. Even though our intuitions might 
seem to tell us that moral disputes are like disagreements over absolute 
matters of fact it is not obvious that they do so; our intuitions might 
involve a minimalist sense of truth or correctness; and it can be ex-
plained why we would think like that about moral expressions even if 
we do not about other indexical expressions. 
The latter step in this reply also opens up for an alternative sort of 
relativist explanation of our disagreement intuitions. Instead of saying 
that the social and evolutionary function of moral thought and language 
makes it reasonable to reinterpret our intuitions, relativists could say 
that it explains away why we (or many of us) have absolutist rather than 
relativist intuitions about moral matters. As we have noted, minimal-
ism about truth or correctness typically does not apply to context-
dependent expressions but to expressions that have the same content in 
different contexts of use. The fact that we think about moral judgements 
in this way, even if it can be explained why we do so, might be one expla-
nation of why we have absolutist intuitions. The relativist strategy con-
sidered above tries to explain why, when we evaluate other people’s 
moral judgements, we focus on what we think about the act in question 
and not on what the other person’s morality says in that matter; if this 
explanation succeeds, it explains why moral discussion proceeds in a 
manner typical to absolutist discourses and atypical to relativist dis-
courses. So it would provide an explanation of why we think that moral 
practice is an absolutist discourse: that is, that we think of moral 
judgements as absolutely true, and not true relatively.  
This means that relativists have a reply to the objection from intuitive 
disagreement also if they do not question the interpretation of these 
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intuitions assumed by the objection. If it can be explained why we intui-
tively think of moral discourse as an absolutist discourse even if relativ-
ism is true, this also explains why we have intuitions that moral 
disputes are disagreements in absolutist sense even if relativism is true. 
That is, the intuitions can be explained away. This actually comes close 
to the explanations some relativists provide. Both Kölbel168 and Wong169 
refer to Mackie as to why we intuitively think that moral matters ‘have 
objective validity’: 
We need morality to regulate interpersonal relations, to control some of the 
ways in which people behave towards one another, often in opposition to con-
trary inclinations. We therefore want our moral judgements to be authorita-
tive for other agents as well as for ourselves: objective validity would give them 
the authority required.170 
While Mackie thinks that our intuition that moral judgements are objec-
tively valid goes into their meaning, relativists like Wong and Kölbel 
obviously deny this. The relativists take Mackie’s explanation to be an 
explanation of why we falsely think of moral matters in this way. 
What I have said in this section cannot serve as conclusive evidence 
that relativist explanations of the sorts presented are correct. It does, 
however, make it likely that some such relativist explanation can be 
made plausible. This would mean that the fact, if it is a fact, that moral 
disputes cannot be disagreements in the sense many of us intuitively 
think they are if moral truth-value relativism is true, is no major prob-
lem for the view. It can be made plausible that we would have these 
intuitions even if moral truth-value relativism were true. 
4.7  C o n clusi o n 
I have argued that even though relativism implies that we do not disagree 
in the sense that the objection from intuitive disagreement assumes that 
we do, relativists have ways of answering the objection. They can either 
argue that the objection misconstrues our intuitions and that relativism 
can account for the intuitions we actually have; or they can explain away 
the intuitions. The objection thus fails to undermine moral truth-value 
relativism. 
 
168 Kölbel, 2005, p. 64. 
169 Wong, 1984, p. 78. 
170 Mackie, 1977, p. 43. 
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More generally, the conclusion in this first part of the book is that 
neither of the common arguments for or against moral truth-value rela-
tivism in contrast to absolutism succeeds. Each view has ways to ac-
commodate the features thought to speak in favour of the other. In chap-
ter 2 I argued that the way moral judgements are connected to motiva-
tion cannot decide to the advantage of relativism. There are ways for 
absolutists to account for this as well. I also argued, in chapter 3, that the 
argument from divergence of moral opinions does not support speaker 
relativism, at least not in any simple way. One version of the argument 
fails because it fails to exclude absolutist error-theory as a viable option. 
Other versions of the argument have to be complemented by some way 
of handling strong moral absolutist intuitions.  
Where should the discussion go from this? Obviously, other argu-
ments are needed to determine between moral truth-value relativism 
and absolutism. In part 2 I approach this matter from what I take to be 
an interesting fact about moral discourse; that different people have so 
different intuitions about the nature of moral properties. This holds not 
least regarding the question of whether moral properties are absolute or 
relative.
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Chapter 5 
Semantic Foundations 
5.1  Intr oducti o n  
Metaethics is a highly disputed area. For every theory about the meaning 
of moral terms, or about how moral judgements should be analysed, 
there are philosophers who reject it because they have intuitions that go 
against it. In the previous chapters I have sometimes referred to absolut-
ist intuitions; many people seem to have intuitions that moral facts are 
absolute and not relative. Part of the job to make relativism plausible 
consists of explaining how it can be that so many people are mistaken in 
this way.  
At the end of the previous chapter I argued that relativists have a way 
of doing this. They can hold that even if a relativist analysis holds for 
our moral judgements, we can be expected to have absolutist intuitions. 
In order to play the social and evolutionary role to further cooperation, 
it is important that we conceive of moral practice as having features 
typical of absolute practices. Accordingly, it is not strange that we think 
of moral facts as absolute. 
But there is one way in which the strong absolutist intuitions can be 
taken to speak against standard relativism, which cannot be countered 
like this. It is common to hold that our intuitions help determine, or are 
indications of what help to determine, what the correct analysis is. Our 
intuitions about the correct application of a term or concept in different 
cases are direct reflections of our dispositions to use that term or con-
cept to categorise things in the world. Such dispositions to apply a term 
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are often seen as relevant to the reference of that term, as used by those 
people or in that linguistic community. So, for example, we might think 
that it is, at least partly, the fact that English-speaking people are dis-
posed to apply the term ‘cup’ to things that we drink from and the term 
‘coffee’ to a substance that we drink, that makes it the case that these 
terms have their respective referents (and not, say, that ‘cup’ refers to 
coffee and ‘coffee’ to cups). In line with this, strong absolutist intuitions 
could be taken to be, or be signs of, dispositions to use moral terms that 
determine their reference. According to this way of thinking, even if it 
turns out that we have these intuitions or dispositions only because this 
furthers the function of moral practice, the fact that we have them is 
enough to make it the case that absolutism is true.  
This poses a challenge for relativists, then, to argue that the absolutist 
intuitions do not determine reference. Not everyone has absolutist in-
tuitions, though; some are prepared to say that relative properties can 
count as moral properties. And this poses a corresponding challenge for 
absolutists. In this part of the book I will argue that as a consequence of 
this difference in intuitions, it is a mistake to think that either one of 
standard relativism or absolutism is true: the difference amounts to a 
difference in concepts, a difference in how different people’s moral 
judgements should be analysed. At least this is so given certain common 
methodological assumptions, a point we will return to later in this 
chapter and throughout the remaining chapters. 
This chapter gives an introduction to the discussion that will proceed 
in the following chapters. First I clear up some terminology, and after 
that I say a bit more about the challenge posed by opposite intuitions 
and how I will approach it in proceeding chapters.  
5.2  Cla r ific at i o n of S o m e  C e nt r al  N oti o n s 
Standard relativism, to repeat, is the view that the extension of moral 
terms and concepts (or the truth-value of moral sentences and beliefs) 
depends on the morality of the speaker or believer. It is important to see 
how this view (and its contenders) connects to some notions we will use 
in the ensuing discussion: meaning, concepts, reference, extension, analyses, 
and properties. Much of what I will say here is a collection of what has 
been more or less explicitly said in the previous chapters. But it will be 
useful to have these things clearly summed up before we move on.  
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5.2.1  R el at iv ist ,  absol u t i st  an d  p l ural  anal yses  
I sometimes speak in terms of relativist and absolutist analyses of moral 
judgements; and I have called the view I will argue for in the end “analysis 
pluralism”. So it is important to get clear on my use of ‘analysis’. That a 
standard relativist analysis holds for a speaker’s moral judgements, 
means that the truth-values of her moral judgements depend on her 
morality as it does if some form of standard relativism is true. The 
claim that a standard relativist analysis holds for moral judgements 
made by every speaker, then, is equivalent to the claim that standard 
relativism is true.  
Accordingly, the claim that a relativist analysis holds (for judgements 
made by everyone) is intended to be neutral between the different forms 
of standard relativism described in the previous chapters. Most cru-
cially, because it might be less than obvious, it is meant to apply also to 
the views I have classified as divergence relativism. These say that moral 
terms refer to different properties when used by two different speakers 
if they have different strong moral beliefs, beliefs they are under no 
circumstances ready to give up. These strong beliefs are considered to be 
reference-fixing for the moral terms. Thus, when a utilitarian says, “It is 
wrong to do X” this might simply mean, “doing X does not maximize 
well-being”; while the same sentence uttered by a Kantian might mean 
something like, “doing X is a way of using someone merely as a means”. 
I have said that these forms of standard relativism might be best de-
scribed as saying that the extensions of moral terms (and concepts) 
varies between different speakers because moral terms have different 
meaning and express different concepts when different speakers use 
them.171 So on these views, the standard relativist analysis does not hold 
because people’s moral judgements share a common relativist meaning 
(or because they share relativist moral concepts), but because the mean-
ings and concepts vary in accordance with standard relativism, that is, 
varies with the speaker’s morality. In one sense, it might seem that this 
view implies that there is no common analysis of the moral statements 
made by the utilitarian and by the Kantian; their judgements simply 
mean different things. By contrast, if indexical relativism is true moral 
terms have a common (Kaplanian) character, and on assessor relativism 
 
171 I will assume here that the meaning of a term is connected to the concept expressed 
by the term: if the term has a different meaning then a different concept is expressed; if it 
expresses a different concept, then it has a different meaning. 
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they even have the same reference.172 In my terminology, however, a stan-
dard relativist analysis holds whichever of these theories is correct. 
What matters is that all of the theories imply that the truth-values of 
moral judgements depend on the morality of the speaker or assessor. 
In a corresponding way I will say that if absolutism is true, then an 
absolutist analysis of (all) moral judgements holds. That is, if the truth-
value of moral judgements does not vary with the speaker’s morality. 
According to absolutism moral judgements have the same meaning no 
matter who makes them (and everyone has the same moral concepts).173   
If standard relativism is true a standard relativist analysis holds for 
moral judgements no matter who makes them; if absolutism is true, an 
absolutist analysis holds for moral judgements, no matter who makes 
them. Analysis pluralism is the view that neither of these are true be-
cause an absolutist analysis holds for moral judgements made by some 
speakers (the truth-value is not dependent on the speaker’s morality), 
and a standard relativist analysis holds for moral judgements made by 
others (the truth-value is dependent on the speaker’s morality). 
5.2.2  R el at ive  moral  pr o p er t ies  
In what follows I will also speak of relative moral properties. Just like the 
claim that a relativist analysis holds is meant only as another way of 
saying that some form of standard relativism is true, the claim that 
moral properties are relative moral properties (or that moral terms 
refer to relative moral properties) is intended only as another way of 
saying that moral properties are such that standard relativism is true. 
Correspondingly, I intend the claim that moral properties are absolute 
properties to be equivalent to the claim that moral properties are such 
that moral absolutism is true.  
Since standard relativism can take a lot of different forms, the claim 
that moral properties are relative moral properties can be specified in 
many different ways. Every form of standard relativism implies that the 
truth-values of moral statements and beliefs depend on some relation 
 
172 Also classical forms of subjectivism, according to which “x is right” means roughly 
“I like x”, imply that moral expressions have the same meaning regardless who uses them, 
but a meaning that includes indexical elements. 
173 Since I have defined absolutism as a claim about truth-values or extensions, it is 
consistent with absolutism that people have different but co-referential moral concepts, 
as is the case with the concepts of triangular and trilateral. I am ignoring this position, 
since it is not represented in metaethics. 
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between the speaker/believer or assessor and the act which is morally 
evaluated. But this leaves open different possibilities as to what the 
referents of moral terms and concepts, i.e. the moral properties, are: 
(i) If assessor relativism is true, moral properties will be properties 
that have different extensions relative to different contexts. Everyone 
refers to the same property when they use, say, the term ‘morally wrong’ 
but the extension of that property varies depending on who assesses the 
statement. 
(ii) The situation is different if speaker relativism is true. There are at 
least two possibilities. The first alternative is that moral words refer to 
two-place relations between the speaker’s morality and the action in 
question. The second alternative is that they refer to one-place proper-
ties picked out by the speaker’s morality. According to an indexical rela-
tivism such as Dreier’s, for example, a moral term refers to a property 
that the speaker desires actions to have; so, if the speaker is a utilitarian, 
the property referred to will be the property of maximizing well-being. 
What is relative about relative moral properties, on these views, is not 
that they have their extension relative to contexts, but the fact that what 
is a moral property is relative to the context of utterance. On the first 
alternative, when P makes moral judgements she refers to relations that 
hold between her own morality and actions, not between, say, Q’s moral-
ity and actions. So a relation that holds between P’s morality and an 
action is a moral property only relative to a context of utterance where P 
is the speaker – not relative to contexts where Q is the speaker. Simi-
larly, on the second alternative, when a Kantian says that an action 
maximizes well-being she is not making a moral statement; so the prop-
erty of maximizing well-being is not a moral property relative to con-
texts of utterances where she is the speaker.174 
In my terminology, all of these different standard relativist views on 
the reference of moral terms can be described as the idea that moral 
 
174 In chapter 1 I said that relativist positions are sometimes characterised as saying 
that the property in question has more places than on the absolutist picture, so that, for 
example, truth is a three-place property rather than a two-place property. We can now 
see that not all forms of moral truth-value relativism can be stated in this manner. 
Neither assessor relativism nor indexical forms of standard speaker relativism imply that 
the properties referred to by moral terms have more than one place. Furthermore, it 
should be obvious that this holds for analysis pluralism as well: it is consistent with this 
view that moral terms, as used by some or all speakers, refers to one-place properties, as 
long as different speakers refer to different such properties. 
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terms refer to relative moral properties, or that moral properties are 
relative moral properties. 
Now we can return to our main theme here: the challenge from oppo-
site intuitions. 
5.3 T h e  Ch all e ng e a nd S e m a nti c F ou nd ati o n s 
We can formulate the challenge from absolutist intuitions against rela-
tivism in terms of relative moral properties: Some people have strong 
intuitions to the effect that moral properties are not relative. (What this 
amounts to more exactly will be discussed in the next chapter.) This is a 
problem for relativism if we take these intuitions, or the dispositions 
they are signs of, to be reference-fixing. On the other hand, some people 
are disposed to say that relative facts of certain sorts can count as moral 
facts. This is a potential problem for absolutists. 
These challenges arise given the way in which much metaethical dis-
cussion is pursued: on the assumption that the correct analysis should 
be consistent with our intuitions about the nature of moral properties 
and moral judgements. In the next chapter we will see that both standard 
relativists and absolutists often make this assumption. 
I will argue that if we take this pursuit seriously, and do not merely 
assume that everyone shares our own personal understanding of the 
nature of moral properties and facts, the conclusion is that none of the 
traditional analyses work: both standard relativism and absolutism are 
views about how moral judgements should be analysed no matter who 
makes the judgement.  
What we have then is a challenge not only for these specific kinds of 
analyses of moral judgements – relativism and absolutism – but also for 
what I have called “the single analysis assumption”; that is, the assump-
tion that a general analysis of moral judgements – one that holds for 
moral judgements no matter who they are made by – is viable.  
What would it take to meet the challenge? For both theories it is cru-
cial that a case can be made that the opponents’ intuitions are not refer-
ence-fixing. Let us focus for the moment on the challenge to standard 
relativism posed by the strong absolutist intuitions some people have. 
What relativists need in order to meet this challenge is a semantic the-
ory – a theory about how the reference of moral terms is determined – 
that does not take the strong absolutist intuitions some people have as 
evidence that the relativist analysis does not hold for moral judgements 
made by those people. I will call this a semantic foundation of relativism.  
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A semantic foundation needs to live up to three desiderata. First, it 
should not take the strong absolutist intuitions of some people as evi-
dence that an absolutist analysis holds for these people’s moral judge-
ments. Second, it should take some features of moral discourse as 
evidence that a relativist analysis holds for moral sentences. Thirdly, it 
must be a semantic theory that is plausible for moral terms. That is, it 
must be reasonable to think that the reference of moral terms is deter-
mined along the lines of the semantic theory. 
Finding such a semantic foundation would accomplish two things for 
relativists, corresponding to the two first desiderata. First, by meeting 
the challenge from opposite intuitions through holding that the absolut-
ist intuitions are not reference-fixing, it would counter the most 
common objections to the theory, since these are objections of the 
counter-intuitivity sort. Second, it would give relativists a way to argue 
in favour of their view. In part 1 I reached the conclusion that the com-
mon arguments for and against standard forms of relativism fail. A 
semantic foundation would provide a new and needed argument. 
To those acquainted with modern metaethics and philosophy of lan-
guage it might seem obvious that there are semantic views that can be 
used to meet the challenge from opposite intuitions in this way. Mean-
ing and reference, it is usually thought, need not be transparent, and even 
competent speakers can be mistaken about these things. This is why the 
open question argument against naturalist analyses generally is consid-
ered to fail. So, it seems, relativists should be able to argue that absolut-
ist intuitions are such mistakes, and absolutists ought to be able to 
argue in a corresponding manner about relativist intuitions.  
In chapter 6 I examine the possibility of defending standard relativism 
(or absolutism) on the basis of semantic internalism, the view that 
meaning and reference is determined by internal properties of the 
speaker, such as referential intentions or dispositions to use terms. I 
state the challenge in more detail given what I take to be the most prom-
ising internalist view, and argue that it cannot be answered in the way 
the open question argument can, that is, through reference to mistakes 
about the reference or moral terms. 
One might think that the obvious solution is to use some form of se-
mantic externalism. In chapter 7 the discussion focuses on the two main 
forms of semantic externalism: social externalism according to which 
meaning and reference are not determined individually but by the use of 
terms in linguistic communities, and causal theories of reference, ac-
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cording to which the reference of a term depends on which properties 
causally governs our use of it. 
I argue that neither social nor causal forms of semantic externalism 
can be used to remove the challenge. The common arguments for exter-
nalism, as given by e.g. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, do not take us 
out of a broadly construed internalist view. Even though they question 
parts of internalism they do not question the foundation of the internal-
ist picture: that the ultimate criteria of reference hinge on intuitions or 
dispositions of the speakers or believers. This point about semantic 
externalism is not a new one175, but it is highly relevant here; I argue that 
it means that the challenge from opposite intuitions cannot be met by a 
simple reference to semantic externalism.  
My argumentation in chapter 6 and 7, then, is to the effect that to avoid 
the traditional methodology of relying on intuitions in analysing, and 
thus avoiding the challenge from opposite intuitions, it is not enough to 
turn to semantic externalism: it takes a more radical departure from 
traditional methodology. Such departures are indeed possible to make. 
My claim is that the challenge holds given certain restrictions on correct 
analyses: namely, if we want our analyses to tell us what our terms and 
concepts refer to given the meaning that is given to them, or is at least 
constrained, by how we are actually disposed to use the terms and con-
cepts. (This idea will be clarified in the next chapter) There are, for sure, 
other purposes one might have when analysing moral concepts (and 
other concepts), and pursuing such analyses might be highly interesting 
tasks. And given certain such purposes it might be possible to defend 
either an absolutist or a standard relativist analysis of moral concepts. 
But all such analyses will be revisionist in a certain sense: they will go 
against the way many people are disposed to classify acts as being, e.g. 
morally right and wrong, in such a way that those people are not ready to 
say that they are analyses of rightness or wrongness. 
The fact that I focus almost exclusively on the traditional methodol-
ogy in chapter 6 and 7, and discuss ways to answer the challenge from 
opposite intuitions given this, is not to be seen as an implicit valuation 
from my part that this methodology is to be preferred. In fact, I am sym-
pathetic to a “liberal” view on these matters, like the one David Chalm-
ers calls “the approach of semantic pluralism”. He says that: 
 
175 Cf. e.g. Chalmers, 2004, Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, Fumerton, 1989, Jackson, 
1998a, Lewis, 1984, Millikan, 2005, Searle, 1983. 
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this approach gives little weight to disputes over whether a given (purported) 
semantic value is “the” meaning of an expression, or even whether it is truly a 
“semantic” value at all. Such disputes will be largely terminological, depending 
on the criteria one takes to be crucial in one’s prior notion of “meaning” or 
“semantics”. On the pluralist approach, the substantive questions are: can ex-
pressions (whether types or tokens) be associated with values that have such-
and-such properties? If so, what is the nature of the association and of the 
values? What aspects of language and thought can this association help us to 
analyze and explain?176 
Analyses of moral judgements can be pursued on the basis of many dif-
ferent methodologies, and depending on how they are specified they can 
help explain aspects of language and thought. The reasons that I pursue 
an extensive discussion of the possibilities for either standard relativ-
ism or absolutism to be defended within a traditional intuition-based 
methodology are, first, that this is how much metaethical discussion is 
pursued, and second, that I think that the right conclusion from pursu-
ing metaethics on these conditions has not been appreciated; that we 
have to give up the single analysis assumption. 
What ensues from the discussion in chapter 6 and 7, then, is that we 
have to make a choice: Either we adopt the traditional approach to ana-
lysing moral judgements and give up the traditional picture that one 
analysis holds for moral judgements made by everyone, or we give up the 
traditional approach to analysing moral judgements. (Or rather, we do 
not have to choose, we can do both, but we shouldn’t mix them up.) 
Perhaps this could be seen as a reductio ad absurdum against the tradi-
tional approach to analysing moral judgements: if no single analysis can 
be defended on this approach we should look for others. In chapter 8 I 
argue that this is not how we need to see things. I argue that what the 
discussion about the challenge from opposite intuitions in chapter 6 
and 7 suggests, given this methodology, is analysis pluralism: that different 
analyses of moral judgements hold for moral judgements made by dif-
ferent speakers. An absolutist analysis holds for judgements made by 
some people, while standard relativist analyses might hold for judge-
ments made by others. I argue that this is not only a consistent, but also 
a plausible position. 
 
176 Chalmers, 2004, p. 167. 
  
Chapter 6 
Semantic Internalism 
and Relativism 
6.1  Intr oducti o n  
Relativist analyses of moral judgements are challenged by the strong 
absolutist intuitions some people have. This challenge seems most acute 
on semantic internalist views on meaning and reference according to 
which such strong intuitions can be taken to be linguistic dispositions 
that fix the reference of moral terms and concepts. The purpose of this 
chapter is to formulate the challenge as it arises on such an internalist 
picture, and see whether standard relativists nonetheless can answer 
this challenge. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. First I sketch something like a 
traditional view on conceptual analysis, taking our intuitions about, or 
dispositions to describe, possible cases as evidence about the reference 
of concepts, and a connected semantic internalist view on how reference 
is determined. I point out that this view is not only commonly applied 
in philosophy in general but also used and explicitly defended as a view 
about what constitutes a correct analysis in metaethics. I then state the 
challenge as it arises on this view. After that I turn to possible ways of 
answering the challenge. The internalist view in question allows that we 
can be mistaken about the correct analysis, which might be taken to 
suggest that the challenge can be answered by maintaining that the abso-
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lutist intuitions some people have are mistaken. I argue that this is not a 
viable reply to the challenge.  
At the end of the chapter I consider objections to the form of semantic 
internalism I have suggested, and argue that these cannot be used to 
make the challenge less pressing: even after we take the objections into 
account, enough of the semantic view remains for the challenge to stand. 
At least this is so if we are not willing to give up on the idea that analyses 
of moral judgements should live up to at least a minimal constraint of 
being consistent with our intuitions about what moral properties can 
possibly be. (The objections considered in this chapter are not of the 
kind that question semantic internalism through arguing for some form 
of externalism; this is the subject of the next chapter.) The conclusion is 
that the kind of semantic internalism considered here cannot serve as a 
semantic foundation for standard relativist analyses of moral judge-
ments.  
6.2  Intuiti o n - B a s ed C o n c eptual  An alysis  
6.2. 1  T h e g e n eral  id ea 
How do we know that a chair need not have four legs to be a chair? One 
way is to ask ourselves about real or imagined cases of candidates for 
being chairs with more or less than four legs: is that a chair? When I ask 
myself that question about my one-legged office chair, my answer is: yes, 
it is a chair. And I take this to show that chairs do not necessarily have 
four legs. On the other hand, I would not say that my office chair, or any 
other chair with one leg, is a four-legged chair. This tells us something 
about what it takes to be a four-legged chair: one is not a four-legged 
chair if one has only one leg. This is an intuitive way of getting to know 
what it takes to be something; we consult our intuitions about whether 
something that has a certain feature can count as being a certain thing, X, 
and take that to show something about what it takes to be an X. Or, in 
other words, it is an intuitive way of doing conceptual analysis: what we 
find out are things about the reference and extension of our concepts (of 
chairs or whatever) and of the terms that express these concepts. There 
is at least one one-legged sitting device in the extension of the concept of 
a chair, so it refers not only to things with four legs. 
On this intuition-based view of conceptual analysis, then, our ways of 
using terms and concepts to classify things in the world and hypotheti-
cal scenarios of how the world might be, tell us something about the 
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reference of these terms and concepts. Here’s how Frank Jackson and 
David Chalmers describe it:  
When given sufficient information about a hypothetical scenario, subjects are 
frequently in a position to identify the extension of a given concept, on reflec-
tion, under the hypothesis that the scenario in question obtains. Analysis of a 
concept proceeds at least in part through consideration of a concept's exten-
sion within hypothetical scenarios, and noting regularities that emerge. This 
sort of analysis can reveal that certain features of the world are highly 
relevant to determining the extension of a concept, and that other features 
are irrelevant.177 
We learn about the reference of a concept from how we classify things in 
the world with that concept, as signalled by how we classify things in 
hypothetical scenarios with the term that expresses the concept. Would 
we say that this or that is an X? If we would, or would not, this tells us 
something about the concept we express with the term ‘X’.  
Conceptual analysis, on this view, is a method of unveiling the way we 
carve up the world with our concepts and the terms that express them. 
We are, as Jackson put it,  
Extracting a person’s theory of what counts as a K from intuitions about how 
to describe possible cases, and taking it to reveal their concept of K-hood 
[…].178 
The simple point that considering our intuitions about possible cases is 
a way of extracting or unveiling a pattern of use that is already there is 
important. We can have a concept without ever encountering or thinking 
about the hypothetical situations that are used to uncover the way we are 
disposed to use the concept. Even when we do not think about the sce-
narios, we are disposed to react to and describe them in certain ways if we 
were to think about them. These dispositions are what matter to the 
reference of our terms and concepts, and our intuitions about hypo-
thetical scenarios is a way of laying bare the dispositions.  
We could understand the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis 
as being silent as to what fixes the reference of concepts or terms. It 
would then be a purely methodological view, telling us how we get to 
know the extension and reference of concepts and terms. However, this 
methodological view is most plausibly paired up with a certain view on 
reference-fixing. What fixes the reference of a term or concept, according 
 
177 Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 322. 
178 Jackson, 1998a, p. 32. 
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to this view, is how we are disposed to classify things using the term 
(which expresses the concept).179 If this is how the reference of our con-
cepts and terms is determined, it makes perfect sense that the intuition-
based method of conceptual analysis is a good way of getting to know the 
reference of terms and concepts. Our intuitions about the applicability 
of terms and concepts in real and hypothetical scenarios are, as we have 
said, expressions of our dispositions to classify things with those terms 
and concepts. Even though accepting the intuition-based view as a method 
does not commit one to accept this view on what fixes reference, in what 
follows I will use “the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis” to 
apply to both. 
We should also note that the intuition-based view of conceptual 
analysis as presented here is committed neither to an internalist nor a 
social externalist view on reference. It can be held that a person’s dispo-
sitions to react to hypothetical cases determine the reference of terms 
(and the concepts they express) as she uses them. Or, alternatively, we 
might think that it is how people in general, or experts, in a linguistic 
society are disposed to use terms, that determine their reference, as used 
also by speakers in that community who lack the relevant dispositions. 
We will return to the latter social externalist view in the next chapter. In 
this chapter we consider the internalist version (with the purpose of 
finding out whether it can provide ways to meet the challenge from 
opposite intuitions). 
Let us say a bit about how, more exactly, our intuitions about, or dis-
positions to classify, hypothetical scenarios would affect the reference 
of concepts on this view. If a concept of F involves necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for being F, then, according to this method of analysing 
concepts, which these conditions are and are not is revealed by our 
intuitions to possible cases in accordance with the following “princi-
ples”: 
Not necessary. That x is G is not necessary for x to be F if, and only 
if, there is some scenario about which we are disposed to say that 
x is F but not G. 
 
179 This is a version of what is sometimes called “conceptual role semantics”. See e.g., 
Greenberg and Harman, 2006. 
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Not sufficient. That x is G is not sufficient for x to be F if, and only 
if, there is some scenario about which we are disposed to say that 
x is G but not F. 
Necessary. That x is G is necessary for x to be F if, and only if, 
there are no scenarios about which we are disposed to say that x 
is F but not G. 
Sufficient. That x is G is sufficient for x to be F if, and only if, there 
are no scenarios about which we are disposed to say that x is G 
but not F.  
There is, on this view, an important difference between, on the one hand, 
arguing that something is not a necessary or sufficient condition, and, on 
the other hand, arguing that something is a necessary or sufficient condi-
tion. If we find the relevant counter-example to something being a neces-
sary or sufficient condition, this serves as conclusive evidence that the 
condition in question does not hold. Thus, it turned out above that it is 
not necessary to have four legs to be a chair. To show conclusively that 
something actually is a necessary or sufficient condition, on the other 
hand, we would have to show that there are no hypothetical scenarios 
that serve as counter-examples to this. There is, of course, no way of 
conclusively proving such a thing. What we can do is to present hypothe-
ses that are consistent with our intuitions about the possible cases we 
have considered this far, that is, with our best evidence so far. These 
hypotheses will be open to refutation. This is, for example, what hap-
pened to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Gettier came 
up with his now famous descriptions of possible cases where people 
have true justified beliefs but our intuitions tell us that they nonetheless 
fail to have knowledge.180 The conclusion being, of course, that knowl-
edge cannot accurately be analysed merely as justified true belief. 
A qualification should be made. Not any rash response to a scenario 
counts. Sometimes we do not think clearly or carefully enough about the 
details or implications of a certain scenario, to realise that it does (or 
does not) constitute a counter-example. For this reason, the intuition-
 
180 Gettier, 1963. Gettier’s argument is often used as a standard example of conceptual 
analysis: see e.g., Ahlström, 2008, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 1997, Chalmers and 
Jackson, 2001, Schroeter, 2004, Weatherson, 2003. 
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based view of analysis should say that it is what we are disposed to think 
about scenarios when we think rationally that reveals something about 
our concepts.181 
It is important to notice what the intuition-based view of analysis, as I 
have construed it, is not committed to. First, as I understand it, it does 
not amount to saying that it is always possible to specify necessary and 
sufficient conditions of a concept. Here is Jackson and Chalmers again: 
What emerges as a result of this process may or may not be an explicit defini-
tion, but it will at least give useful information about the features in virtue of 
which a concept applies to the world. It will usually be the case that one can 
find complex expressions whose conditions of application approximate those of 
the original concept to some degree, where one finds increasingly good ap-
proximations through increasingly complex expressions. In this way we can 
elucidate at least many important aspects of how a concept's extension 
depends on the world. But in general, there is no reason to suppose that a 
finite expression yielding a counterexample-free analysis of a concept must re-
sult from this process. This pattern, whereby a conditional ability to evaluate a 
concept's extension yields elucidation of a concept without a finite counterex-
ample-free analysis, is illustrated very clearly in the case of 'knowledge'.182 
I take it that the thought here is something like this: there is little reason 
to expect that the way we are disposed to classify possible cases with a 
certain term can be fully and exactly described using other terms. But we 
can approximate it more and more by looking at more and more rele-
vant scenarios and taking account of our dispositions to classify these 
using the term in question. This is what we are doing when we are ana-
lysing a concept or the meaning of a term. Consequently, the intuition-
based view of conceptual analysis allows that for at least some concepts 
it is not possible to find a complete analysis (one that is not open to any 
counter-examples). All this view is committed to is that something is a 
sufficient or necessary condition if there are no intuitive counter-exam-
ples to this (as specified by the principles above). 
This illustrates a difference between the intuition-based view and 
another closely related class of theories often referred to as “descriptiv-
ism” about meaning. According to such views, terms have their mean-
 
181 Cf. the use of ‘rational reflection’ in Chalmers, 2004, Chalmers and Jackson, 2001. 
182 Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 323. In a footnote, Jackson and Chalmers add that 
“[Jackson] is somewhat more optimistic than [Chalmers] about the possibility of 
satisfactory finite analyses, especially if one recognizes that conceptual analysis can 
accommodate an element of conceptual revision to clear up confusions in a folk 
concept.” We will return to this idea of conceptual revision later in this chapter.  
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ings by virtue of the descriptions that speakers associate with them. 
Theories of this kind are found both in Frege and Russell.183 The mean-
ing of a name for example, such as ‘Aristotle’, is on this view given by a 
definite description associated with the name by the speaker, such as 
“the writer of the Nichomachean Ethics”, and the referent of a name is 
whatever satisfies the definite description. A modified version is what 
might be called the cluster theory, according to which the meaning is not 
given by some single definite description but by a cluster of different 
definite descriptions of which some might not be accurate descriptions 
of the referent. The referent of the name, on this view, is the thing that 
satisfies most, or a sufficient number, of the descriptions associated 
with the name.184 One difference between these descriptivist views on 
meaning and the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis (or mean-
ing) is that the latter does not presuppose that our dispositions to clas-
sify possible cases can be perfectly and exactly depicted by a description, 
however complex or disjunctive this description is. We will return to 
this difference in the next chapter.  
A point connected to this one is that the intuition-based view of con-
ceptual analysis is not committed to the idea that the correct analysis of 
a concept, described in terms that express other concepts we have, is a 
short or simple one. For many concepts we might expect that if the 
analysis is to be exhaustive, or even close to exhaustive, and informative 
to us, it will be a long and complex one. 
Neither is the intuition-based view committed to the idea that the 
correct analysis of a concept specifies for everything whether it falls 
within or without the extension of a concept. It is more plausible to 
think that it does not. After all, there is the phenomenon of vagueness, 
and we might want to allow that some concepts have “blind spots”, cases 
for which the concept simply does not specify whether they are in or 
out.  
Of course, the claim should not be made too strong. There is almost certainly a 
high degree of indeterminacy in our concepts, in their application both to the 
actual world and to hypothetical epistemic possibilities. It can sometimes hap-
pen that when an epistemic possibility is found to be actual, no clear decision 
about the concept's application is dictated.185 
 
183 See e.g. Frege, 1997, Russell, 1905. 
184 Searle, 1958. 
185 Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, p. 344. 
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All the intuition-based view of analysis says, as I conceive of it, is that to 
the extent that there are clear cases of falling inside or outside the exten-
sion of a concept, as there will be for every concept, these will show in 
our classification dispositions. 
6.2. 2  In t u i t ion -base d  anal ysis in  me tae t hic s  
It should be clear that, when construed in this uncommitted manner, the 
intuition-based view of conceptual analysis is used frequently in virtu-
ally every area of philosophy. Philosophers construe ingenious hypo-
thetical scenarios and ask themselves how to describe these scenarios. 
And our willingness or unwillingness to describe a scenario in a certain 
way is taken as justification that certain things are or are not possible. 
We have already seen an example of how this is done in the case of ana-
lysing the concept of knowledge: Gettier’s famous scenarios tell us that 
people can have true justified beliefs without having knowledge. In other 
philosophical discussions we are presented with hypothetical scenarios 
populated by swampmen, zombies and people travelling by teleporters 
to Mars, and our reactions to the examples are thought to show things 
about philosophically controversial questions; in these cases, the nature 
of mental content, consciousness and personal identity.186 Examples of 
this kind are easily multiplied just through opening up a philosophical 
journal at random. On the intuition-based view of analysis, such argu-
mentations can be seen as applications of the method of finding intuitive 
counter-examples. 
And perhaps it should be surprising that this is a common method. 
The intuition-based view can in a very straightforward sense be said to 
deliver intuitively correct analyses. Its constraints on what counts as a 
correct analysis guarantees that an analysis of the concept of x will ac-
cord with what we are disposed to think can count as an x. 
Metaethical debate is no exception to the use of this method. A clear 
example is the discussion concerning motivational internalism, as we 
saw in chapter 2. Motivational internalists hold that there is a necessary 
connection between accepting a moral judgement and being motivated in 
accordance with it (at least under normal circumstances), sometimes 
using as an argument for this view simply that a judgement which is not 
accompanied by motivation (in normal cases) intuitively does not get to 
 
186 Swampman: Davidson, 1987. Zombies: Chalmers, 1996. Teleporters: Parfit, 1984. 
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count as a moral judgement.187 One of the main arguments for motiva-
tional externalism – the position that denies that there is a necessary 
connection of this sort – on the other hand, is that we can conceive of an 
amoralist; a person who accepts moral judgements without having the 
relevant motivation (even in normal circumstances).188 The arguments 
on both sides seem to be examples of the intuition-based way of doing 
conceptual analysis, applied to the concept of moral judgements.189 
Not only is this way of reasoning – taking intuitive counter-examples 
to establish the falsity of certain analyses of moral judgements and the 
truth of others – present in metaethical debate. It is also explicitly de-
fended from methodological considerations about what a good analysis 
of moral judgements is. On one prominent view, the correct analysis of a 
moral concept depends on the dispositions of competent speakers 
(speakers who master moral terms) to use moral terms. Smith states 
his version of this view in terms of platitudes: 
To say that we can analyse moral concepts, like the concept of being right, is 
to say that we can specify which property the property of being right is by ref-
erence to platitudes about rightness: that is, by reference to descriptions of the 
inferential and judgemental dispositions of those who have mastery of the 
term ‘rightness’.190 
Smith’s idea of platitudes is hinted at already in this quote, but here is a 
more elaborate description, taken from a passage where Smith illus-
trates the idea through platitudes about colours:  
These platitudes about colour play a certain crucial role in our coming to mas-
ter colour vocabulary, for we come to master colour vocabulary by coming to 
treat remarks like these as platitudinous. The point is not that if we have mas-
 
187 See e.g., Dancy, 1993, pp. 4-6 and Gibbard, 1993, pp. 318-19 for such arguments. 
And when Smith gives an argument for his form of internalism, that argument is 
deliberately independent of our intuitions about amoralists but it relies on other 
intuitions – intuitions about what it takes to be a good person. Smith, 1994, pp. 71-76. 
188 See e.g., Brink, 1989, pp. 46-49, Mele, 1996, Stocker, 1979. 
189 Indeed, in my discussion in that chapter I also sometimes relied on this method. 
We noticed in chapter 2 that philosophers on different sides here have different 
intuitions about how strong the connection between moral judgements and motivation 
is, both generally but, perhaps more importantly, also about particular cases like 
amoralist examples. When I said in 2.6 that one could hold it to be an advantage of de 
dicto internalism that it can accommodate this through holding open that people have 
slightly different concepts of moral judgements in this respect, I was implicitly relying on 
the idea that we can take someone’s intuitions about what counts as an X (moral 
judgement) to determine his or her concept of an X.  
190 Smith, 1994, p. 39. 
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tery of the word ‘red’ then we are able to produce a long list of remarks like 
these off the tops of our heads. That may or may not be true. The point is 
rather that these remarks capture the inferential and judgemental dispositions 
vis-à-vis the word ‘red’ of those who have mastery of that term, whether or not 
they are able to produce them off the tops of their heads. To have mastery of 
the word ‘red’ is to be disposed to make inferences and judgements along these 
lines. It is in this sense that the remarks constitute a set of platitudes.191 
To master a term, then, is to treat a set of claims involving that term as 
platitudes, not necessarily in the sense of explicitly holding any of these 
claims as obviously true or even true, but in the sense of making infer-
ences and judgements that are in line with them. This fits the idea of 
testing what a term and the concept it expresses refers to through letting 
competent speakers, speakers who master the term in question, make 
judgements about real or hypothetical cases. People who master colour 
terms will for example be disposed to judge that “There’s no seeing a 
colour without seeing an extended coloured patch”, which would show 
that this is a reference-fixing platitude for colour concepts. We saw in 
chapter 2 what kind of analysis of moral concepts Smith takes this to 
support. According to this analysis, judging that one has a moral reason 
to perform a certain action is to judge that fully rational people would 
desire that one performs that action. Obviously, this is not an enumera-
tion of the platitudes that surround moral concepts. But, Smith argues, 
the analysis can account for the platitudes, and thus it is supported.  
Jackson and Pettit hold a view on how moral concepts should be ana-
lysed which is, for our purposes, very similar to Smith’s.192 On this view 
”moral terms are involved in a network of content-relevant connections, 
including connections with other moral and evaluative terms”.193 That 
is, each moral term is analytically connected to other moral terms and 
descriptive terms, and together these connections form a network. And 
any specific term is defined by its place in the network.194 A claim in-
volving such a term is therefore, in a sense, a very complex claim about 
all of the relations between the term and other terms in the network.  
What is interesting here is that according to this view the connections 
between different terms are given by the ”commonplaces” involved in 
 
191 Ibid., p. 30. 
192 Jackson, 1992, Jackson, 1998a, Jackson and Pettit, 1995 
193 Jackson and Pettit, 1995, p. 22 
194 This way of analysing moral terms builds on Lewis’s view on how to analyse 
theoretical terms (in Lewis, 1970), which in turn draws on views defended in Ramsey, 
1931 and Carnap, 1963. 
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”folk morality”.195 That is, they are what Smith calls platitudes. Those 
who master evaluative language have these platitudes as disposition to 
use the terms, that is to make judgements involving them, in accordance 
with the platitudes. Having spelled out certain commonplaces about the 
moral property of fairness, Jackson and Pettit write about people who 
make judgements about fairness:   
They may not have the concepts necessary for spelling out those common-
places, but the way they are disposed to carry on in forming and revising their 
fairness-beliefs gives them all the evidence needed for supporting the complex 
claim.196 
So on their account it is people’s dispositions to use moral terms that 
determine how these and the concepts they express should be analysed. 
In chapter 3 we saw that Wong accepts a similar view on what fixes the 
reference of concepts and words, and uses it to argue for his speaker 
relativism. Recall, according to Wong different people have different 
moral systems, systems of moral rules. These moral systems differ 
between us to the extent that we have different “substantive moral be-
liefs that we cannot conceive to be false”197. This is important, according 
to Wong, since these beliefs that a person cannot conceive to be false (or 
descriptions that we can extract from them) are what fixes the reference 
of the term ‘adequate moral system’. And since Wong analyses moral 
judgements as judgements about whether an action does or does not 
violate a rule of an adequate moral system, the consequence is that 
moral judgements made by different people have different content. (I 
also suggested there that the argument might be construed more 
directly, so that to avoid committing to an analysis of moral judgements 
in terms of adequate moral systems: that people have different moral 
beliefs, involving moral concepts, that they cannot conceive to be false, 
 
195 It is perhaps suggested in Jackson and Pettit, 1995 (p. 28-29), but explicitly stated in 
Jackson, 1992, Jackson, 1998a, that it is not the commonplaces found in our actual 
morality (or moralities) that is important, but those of ”mature folk morality”, the 
morality we would converge on under “critical reflection” (e.g. Jackson, 1998a, p. 140) 
According to one understanding this is a sign of that Jackson’s idea involves a revisionary 
element: it is not our actual dispositions but those we would have given certain ideal 
circumstances that matters to the correct analysis (see further section 6.6.2 below). 
Another understanding would be that it is because our actual dispositions reveal that 
moral properties are what we would take them to be under such ideal circumstances that 
this matters to the correct analysis. 
196 Jackson and Pettit, 1995, p. 37 
197 Wong, 1984, p. 59 
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can be taken to imply directly that the reference of their moral concept 
and the terms that express them are different.) 
At least one way to explicate Wong’s idea about reference-fixing, is 
that he places it under the constraint of intuitive counter-examples. Not 
being able to conceive a belief or judgement to be false, then, is to be 
disposed not to (hypothetically) retract that belief or judgement in reac-
tion to any hypothetical scenario.  
So, both absolutists like Smith and Jackson, and speaker relativists 
like Wong, have accepted something like an intuition-based view about 
the reference-fixing of moral concepts and terms, and argued that their 
analysis is supported by this view. Now, in this part of the book we are 
concerned with a problem for both of these – what I have called the 
challenge from opposite intuitions. Let us state this challenge more 
precisely, in the form it takes with the intuition-based view of analysis.  
6.3 T h e  Ch all e ng e St at ed 
6.3.1  Absol u t i st  in t u i t ions  
Let us start with describing the absolutist intuitions that form the basis 
of the challenge. It is important to be careful here – some ways of trying 
to state them fail because they are consistent with certain forms of stan-
dard relativism. This is because, as we saw in section 5.2.2, different 
forms of standard relativism have different implications for the nature 
of moral properties. Consider first this statement:  
(1) Moral properties (or the properties referred to by moral 
terms) are absolute properties.  
This can be further spelled out as: 
(1’) Whether an act is morally right (has the property referred to 
by ‘moral rightness’) does not depend on what my (or anyone 
else’s) actual morality is like. 
This statement of the absolutist intuition contradicts assessor relativ-
ism. Remember, according to this view, while the circumstances of 
evaluation for ordinary statements are possible worlds, the circum-
stances of evaluation for moral statements are our individual moral 
frameworks, or moralities. So just like we would say that whether Mars 
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has two moons depends on what our actual possible world is like, if 
assessor relativism is true I should agree that whether an act is morally 
right depends on what my morality is like.  
Speaker relativists (both indexical relativists and divergence relativ-
ists) can accept (1) and (1’), however. They can hold that different peo-
ple’s moral statements refer to different ordinary natural properties. 
For example, when used by a utilitarian, ‘morally right’ refers to the 
property of maximizing well-being. This is how it is on Dreier’s indexi-
cal relativism for example. What indexical relativists cannot accept is 
that the properties are absolute moral properties – they are moral proper-
ties only relative to certain moralities. So we might try the following 
way of stating the absolutist intuition: 
(2) Moral properties (or the properties referred to by moral 
terms) are absolute moral properties.  
However, indexical relativists might want to maintain that they can ac-
commodate this statement as well. (2) can be spelled out as the claim 
that whether something is a moral property does not depend on my or 
anyone else’s morality. And this, in turn, can, if we exemplify with moral 
rightness, be cashed out as: 
(2’) Whether killing an innocent is morally right does not depend 
on my morality.  
And indexical relativists can accept this, it seems. The content of ‘mor-
ally right’, on their view, depends on the morality of the speaker. So if 
our utilitarian, Smart, utters or thinks (2’), the content is: whether kill-
ing an innocent maximizes well-being does not depend on my morality. 
This is true. So maybe indexical relativists would want to hold that 
there are no specifically absolutist intuitions, only absolutist-seeming 
intuitions that standard relativists can accept as well.  
This would be a too easy way of dismissing the absolutist intuitions, 
however. (To be clear, I am not attributing it to any standard relativist: 
as we will see in the next chapter, at least some standard relativists 
acknowledge that many people have an absolutist understanding of mo-
rality.) There are ways of cashing out the intuitive difference between 
standard relativism and absolutism. Compare (2’) to a sentence involv-
ing an uncontroversial indexical: 
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(3) Whether the seminar starts now, does not depend on which 
moment in time I am at. 
If (3) is uttered at 2 pm its content is: whether the seminar starts at 2 pm 
does not depend on which moment in time I am at. This is true. But 
since ‘now’ is an indexical, we are also able to interpret (3) in such a way 
that it comes out as false. In a very straightforward sense, whether the 
seminar starts now, does depend on which time it is at this moment (of 
utterance). Say the seminar starts at 1 pm. Then, whether the seminar 
starts now, depends on whether the time is at present (the time of utter-
ance) 1 pm. This means that we do not have absolutist intuitions about 
‘now’ in the relevant sense here: we see that there is a sense in which 
whether something happens now, is relative to times (of use). Analo-
gously, indexical moral relativists should maintain that there is one 
sense in which the moral rightness of, say, killing an innocent, is relative 
to moralities. What moral absolutists maintain is that, whether killing 
an innocent is morally right is in no sense relative to moralities. So we 
have a way of cashing out the intuition that moral properties are abso-
lute moral properties, such that indexical relativists cannot accept the 
intuition. 
6.3.2  T h e c hall en ge  
In which way is this intuition a challenge to standard relativists? Let us 
start with an analogy to illustrate. In the following passage Greenberg 
and Harman suggest how one might proceed to analyse the concept of a 
witch: 
Mabel applies this concept to various people and also accepts some general 
views about witchcraft, including the view that witches have magical powers 
of certain specified sorts. We can ask Mabel how she would describe the possi-
ble discovery that no one has the relevant magical powers. Would she describe 
this as showing that there are no witches or as showing that witches do not 
after all have magical powers? If Mabel says that this sort of discovery would 
show that there are no witches, that is some evidence that her acceptance of 
the general views is more important to the content of her concept of a witch 
than her judgments that various people are witches. 198 
 
198 Greenberg and Harman, 2006, p. 306 
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Mabel’s reaction – “if no one has magical powers, then there are no 
witches” – reveals a disposition to think that a person is not a witch 
unless she has certain magical powers.  
Let us apply the same way of exploring necessary conditions to moral 
properties. Moral absolutists think of moral properties as absolute 
moral properties. Should we say that this belief determines the refer-
ence of their concepts of moral properties? Here is a hypothetical sce-
nario to test it: 
Scenario 1. There are no absolute moral properties. What we 
experience as absolute moral properties pertaining to actions ac-
tually are merely relations between these actions and our own 
moralities (or properties that depend on these relations).  
How would absolutists respond to this scenario? Probably there is no 
uniform answer to this question. However, there is reason to think that 
at least some absolutists would say that, if that scenario were true of our 
world, then there would be no moral properties: no actions would be 
morally right or wrong. Let us call them ‘die-hard absolutists’. They are 
disposed to think that, if there are no reasons to perform certain actions 
rather than others that do not pertain to the actions’ relations to our subjec-
tive moralities, then there are no moral facts at all. This reaction is struc-
turally identical to Mabel’s reaction that if there are no people with 
magical powers, then there are no witches. And just as Mabel’s reaction 
is evidence that her concept of a witch involves as a necessary condition 
of being a witch that one has magical powers, the dispositions of the die-
hard absolutists is evidence that their concepts of moral rightness and 
wrongness contain as a necessary condition for something to be the 
property of moral rightness or wrongness that it is an absolute moral 
property.  
What reason do we have to think that some absolutists are disposed 
to react in this manner? The best evidence as to how people would re-
spond to hypothetical scenarios like this, I take it, would be given by 
experiments in descriptive psychology, where the reactions of many 
people are studied in a systematic way. There are indeed studies in the 
vicinity, examining people’s commitment to objectivism about morality. 
Nichols and Folds-Bennett performed two experiments on children 
(between 5 and 6 years of age in one experiment, and 5 years of age in the 
other), and another study on college students.  
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The experiments on children tested if they thought of moral proper-
ties as response-dependent properties.199 The questions were of the 
following sort: 
You know, I think it was good for the monkey to help the other monkey. Some 
people don’t like it when monkeys help each other when they’re hurt. They 
don’t think it’s good when monkeys do that. Would you say that when one 
monkey helps a hurt monkey that is good for some people or good for real?200  
Questions of the same kind were asked about the properties of being 
beautiful, yummy and fun. The children tended to treat the paradigmati-
cally preference-dependent properties, being yummy and funny, as 
preference dependent, but were significantly less likely to treat moral 
properties (and beautiful) in this way.201 The studies on college students 
examined whether the students thought that in scenarios involving cul-
tural disagreement about whether, for example, “It’s okay to hit people 
just because you feel like it”, there is a fact of the matter. These studies 
indicated that some of the college students think that there is a fact of 
the matter while others don’t.202 
These studies are interesting, but it is not clear that they say much 
about whether people (children and college students) intuitively are 
moral truth-value relativists or absolutists. Take first the experiments 
on college students. Different questions were asked in two different 
experiments. In the first, the non-objectivist option was stated with the 
following formulations: “There is no fact of the matter about…” and 
“Different cultures believe different things, and it is not absolutely true 
or false that …”. This option does not discriminate between a relativis-
tic view on moral matter and an absolutist but error-theoretical view. 
The second experiment included the following option: “There is no 
objective fact, independent of what different people think, about whether 
it was wrong for…” and “These actions were “wrong for Ted” and 
maybe “wrong for me”, but they aren’t objectively wrong, independent of 
what people think about them”. Here there is a relativist twist to the 
formulation. But if this is the only “non-objectivist” option in the ques-
tionnaire we still cannot exclude that error-theoretically inclined abso-
 
199 Nichols and Folds-Bennett, 2003 
200 Nichols, 2004, p. 174 
201 Ibid., pp. 173-76 
202 Ibid., p. 170. Here Nichols also emphasizes that also many students who did say 
that there is a fact of the matter about other things, such as about whether the earth is 
flat, said that there is no fact of the matter in the case of moral violations.  
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lutists choose this option because it comes closest to their view. This 
suspicion might be strengthened by the fact that the “wrong for”-clauses, 
unless specified, can be interpreted as meaning “wrong according to”. 
The experiments on children might be better for the purpose of testing 
absolutist/relativist intuitions. What is interesting about these experi-
ments is that the children distinguished between moral properties and 
paradigmatically response-dependent properties. No matter how one is 
to interpret the children’s answers – what they mean by “good for real” 
and “good for some people” – it is clear that they draw a line between 
these two sorts of judgements. But it need not mean that the children 
have an absolutist view on moral matters. The “good for real” answer 
might be what to expect given the truth of at least some forms of indexi-
cal relativism and divergence relativism. 
We need not dwell further upon this matter, however, since it is clear 
that the experiments cannot provide the evidence we are after here. Sup-
pose they do provide some evidence that children do take moral facts to 
be absolute, and that some college students think this while others 
don’t. Still, the experiments do not tell us how strong the absolutist 
belief is for those who have it. Is it like Mabel’s belief that witches have 
magical powers; that is, would they say that if there are no objective or 
absolute moral facts, then there are no moral facts at all? The experi-
ments simply don’t test this. 
However, even in the absence of empirical experiments on this matter 
we can be rather confident that there are absolutists who would react in 
the envisaged manner. First, my experience is that intuitions of this kind 
are fairly common among both students and teachers at philosophy 
departments. Second, intuitions of this kind have found their way into 
metaethical literature. 
Consider for example the following argument from Smith against 
speaker relativism where he appeals to such intuitions: 
[…] if normative reasons were indeed relative, then mere reflection on that 
fact would suffice to undermine their normative significance. For on the rela-
tive conception it turns out that, for example, the desirabilityme of some con-
sideration, p, is entirely dependent on the fact that my actual desires are such 
that, if I were to engage in a process of systematically justifying my desires, 
weeding out those that aren’t justified and acquiring those that are, a desire 
that p would be one of the desires I would end up having. … But what my 
actual desires are to begin with is, on this relative conception of reasons, an 
entirely arbitrary matter, one without any normative significance of its own. I 
might have had any old set of desires to begin with, even a set that delivered 
up the desire that not p after a process of systematic justification. The desir-
abilityme of the fact that p thus turns out to be an entirely arbitrary fact about 
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it. But arbitrariness is precisely a feature of a consideration that tends to 
undermine any normative significance it might initially appear to have.203 
According to speaker relativism of any kind, the truth of moral judge-
ments depends on facts that are arbitrary in Smith’s sense above, that is, 
facts that depend on the actual desires or beliefs (the moral system) of 
the speaker or believer of the judgement. Such arbitrary facts, Smith 
contends, cannot have any normative significance; the actual desires of 
someone are arbitrary from a normative perspective, and consequently 
so are any fact or property that depend on these. Due to these considera-
tions, Smith constructs his ideal observer analysis as an absolutist 
analysis: moral judgements are about what everyone would want us to do 
if they were fully rational; that is, my moral judgements are not merely 
about what I would want people to do if I were fully rational. And he is 
willing to take the consequence that, if it indeed turns out that the de-
sires of different fully rational people would not converge, then there 
are no moral facts. In that case, there would only be arbitrary and thus 
non-normative facts that depend on people’s actual wants. Here are the 
final words from The Moral Problem: 
As I see it we are justified in thinking that that there are moral facts, and so in 
engaging in ordinary moral debate, but our justification is defeasible, and it 
may itself be defeated by the outcome of those very debates. If we are inter-
ested in the final resolution of meta-ethical questions – in whether or not 
there really are any moral facts – then it seems to me that we therefore have 
little alternative but to engage in normative ethical debate and to see where 
the arguments that we give ultimately lead us.204 
Why does Smith think that the outcome of moral debates is an indicator 
of the existence of moral facts? He does so because, as we have seen, he is 
convinced that the truth of moral judgements (and thus moral proper-
ties and facts) cannot depend on the actual desires of the speakers or 
believers of the judgements: and if rational moral debate tends to make 
different people’s moral convictions converge, this is an indicator that 
there actually are moral facts of this kind. Indeed, he is so convinced of 
this that he is ready to say that if it turns out that rational moral debate 
does not tend to make people agree about the answers to moral ques-
tions, then this is an indication that there are no moral facts at all, no 
true answers to moral questions, since it would indicate that there are 
 
203 Smith, 1994, pp. 172-73. 
204 Ibid., p. 202. 
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no facts of the actual-desire-independent sort out there. That is, Smith’s 
reaction to the hypothetical inexistence of absolute moral facts is analo-
gous to Mabel’s reaction to the hypothetical inexistence of people with 
magical powers: if the inexistence is a fact, Smith contends, then there 
are no moral facts at all.  
Other philosophers have shared Smith’s reaction. While Smith re-
mains optimistic to the existence of moral facts, Mackie famously 
draws the conclusion that an error-theory holds for moral judgements – 
moral judgements concern facts that do not exist: 
The ordinary user of moral language means to say something about whatever 
it is that he characterizes morally, for example a possible action, as it is in itself, 
or would be if it were realized, and not about, or even simply expressive of, his, 
or anyone else’s, attitude or relation to it. But the something he wants to say is 
not purely descriptive, certainly not inert, but something that involves a call 
for action or for the refraining of action, and one that is absolute, not con-
tingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice, his own or anyone 
else’s. Someone in a state of moral perplexity, wondering whether it would be 
wrong for him to engage, say, in research related to bacteriological warfare, 
wants to arrive at some judgement about this concrete case, his doing this 
work at this time in these actual circumstances; his relevant characteristics 
will be part of the subject of the judgement, but no relation between him and 
the proposed action will be part of the predicate. The question is not, for exam-
ple, whether he really wants to do this work, whether it will satisfy or dissatisfy 
him, whether he will in the long run have a pro-attitude towards it, or even 
whether this is an action of a sort that he can happily and sincerely recom-
mend in all relevantly similar cases. Nor is he even wondering just whether to 
recommend such action in all relevantly similar cases. He wants to know 
whether this course of action would be wrong in itself. Something like this is 
the everyday objectivist concept of which talk about non-natural qualities is a 
philosopher’s reconstruction.205 
Mackie is not entirely clear on what it is he means that ordinary moral 
judgements are not about. Or at least, he seems to have several different 
things in mind. Alexander Miller extracts 16 interpretations of what 
Mackie, in different passages, seems to mean by the claim that moral 
concepts are of objective requirements.206 However, one thing that 
Mackie clearly has in mind in the passage above, is that moral judge-
ments are objectivist in the sense that they are not about the relation the 
speaker/believer stands in to the action in question, or about her atti-
tudes towards it. This is obviously directed against forms of speaker 
 
205 Mackie, 1977, pp. 33-34. 
206 Miller, 2003, p. 116. 
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relativism that make moral judgements be about these things. It is not 
explicitly directed against other forms of relativism. As we have noted 
before, on Dreier’s indexical relativism, and divergence relativism 
(forms of relativism according to which different people’s moral con-
cepts refer to different properties because their moralities involve dif-
ferent fundamental moral beliefs), we refer to the natural properties 
that our moralities pick out, and not to these moralities or the way the 
actions relate to them. But there is no reason to think that Mackie 
would not have extended his case to hold against these theories, had he 
considered them. A claim like the following seems to be congenial to 
Mackie’s objectivist picture in spirit, if not to the letter: when the ordi-
nary user of moral language says that an action is morally wrong, she 
does not mean to make a claim about the action she characterises mor-
ally, the truth of which depends on her own, or anyone else’s, actual 
relation to it.  
Now, Mackie argues not only that moral judgements are about objec-
tive or absolute facts – this of course holds for many other sorts of 
judgements as well. What is specific about absolute moral facts is that 
they are absolute facts about categorically prescriptive requirements. 
We need not go into what this means here. The important thing here is 
that this semantic or conceptual claim is just the first part of Mackie’s 
argument for his error-theory. The second part is to argue for the onto-
logical claim that there are no objective or absolute facts of that specifi-
cally moral sort. And from this he draws the conclusion that there are 
no moral facts at all. That is, Mackie, just like Smith, thinks that if there 
are no absolute moral facts, then there are no moral facts at all. Unlike 
Smith he also draws the conclusion that there are no moral facts.207 
I suggest that we can think of the reasoning of Smith and Mackie as 
manifestations and specifications of a strong intuition that at least some 
absolutists have: if there are no absolute moral facts, there are no moral 
facts at all. It is probably true that the vast majority of moral absolutists 
are realists, that is, they think that there are moral truths. But this is 
consistent with the idea that many of them are potential error-theorists, 
like Smith. That is, they would become error-theorists if they actually 
 
207 Richard Joyce, who has also defended an error-theory, reasons similarly to Mackie, 
but he directs the semantic part of his argument against agent relativism – that is, the idea 
that the truth-value of a moral judgement depends on the morality of the agent who’s 
action is judged. He argues that if there are no agent absolute moral facts, then error-
theory holds for moral matters just like it does for witches. (Joyce, 2001, pp. 95-99) 
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came to think there are no absolute moral properties. And this is evi-
dence that their moral concepts are concepts of absolute moral proper-
ties. 
It should be admitted, however, that this evidence is not conclusive. 
Remember that according to the intuition-based view of conceptual 
analysis we are working on now, to establish that being G is a necessary 
condition of being F, one has to establish that there are no hypothetical 
scenarios about which we judge that something is F without being G. So, 
to show that on the die-hard absolutists’ concept of moral properties an 
action has to have an absolute moral property to be, say, morally wrong, 
we would have to show that there are no hypothetical scenarios about 
which they would judge that an action is wrong even though it does not 
have an absolute moral property. But since it is impossible to actually 
test this for every possible hypothetical scenario, we cannot exclude that 
for some scenario where an action is described as having no absolute 
moral properties but as having a complex combination of other proper-
ties, they would judge that that action would be morally wrong. That is, 
we cannot exclude with absolute certainty that some philosopher in the 
future could think up clever scenarios which would make even die-hard 
absolutists, such as Smith and Mackie, falter and think of relative moral 
properties as a possibility.208  
For this reason, the view that the moral concepts of die-hard absolut-
ists refer to absolute moral properties is best seen as our best shot given 
our current epistemic situation. As long as no-one has made a reason-
able case that there are counter-examples of the relevant kind, our best 
evidence is to the effect that at least some absolutists have concepts of 
moral rightness and wrongness which include as a necessary condition 
that any morally right or wrong act has an absolute moral property. 
 
208 It is of course trivially true that Smith and other absolutists could come to change 
their metaethical views in the future. But not all such changes are relevant in the present 
context. Let us make a comparison. It is, for sure, possible that in the future I (and every 
other competent user of English) will be disposed to use the term ‘chair’ only about 
things that hover three meters over the ground: but in that case we will have a change of 
meaning of the word ‘chair’. People’s dispositions to use moral terms could change in a 
similar manner: and then we would also have a change of meaning. What I am after here 
is something else: I am suggesting that the way some people are currently disposed to use 
moral terms to describe hypothetical scenarios, only absolute moral properties can count 
as moral properties. It is not an objection to this that their dispositions might change: no 
doubt they can. What would constitute an objection is if there are situations that they 
with their current dispositions are ready to classify as situations where moral properties 
are relative moral properties. 
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I think that this is indeed the conclusion to draw from the best evi-
dence currently at hand. However, there are situations that seem to con-
stitute obvious counter-examples of the relevant kind. If they are indeed 
such counter-examples, we have reason to reject my claim about the 
moral concepts of die-hard absolutists, and consequently reason to 
reject the idea that the challenge from absolutist intuitions is a real 
threat to standard relativism. Let us examine the case for this objection. 
6.3.3 Error - t h e ori sts  mak e  mor al  ju d g em e n ts  
Error-theorists are convinced by theoretic philosophical considerations 
that there can be no moral facts, that all moral judgements are false. But 
no one thinks that these philosophers would stop forming and accepting 
moral judgements when they are confronted with “morally loaded” 
situations in real life. That is, they continue to think of actions as mor-
ally right and wrong in certain situations, even though they have the 
belief that there are no absolute moral properties. And this seems to be 
evidence that their moral concepts are not such that there being absolute 
moral facts is a necessary condition for actions being morally right or 
wrong: these real life situations function as counter-examples to this. 
However, I think there is a quite simple explanation to this phe-
nomenon that does not threaten my conclusion. The objection we are 
considering here presupposes that the error-theorists form and accept 
moral judgements at the same time as they are convinced that there are no 
absolute moral facts, and that they are taking this conviction into account 
when forming and accepting the moral judgement. But this is not the best 
understanding of situations like the one above.  
To see why, we can first recapitulate a line of reasoning from chapter 
4. I argued there that speaker relativists have to explain away our experi-
ence of moral disputes as involving disagreements. One way for them to 
do this, I said, is through pointing to the social and evolutionary func-
tion of moral thinking. At least an important part of the function of 
moral thought and language is that it allows us to approach interper-
sonal conflicts in a way that makes it easier to cooperate and coordinate 
our behaviour. If moral judgements are to fill the social function of 
facilitating cooperation, it is important that we do not think of the truth 
(or correctness etc.) of our own and other people’s moral judgements as 
depending on the judge’s own desires or values. When we are engaged in 
moral situations and discussions it is important that we experience 
disagreement between ourselves and other people who make different 
moral evaluations of certain actions; that we are right in our claims and 
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that they therefore are wrong. Now, such thinking is typical of absolutist 
and atypical of relativist discourses. Thus relativists could argue (and 
have done so) that even though their view on moral beliefs and state-
ments is correct – that is, that their truth-values depend on the be-
liever’s/speaker’s own morality – it is quite understandable that we 
intuitively experience these beliefs and statements as being about abso-
lute moral facts; this is how our moral experiences have come to be due 
to the coordinating function of moral thought. 
To develop this into an explanation of why error-theorists come to 
form and accept moral judgements, we have to add something. In order 
for moral thinking to have the function of coordinating behaviour, it is 
not enough that we think of moral discourse in a typically absolutist 
way. We also have to experience actions as actually being morally right 
and wrong, that is, come to form and accept moral judgements. If we did 
not actually come to accept moral judgements, we would have no moral 
judgements that could affect and coordinate our behaviour. So, as moral 
thinkers, we are formed to experience actions, especially in morally 
loaded situations, as being morally right or wrong; and for many of us, 
at least, these experiences involve an absolutist phenomenology. 
This can be the basis of an explanation of the sort we are looking for. 
Error-theorists deny that there are any absolute moral properties. This 
sceptical conclusion, though, is not based on not experiencing actions as 
being absolutely right or wrong in morally loaded situations. They have 
come to the conclusion on theoretical grounds in morally calm mo-
ments. The reason that error-theorists, just like the rest of us, come to 
form and accept moral judgements in morally loaded situations, is that 
they, just like the rest of us (that is, those of us who do that), experience 
that actions are right and wrong in the absolute sense. In these moral 
experiences, the presence of absolute moral facts is so obvious and 
compelling that the theoretical doubts that there are no absolute moral 
facts are “forgotten” or repressed.  
Obviously, this is not conclusive evidence that this is why error-theo-
rists continue to form and accept moral judgements. I think, however, 
that what I have said makes it the most reasonable hypothesis. And we 
can add one further consideration to this effect.  
Error-theorists do not, when they are in morally loaded situations, 
reflect in the following way about the action in question: “On the one 
hand the action does not have absolute moral properties. On the other 
hand it has other features, say, being deliberately cruel, that indeed make 
it seem morally wrong. In light of this I conclude that the action is 
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wrong after all.” Had they reasoned in that way, this would have shown 
that they did not treat having an absolute moral property as a necessary 
condition of being morally wrong. But reasonably, this is not how they 
think. If they did (and if we set aside the idea that error-theorists all have 
very bad memory or are irrational) we could not expect them to still be 
error-theorists in their next morally calm moment. Their reasoning in 
the morally loaded situations would have shown to them that an action 
can be wrong without having an absolute moral property. 
A better picture is the one drawn above. In morally loaded situations 
error-theorists do not even consider their belief that there are no abso-
lute moral properties, this belief does not enter their deliberation. 
Instead they take their moral experience at face value, and that experience 
is as of absolute moral properties. (This point can be appreciated also 
without putting the argument in terms of the social function of moral 
thinking. It does not really matter why error-theorists, like many of us, 
have the absolutist moral experiences they do.)  
We can conclude that the fact that error-theorists still form and 
accept moral judgements does not show that there are scenarios where 
they are ready to question that there has to be absolute moral facts for 
there to be moral facts; it merely shows that there are circumstances 
where they “forget” or repress their conviction that there are no abso-
lute moral facts. It is simply very hard, perhaps in some sense psycho-
logically impossible, for error-theorists to let their belief that there are 
no absolute moral properties guide their moral judgements in particu-
lar situations: the world presents itself very convincingly as if these 
properties are out there.209 
 
209 A parallel objection to the one I have discussed here concerns potential error-
theorists, that is, die-hard absolutists who believe that there are absolute moral 
properties. Suppose that such die-hard absolutists were presented with hypothetical 
scenarios of the following kind: “Imagine that there are no absolute moral properties, but 
that someone tortured your child, wouldn’t that be morally wrong?” Probably, even for 
those who seem to be potential error-theorists, thinking that if there are no absolute 
moral properties then there are no moral properties at all, the actions described in such 
scenarios intuitively appear as wrong. But then, since the scenarios are described as 
lacking absolute moral properties, it seems that these people after all are willing to accept 
non-absolute facts as moral facts! I think this parallel version of the objection can also be 
parallelly rebutted: When we are confronted with certain kinds of actions, even in 
imaginary cases, we cannot help but think that these are wrong and we are unable to 
keep in mind the stipulated non-existence of absolute moral facts in the hypothetical 
scenarios. 
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To sum up, my answer to the objection under consideration is this. In 
cool hours error-theorists say that moral properties don’t exist. The 
reason that they still make moral judgements when confronted with, say, 
morally outrageous actions, is that in such situations their sceptical 
beliefs are put to one side. This is not something they choose to do; it is 
just how we and our moral practice work. When we see certain things 
we cannot but form moral beliefs, and our sceptical beliefs or worries 
vanish temporarily from our conscious minds. But this doesn’t remove 
the fact that if and when the sceptical beliefs about absolute moral prop-
erties are present, some people (actual and potential error-theorists) say 
that moral properties don’t exist.210 
We have not found any reasonable counter-examples to the suggestion 
that the moral concepts of die-hard absolutists are concepts of absolute 
moral properties. What we have most reason to conclude, given our 
current epistemic state, is that some people have absolutist moral con-
cepts. So on the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis, the chal-
lenge from absolutist intuitions is a real threat to standard relativism, 
construed as a general theory about everyone’s moral concepts. Let us 
turn to objections to this conclusion. 
6.4  N o S i mple R eply: Th e  D iffe r e n c e fr o m  th e Op e n 
Qu esti o n A rgum e nt 
To those acquainted with modern metaethics and philosophy of lan-
guage it might seem obvious that there are ways to meet the challenge 
from opposite intuitions. The challenge is structurally similar to 
Moore’s famous open question argument against metaethical naturalism: 
both objections hold our intuitions against analyses of moral judge-
ments. It has been argued that, if analyses of moral concepts are 
grounded on a reasonable form of the intuition-based view of concep-
tual analysis, then there is a simple reply to the open question argument. 
Because of the structural similarity between the challenge from oppo-
site intuitions and the open question argument, one might expect that if 
 
210 Some cases where error-theorists continue to make moral judgements might have 
other explanations, and Mackie (1977) might be one example. After being convinced 
about error-theory Mackie continues to make moral judgements, but now, consciously it 
seems, without the absolutist presuppositions. For such persons it might be that the 
meaning of their moral terms change from absolute to relative when they (intentionally) 
change their presuppositions about what it takes for there to be moral properties. 
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this is correct, it holds for the challenge as well. I will argue that it 
doesn’t. 
The open question argument tells us that any naturalist analysis of 
moral terms and concepts fails. Consider the utilitarian analysis telling 
us “X is morally right” has the same meaning as “X maximizes well-
being”. We can ask the following question:  
(OQ) Is whatever action that maximizes well-being also morally 
right? 
This does not strike us as an odd thing to ask. Indeed, it is a question 
philosophers ask and debate frequently. But how can this be so if 
‘maximizes well-being’ and ‘is right’ mean the same? If they did, it seems 
we should regard it a strange thing to seriously ask, much like “is every 
circle also round?”. We who master the terms ‘circle’ and ‘round’ surely 
see this question as an indication that he who seriously asks it does not 
master these terms, since there is no room to doubt what the answer is 
once one has a proper understanding of them. It is part of the concept of 
a circle that circles are round. We who master the terms, then, do not 
see it as an open question. Not so with (OQ). In Moore’s terms, such 
questions are “significant”, “intelligible” and “the mere fact that we 
understand very well what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we 
have two different notions before our minds”211. According to the open 
question argument, then, since we see it as an open question whether 
every act that maximizes well-being also is morally right, it is not con-
ceptually excluded that some act maximizes well-being without being 
morally right. 
The open question argument now proceeds to generalize this result. 
For any natural property it is an open question whether every action, X, 
which has the property, also is morally right. And equivalent claims 
hold for other moral properties. Thus, the following general question is 
open whichever natural property N is, and whichever moral property M 
is: 
(General OQ) Is every action that is N also M? 
 
211 Moore, 1903, p. 68. 
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That any question of this type is open, the argument goes, shows that no 
analysis of moral terms that gives the meaning of them in natural terms 
can be correct. For every natural property it is simply conceptually pos-
sible that an action has that property without having the property of 
being morally right, or any other specific moral property. 
The open question argument and the challenge from opposite intui-
tions are similar to each other in that both build a case against analyses 
on our intuitions. The open question argument tells us that some pro-
posed analysis is problematic since the analysis implies that something 
is conceptually precluded (for example, that acts that maximize well-
being are not right), while our intuitions tell us that this is not concep-
tually precluded. The challenge from opposite intuitions tells us that 
some proposed analysis is problematic since on that analysis moral 
properties are of a certain kind (for example relative properties) while 
at least many people have intuitions to the effect that this (e.g., that 
moral properties are relative) is conceptually precluded. 
How can the open question argument be replied on an intuition-based 
view of conceptual analysis? Smith approaches the question through 
“the paradox of analysis”: how can an analysis of a concept we are sup-
posed to master be correct – and thus not add any information over and 
above what is already contained in the concept – and at the same time be 
unobvious and informative about the concept (why else would we need 
an analysis)? If we can answer this question it seems we can rebut the 
open question argument, which holds against analyses of moral terms 
precisely that they seem unobvious to us. Here is Smith’s reply: 
This account of what conceptual analysis consists in enables us to make good 
sense of the phenomena associated with the Paradox of Analysis. Why are 
analyses unobvious and informative? Because even though someone who has 
mastery of some concept C must have certain inferential and judgemental dis-
positions, it may not be transparent to her what these inferential and judge-
mental dispositions are, and so, a fortiori, it need not be transparent to her 
what the best summary or systematization of the platitudes that describe 
these dispositions is. Whereas mastery of a concept requires knowledge-how, 
knowledge of an analysis of a mastered concept requires us to have knowledge-
that about our knowledge-how. It might therefore take time and thought to 
see whether or not C* constitutes an analysis of C because it takes time and 
thought to figure out what the relevant inferential and judgemental disposi-
tions are and what the best systematization of the platitudes describing these 
dispositions is.212 
 
212 Smith, 1994, p. 38. 
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How exactly does this help rebut the open question argument? A first 
part is the one Smith puts in terms of know-how and know-that: in 
order to master a concept one merely has to be disposed in a specific 
way, one does not have to know in which way one is disposed. A second 
part of the reply is at least indicated. It can take much time and thought 
to figure out what the relevant dispositions are and how to best systema-
tize them, because this is a complex matter. This aspect is more explicit 
in Jackson’s way of tackling the open question argument: 
True, according to moral functionalism, a sufficiently rich descriptive story 
leads a priori to an act’s being right; but this will be a clear case of an unobvi-
ous a priori or conceptual entailment, precisely because of the complexity of 
the moral functionalist story. Just as we can sensibly doubt the result of a long, 
complex numerical addition by virtue of its making sense to doubt that the 
addition was done correctly (and, consequently, insist that a statement of the 
result of the addition is a ‘substantive’ position in arithmetic, and that it is 
‘open’ to us to query the answer), so we can make sense of doubting the result 
of the complex story that moral functionalism says leads from the descriptive 
to the ethical.213 
The correct analysis, on both Smith’s and Jackson’s account, should 
account for a complex system of dispositions we have to use moral 
terms. If we think of each platitude (corresponding to a disposition to 
react to certain aspects of hypothetical scenarios) as being an aspect of 
the correct analysis, adding some condition to it, it has to hold that there 
is no counter-example to any such aspect of the analysis. If we consider 
the relevant hypothetical scenarios, those that pinpoint the different 
aspects, we will gain knowledge of the platitudes. The first part of the 
answer to the open question argument, the one in focus in the passage 
from Smith, is that we might not have considered all relevant scenarios, 
and for this reason the correct analysis might seem unobvious to us. The 
second part, the one Jackson states, is that even if we consider all rele-
vant scenarios, this need not make the analysis as a complex whole obvi-
ous to us, even if it exposes the individual aspects of it.  
To illustrate; suppose that epistemologists manage to patch up the 
holes Gettier made in the analysis of knowledge by adding a number of 
paragraphs to the analysis, such that there are no counter-examples to it. 
This need indeed not mean that the resulting analysis is obvious to us 
who master the concept of knowledge. It will probably be a complex 
analysis without intuitive appeal at first sight.  
 
213 Jackson, 1998a, p. 151. 
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Consequently it is not through considering our intuitions about an 
analysis as a whole that we test the analysis: it is through finding pat-
terns in how we are disposed to use the term that expresses the concept 
in different scenarios. This way we can find (and discard) platitudes, 
claims about the property in question that we are never ready to deny. It 
need not be obvious which analysis best captures all of these platitudes. 
This is the reply to the open question argument. Can the challenge from 
absolutist intuitions be answered in the same way? 
It cannot. The challenge from absolutist intuitions is about one spe-
cific aspect of the analysis of moral concepts: are they or are they not 
about absolute moral properties. Some people are disposed to think, in 
relevant hypothetical scenarios, that being an absolute moral property is 
a necessary part of being a moral property. Since the challenge concerns 
one specific aspect of the analysis, Jackson’s response to the open ques-
tion argument cannot be used here; it simply is not a complex matter. 
And since the challenge is stated through absolutist responses to hypo-
thetical scenarios, it cannot be replied to in Smith’s way; it is not the 
case that they are absolutists because they are not aware of their own 
relativist dispositions, which they would become aware of if confronted 
with the relevant scenarios. So, on the intuition-based view of analysis, 
there is no simple reply to the challenge of the kind that there is to the 
open question argument.  
As admitted above, it is possible that some clever philosopher will 
think up scenarios described as involving no absolute moral properties 
in reaction to which even die-hard absolutists will say that there are 
moral properties (also in morally calm moments). But in want of such 
scenarios, our best shot is that these people’s moral concepts are con-
cepts of absolute moral properties. 
6.5 R el ati v i sts  a nd M od est A bs olutists  
There are people who are not die-hard absolutists. To start with, some 
absolutists are what we can call ”modest absolutists”. Even though they 
believe that moral properties are absolute moral properties, there are 
scenarios about which they would say; if the world turns out to be like 
that, then moral properties are relative. Frank Jackson seems to be one 
example: 
 […] some hold that we know enough as of now about moral disagreement to 
know that convergence will (would) not occur. In this case, there will not be a 
single mature folk morality but rather different mature folk moralities for dif-
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ferent groups in the community; and, to the extent that they differ, the 
adherents of the different folk moralities will mean something different by the 
moral vocabulary because the moral terms of the adherents of the different 
schemes will be located in significantly different networks. […] I will assume 
what I hope and believe is the truth of the matter, namely, that there will 
(would) be convergence. But if this is a mistake, what I say in what follows 
should be read as having implicit relativization clauses built into it. The identi-
fications of the ethical properties should be read as accounts, not of rightness 
simpliciter, but of rightness for this, that, or the other moral community, 
where what defines a moral community is that it is a group of people who 
would converge on a single mature folk morality starting from current folk 
morality.214 
Jackson thinks that absolutism is true, but sees possible circumstances 
under which it would not be. This means that absolutism is not built 
into his moral concepts. His analysis of moral judgements is very much 
like Smith’s, but with this difference. 
How about the moral concepts of relativists? Are there die-hard rela-
tivists; that is, speakers who exclude that any absolute properties can 
count as moral properties? I am not sure. Take Harman as an example. 
Harman is an ideal system relativist. According to his theory, the truth-
values of moral utterances and beliefs depend on what the speaker’s or 
believer’s system of goals, values and principles would be like if it was 
corrected to become more coherent. My belief that an action is wrong is 
true if my system of attitudes would contain a negative attitude towards 
the action if the system were corrected. Harman’s analysis is relativist 
since he thinks that different people’s moral systems would be different 
if they were corrected. It is not clear, however, what Harman would say 
about a scenario where it turns out that people’s moral systems con-
verge if they are corrected no matter which goals, values and principles 
they contain from the beginning. Would he say that, in that case, absolut-
ism turns out to be true after all. Or would he say that the truth-values 
of people’s moral judgements are not relative to those corrected systems. 
In such a case, he could say, the systems are over-corrected; they cannot 
function as moral systems since they are no longer sensitive to the spe-
cific goals, values and principles of the individual.  
If a relativist reacts in the first way, her moral concepts are structur-
ally much like Jackson’s: they should be analysed such that if there are 
absolute facts of a certain kind, these are moral facts; but if there are 
not, then relative facts count as moral facts. If the world turns out to be 
 
214 Ibid., p. 137. 
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in a certain way, moral terms used by this relativist refer to absolute 
moral properties; if the world turns out to be in another way, then they 
refer to relative moral properties.215 If a relativist reacts in the second 
way, on the other hand, then she is a die-hard relativist: her moral con-
cepts are concepts of relative moral properties. Moral terms, when used 
by her, always refer to relative moral properties. 
The existence of die-hard absolutists is a problem for standard rela-
tivism: how can it be argued that these people use moral terms to refer 
to relative properties, when under no circumstances they are willing to 
say that such properties can count as moral properties? If there are die-
hard relativists this poses a corresponding problem for absolutism. But 
even if there are no die-hard relativists, the existence of people who 
think that moral properties are relative at least under certain circum-
stances is a potential problem for absolutism. Whether moral judge-
ments made by these people refer to relative or absolute moral facts 
depends on which properties there are in the world. (This connects to 
parts of the discussion in next chapter, where I discuss the view that 
standard relativism is true, not as a conceptual fact, but in virtue of how 
the world is constituted.) 
6.6  O b j e cti o n s a nd R epli es  
I have argued that if the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis is 
correct, the strong absolutist intuitions some people have threaten to 
prove standard relativism false, at least when this is construed as a gen-
eral view, that is, as a view about the reference of the moral terms and 
concepts of every speaker.  
However, this result is of course irrelevant to the question of whether 
standard relativists can answer the challenge from absolutist intuitions 
if the intuition-based view (as understood above) is not correct. If it 
should be modified or abandoned for a better view, chances are that the 
challenge can be met on the better view. And it is indeed a common view 
today, perhaps even the received view, that the intuition-based view of 
conceptual analysis is not consistent with how the reference of at least 
many terms and concepts is fixed. Many of these objections are argu-
 
215 It might be worth noting that I am not excluding that modest absolutists and 
relativists can also be potential error-theorists – there might be scenarios about which 
they would say that there are no moral properties, since there are neither relative nor 
absolute properties that satisfy other necessary conditions for being moral properties.  
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ments to the effect that some form of externalist view on reference 
holds, either a social or a causal view, or both. If this is so, the reference 
of words and concepts depends (at least partly) on other things than the 
psychological states of the speaker. This, it would seem, makes it in-
credible that we can look to our intuitions to find the reference. Such 
externalist objections will be considered in the next chapter. Here I will 
consider objections to the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis 
that are not necessarily to the effect that internalism should be aban-
doned. 
6.6.1  Unr ealis t ic  p ic t ur e  of anal ysis  
It is quite common to hold against the intuition-based view of concep-
tual analysis that few, if any, concepts have been successfully analysed in 
this way. Thus Lycan writes that, “[…] no effort of analytic philosophy 
to provide strictly necessary and sufficient conditions for a philosophi-
cally interesting concept has ever succeeded”.216 But the point is not 
restricted to philosophically interesting concepts. Part of Quine’s and 
others’ objection to the analytic-synthetic distinction was that even what 
had been thought of as paradigmatic and clear cases of simple and good 
analyses fail, because there are counter-examples. Harman collects some 
examples:  
We can imagine discovering that cats are not animals but are radio controlled 
robots from Mars. […] Speakers do not consider the Pope a bachelor. […] Peo-
ple will not apply the term ‘bachelor’ to a man who lives with the same woman 
over a long enough period of time, even if they are not married. Society pages 
in newspapers will identify as eligible ‘bachelors’ men who are in the process of 
being divorced but are still married.217 
What have seemed to be obvious necessary and sufficient conditions, 
have been proven to not stand up to the test of counter-examples. Such 
examples are supposed to serve as premises in an inductive argument 
against intuition-based conceptual analysis. If we have not yet found a 
good analysis along these lines, if even paradigm examples of analytic 
truth fail, what are the chances of finding one at all? More specifically, 
the following is the instance of the inductive argument that is directly 
relevant for us here: if we have not yet been able to find one example of a 
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217 Harman, 1999, p. 140. The example with robot cats is from Putnam, 1962, and the 
Pope example from Terry and Flores, 1986. 
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necessary condition that people are never, under no circumstances, 
ready to question, then it seems that we can expect that the same holds 
for the die-hard absolutists’ belief that moral properties has to be abso-
lute moral properties.  
The objection can also, instead of relying on inductive reasoning from 
previous attempts to analyse concepts, take a more theoretical form. 
Harman expresses the thought behind the argument as follows:  
Some beliefs may be more ‘central’ than others – more theoretical, more taken 
for granted (in a way that needs more explication than I can provide). These 
more central beliefs will seem obvious, because it is hard to take seriously re-
vising them, but they are not therefore guaranteed to be true and there will 
normally be circumstances in which such previously obvious beliefs will be 
revised. 
There is no sharp, principled distinction between changing what one means 
and changing what one believes. We can, to be sure, consider how to translate 
between someone’s language before and after a given change in view. If the 
best translation is the homophonic translation, we say that there has been a 
change in doctrine; if some other (nonhomophonic) translation is better, we 
say that there has been a change in meaning. What we say about this depends 
on the context and our purposes of the moment.218 
Two different but related ideas are in focus in the two paragraphs in this 
quote (although they are not fully and clearly separated). The first can be 
stated as follows: 
Revisability: For every belief in our belief-systems there are cir-
cumstances in which that belief would be given up or revised.  
The idea is that our beliefs are structured in a coherentist way rather 
than a fundamentalist way. Even for the most central beliefs in our sys-
tems it holds that if enough of the other beliefs in the system were 
revised, we would revise the central beliefs. This is the idea in the quote 
that backs up the inductive argument: if every belief would be given up 
under some circumstances, then it is simply not true that there are some 
beliefs to which there are no counter-examples. It is just that for some 
beliefs these counter-examples are much harder to think of, because we 
would have to imagine so many of our other actual beliefs to be false. 
This, then, is a more principled reason to doubt that there are no cir-
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cumstances or scenarios that would make also die-hard absolutists give 
up the idea that moral properties have to be absolute moral properties. 
As we have seen, defenders of the intuition-based view of conceptual 
analysis like Chalmers and Jackson think that the correct analyses will 
often have to be very long and complex (and might even be open ended). 
Indeed, this was a central part of Jackson’s reply to the open question 
argument; the correct analyses of moral terms in natural terms are so 
complex that it might be hard to get an intuitive grip on whether they are 
the correct analyses at all; just like it is hard to get an intuitive grip on 
whether certain mathematical calculations are correct. This makes it 
hard to evaluate this nuanced intuition-based view of conceptual analy-
sis, in contrast to the claim that there are no analyses to which there are 
no intuitive counter-examples. As for the inductive objection: the reason 
that we have not yet found any counter-example free analyses might be 
that there are none; but it might also be that we have not looked at com-
plex enough analyses and that even if we have or would do so, these 
would be very hard to evaluate on an intuitive basis. But it also makes 
the theoretical argument hard to evaluate: the view that all beliefs in 
principle are revisable, understood as a theory of how our minds and 
systems of beliefs work, has to be empirically confirmed. If the evidence 
fails to distinguish between this hypothesis and the complex-analysis 
hypothesis, it seems we have no reason to accept one rather than the 
other. 
Luckily, I think, we do not have to solve this question. I will argue that 
we do not have to take a stand on the matter of whether there are beliefs 
that we are disposed not to give up under any circumstances or whether 
there are only very central beliefs, in order to maintain my conclusion 
about the moral concepts of die-hard absolutists. To see this, consider 
the second idea in the quote from Harman above. 
Change: There is no principle drawing a sharp line between the 
changes in belief that count as changes in meaning and those that 
don’t; our decisions about this depend on the context and our 
purposes of the moment. 
In the quote from Harman I think that Change should be understood in 
the light of Revisability: since we actually do think of some changes in 
belief as constituting or giving rise to changes in meaning, and since we 
are disposed to revise every belief in reaction to some scenarios (Revis-
ability), it cannot be that we think there is a change in meaning only when 
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someone has given up a belief that she previously was not disposed to 
give up. Change in meaning, rather, results from giving up central beliefs 
(beliefs we are disposed to give up only in a few peripheral cases); but 
there is no principle stating a sharp distinction between those changes 
in central beliefs that we take to change meaning and those that we do 
not; “What we say about this depends on the context and our purposes 
of the moment”.  
As I see it, there are (at least) two different consequences for concep-
tual analysis one can draw from Change. The intuition-based view of 
conceptual analysis, as I have construed it, is supposed to capture the 
ways in which we intuitively determine when a term or concept has a 
certain meaning or reference: we do this according to principles attach-
ing decisive weight to the beliefs that we are disposed not to give up 
under any circumstances. Change can be taken as a rejection of this; no 
such principles describe the way we intuitively determine reference or 
change in reference. Interpreted in this way, it is consistent with Change 
that we stick to the task of giving analyses of moral judgements that are 
in line with an intuitive picture of actual meaning, one that makes mean-
ing depend on actual use and dispositions to use. It is just that we have to 
be more attentive to our intuitions about the specific case we are inter-
ested in, since we cannot go by simple principles. The other conse-
quence one might draw is that when we make our analyses we should 
explicitly take into account the different purposes one might have in 
making it, since having different purposes in mind might affect what we 
should say is a correct analysis. Under this interpretation, Change might 
make analysing involve a revisionary component; if we take the pur-
poses of making the analysis explicitly into account this might mean that 
the resulting analysis deviates from our intuitive judgements of what the 
correct analysis is. I will turn shortly to such revisionary approaches to 
conceptual analysis, but here I want to consider the first interpretation 
of Change. 
There are changes in beliefs, or in dispositions, that we intuitively 
think of as leading to changes in reference. Or, in other words, there are 
beliefs or dispositions that we think of as relevant for reference, or 
reference-fixing. I think that the absolutist beliefs of die-hard absolut-
ists are such beliefs. However, let us first return to the example of the 
concept of witches. In the case we discussed above we imagined that 
Mabel believes that certain people are witches. When she is asked to 
imagine that there are no people with magical powers, her reaction is, 
“in that case, there are no witches”. Intuitively we take Mabel’s reaction 
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as evidence of a disposition (not to judge people without magical powers 
to be witches) that makes her concept of witches refer only to people 
with magical powers. Imagine that Mabel also has the word ‘wutch’ in 
her vocabulary. She actually uses this word to describe the same people 
that she calls ‘witches’. But in reaction to the possible case that there are 
no people with magical powers, Mabel says, “well in that case these 
people would still be wutches – they would simply be wutches without 
magical powers (as long as they have certain other properties such as 
being wicked)”. Intuitively, we think that there is a difference between 
these terms (as they are used by Mabel) and the concepts they express: 
‘Witch’ refers only to people with magical powers, but ‘wutch’ refers 
also to people without magical powers. So regardless of whether there 
are beliefs that are non-revisable or not, the way we actually classify 
terms and concepts on basis of how speakers use them, and are disposed 
to use them, we do think of reactions such as Mabel’s as relevant to their 
reference. We take Mabel’s error-theoretical dispositions about witches 
as evidence that there has to be people with magical powers for there to 
be witches, as she uses the word.  
The same holds in the case of die-hard absolutists’ dispositions. 
These too have error-theoretical inclinations; they say and think that if 
there are no absolute moral properties, or no moral facts that are inde-
pendent of the moralities of us as speakers and believers, then there are 
no moral properties or facts at all. They are not willing to apply their 
moral terms and concepts to actions unless (they think that) these have 
absolute moral properties. The intuitively plausible result is that moral 
terms as used by these speakers (and their moral concepts) refer only to 
absolute moral properties; they do not apply the terms to actions they 
do not consider to have such properties. 
Perhaps there are no beliefs that are in principle non-revisable, and 
perhaps there is no sharp line between what counts as a change in mean-
ing or reference or merely a change in a strong belief. But in certain 
cases it is clear that we intuitively give certain beliefs or dispositions a 
role in determining reference – the case of Mabel’s and most people’s 
concept of witches is one, the moral concepts of die-hard absolutists is 
another case. So if what we are after in giving an analysis of moral terms 
and concepts is something by the way of an account of their reference 
that agrees with the actual meaning as given by how we use and are dis-
posed to use moral terms and concepts, then we should accept the con-
clusion that die-hard absolutists refer to absolute moral properties. 
(Still, of course, this should be seen as the best position given the evi-
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dence we have now: we cannot exclude that someone will think up 
scenarios where die-hard absolutists are willing to accept the existence 
of relative moral properties.) 
This means that accepting Revisability and Change as objections to the 
intuition-based view of conceptual analysis, does not provide a way of 
answering the challenge from opposite intuitions.  
6.6.2  R e vision ism 
If we cannot answer the challenge from opposite intuitions – that is, if 
we cannot find a common meaning to moral terms as everyone (or every 
competent user) uses them – through considering the meaning of moral 
terms as people are actually disposed to use them, perhaps there is a 
possible solution in the idea that analysis can or should involve a certain 
amount of revision. Jackson, for example, adds a revisionist aspect to his 
version of the intuition-based view of conceptual analysis. Here is one of 
the examples he uses to illustrate the idea: 
I take it that our folk concept of personal identity is Cartesian in character – 
in particular, we regard the question of whether I will be tortured tomorrow as 
separable from the question of whether someone with any amount of conti-
nuity – psychological, bodily, neurophysiological, and so on and so forth – with 
me today will be tortured tomorrow. But critical reflection of the style initiated 
most famously by Locke reveals – or so it seems to me and many – that per-
sonal identity so conceived is not worth having, and is nowhere instantiated. It 
is, thus, only sensible to seek a different but ‘nearby’ conception that does, or 
does near enough, the job we give personal identity in governing what we care 
about, our personal relations, our social institutions of reward and punishment, 
and the like, and which is realized in our world. Certain continuities between 
how persons are at various times arguably fit the bill, and so we should analyse 
personal identity in terms of such continuities.219 
It seems that Jackson thinks there is good reason to abandon the project 
of grounding an analysis of personal identity solely on our actual dispo-
sitions because our actual concept does not give us what we want from a 
concept of personal identity. We want personal identity to be something 
that is worth having; and we want and need a concept that is instantiated, 
that actually makes me the same person as I was yesterday. If our actual 
concept, as pointed out by our dispositions, cannot give us that, we do 
best to revise it. 
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This is congenial with what some advocates of revisionary analyses of 
moral concepts say. Richard Brandt gives the following suggestions to 
why analysing moral concepts and words from actual “linguistic intui-
tions” is not a good idea:  
Even if linguistic intuitions pointed to more precise paraphrases of normative 
terminology than they actually do, one would not want to rely on them for 
guidance in normative reflection. For language might well embody confusing 
distinctions, or fail to make distinctions it is important to make.220  
The locutions of ordinary language are not always well adapted to say what on 
reflection we want to say, or to raise questions which on reflection we want to 
raise. At least they are not infallible guides to framing the questions we want 
to ask.221 
Like with Jackson, the idea here seems to be that the categorisations 
springing from our actual intuitions and dispositions need not be the 
ultimate or best categorisations to make, given our goals. I think that 
this is also what lies behind Peter Railton’s defence of revisionism: 
The striking thing is that the development of scientific theory has shown us 
how claims which seemed logically or conceptually true when matters were 
viewed in a strictly philosophical way could nonetheless come to seem empiri-
cally false as a result of the effort to construct powerful explanatory empirical 
theories. […] [P]hilosophers who can see from a historical perspective the 
danger of becoming entrapped by treating evolving linguistic categories as 
fixed should resist the temptation to view philosophical inquiry as somehow 
methodologically prior to science, and should instead attempt as best they can 
to integrate their work with the ongoing development of empirical theory. […] 
Our naturalist’s central claims hence are, at bottom, synthetic rather than 
analytic. This would be so even if he put forward his naturalistic interpretation 
using reforming definitions, for a reforming definition is revisable as well as revi-
sionist, and must earn its place by facilitating the construction of worthwhile 
theories.222 
We want our ‘linguistic categories’ to fit with findings in empirical 
sciences; if our actual ways of categorising things with our terms and 
concepts don’t do that, we should revise them. 
Can standard relativism be defended as a revisionist analysis of moral 
judgements? It depends on how revisionism is specified. As we have 
seen, the idea is not that we should simply stipulate a definition of 
moral terms. The revisionist suggestion is that we should search for a 
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concept that can serve all or many of the purposes we want moral con-
cepts to serve. There can be different understandings of which restric-
tions this puts on analysis. We can look at Railton’s ideas to see this. 
When discussing how much revision an analysis can involve, he writes: 
“although the definitions proposed may not fit with all of our linguistic 
or moral intuitions, they [should] nonetheless express recognizable 
notions of goodness and rightness”.223  When Railton specifies this idea 
he distinguishes tolerable revisions from non-tolerable ones: 
Revisionism may reach a point where it becomes more perspicacious to say 
that a concept has been abandoned, rather than revised. No sharp line sepa-
rates tolerable revisionism and outright abandonment, but if our naturalist 
wishes to make his case compelling, he must show that his account of a per-
son’s good is a clear case of tolerable revision, at worst.224 
Railton also gives examples of tolerable and non-tolerable revisions 
(here talking of vindicative and eliminative reductions to make the same 
point): 
The successful reduction of water to H2O reinforces, rather than impugning, 
our sense that there really is water. By contrast, the reduction of “polywater” – 
a peculiar form of water thought to have been observed in scientific laborato-
ries in the late 1960s – to ordinary water-containing-some-impurities-from-
improperly-washed-glassware contributed to the conclusion that there really is 
no such substance as polywater. Weather a reduction is vindicative or elimina-
tive will depend upon the specific character of what is being reduced and what 
the reduction basis looks like.225  
In light of these passages, Railton can be interpreted as proposing what 
we might call “modest revisionism”: that is, a view that puts rather large 
restrictions on how much revision an analysis can involve. What does it 
take for a definition to express a recognisable notion of moral right-
ness? The nature of the examples in the last quote might suggest the 
following answer. Sometimes when we find out that the things we think 
of as x’s have some distinguishing property F, we are willing to say that 
x’s are those things that have F. This is how it was with water and H2O. 
In these cases ‘thing that has F’ can serve as a tolerable revisionist analy-
sis of ‘x’. For other terms, when we find out that the things we think of 
as x’s are things that have F, we are inclined to conclude that there are no 
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x’s. This is how it was with polywater and contaminated water. In such 
cases ‘thing that has F’ would not be a tolerable revisionist analysis of ’x’. 
With this restriction on what counts as an acceptable revisionist 
analysis it should be clear that revisionism provides no rescue from the 
challenge from absolutist intuitions for standard relativism. Die-hard 
relativists are disposed to say that if the actions we think of as being, say, 
morally right, do not have an absolute moral property, but only relative 
moral properties, then they are not morally right after all. That is, they 
are disposed to react in the way people did to the discovery that the sub-
stance thought of as polywater was contaminated water.  
Indeed, this will be the result as long as we say that acceptable analy-
ses must “express recognisable notions” of the analysed objects. Die-
hard absolutists see it as essential to moral rightness and wrongness 
that they are absolute moral properties; they will not recognise a stan-
dard relativist analysis as an analysis of moral rightness or wrongness. 
Consequently, if the amount of revision is restricted in this manner, 
revisionism cannot help speaker relativists answer the challenge from 
opposite intuitions. Indeed, it even seems that it allows for no amount of 
revision at all in any interesting sense. The intuition-based view of 
analysis allows that we can be mistaken, and thus that the correct analy-
sis is allowed to “revise” certain of our beliefs or intuitions. What it 
implies is that the correct analysis must not go against people’s disposi-
tions to judge what may and may not count as, say, moral rightness or 
wrongness. But this is exactly what modest revisionism tells us as well.  
I am not at all convinced that this is the correct understanding of Rail-
ton’s view. And it is equally unclear to me what Jackson’s view is regard-
ing which revisions are permitted. He writes that we should look for a 
‘nearby’ conception that does the job we give to the original concept. 
Before this is specified it is impossible to determine whether it can help 
standard relativists. If ‘nearby’ is understood to imply something like 
the requirement described above, then it cannot.226 
If revisionism is to help speaker relativism escape the challenge from 
absolutist intuitions, the analysis suggested has to be one that is not 
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recognisably an analysis of moral rightness and wrongness – in the 
sense described above – to at least some people. This is of course an 
alternative. We might call this “radical revisionism”, rather than mod-
est. Depending on which form of radical revisionism we adopt it might 
be possible to argue for a standard relativist or an absolutist analysis of 
(everyone’s) moral judgements.  
Perhaps radical revisionism is a better interpretation of Railton’s 
view. He might want to say that the dissimilarity between the cases of 
water and polywater he is after is not the one I have discussed. What is 
relevant is not what people are willing to accept as a correct analysis or 
not, but something other – such as the explanatory power of the analy-
ses. My only complaint about this would be that the examples used 
might fool the reader to think that the form revisionism defended pro-
vides intuitively acceptable analyses – in the sense that ‘H2O’ is an ac-
ceptable analysis of ‘water’. It should be made clear that this is not the 
case. (Railton’s example of a revisionist analysis of ‘water’ as ‘H2O’ of 
course leads the mind to causal theories of reference. We return to this 
in the next chapter.) 
What I want to emphasize here is this. If we adopt radical revisionism 
we will have left the project of finding an analysis of moral judgements 
that is consistent with our dispositions to use moral terms and con-
cepts in the following sense: the result will be an analysis that some 
people will not be disposed to accept as an analysis of moral properties 
at all. What I argue here, then, as explained in chapter 5, is that as long as 
we do want an analysis that respects what all speakers, or even most, are 
ready to say can count as moral rightness and wrongness, then people’s 
diverging intuitions over absolutism and relativism pose a problem. 
6.7 C o n clusi o n 
Standard relativism cannot be founded on an intuition-based view of 
analysis. Die-hard absolutists are disposed to think that relative proper-
ties cannot count as moral properties. So, starting from this approach to 
conceptual analysis, their moral judgements should be given an absolut-
ist analysis. If we want to escape this conclusion and argue that standard 
relativism holds as a general theory, it seems we have to opt for a radi-
cally revisionist analysis, an analysis that a group of competent speakers 
will be disposed to think of as not giving an account of moral rightness 
or wrongness.  
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Or, can we appeal to some form of semantic externalism, not attach-
ing the weight intuition-based views do to individual speaker’s disposi-
tions to use terms and concepts? This is the topic of next chapter. 
  
Chapter 7 
Semantic Externalism 
and Relativism 
7.1  Intr oducti o n  
The argument in the previous chapter, it seems, ignores the insights of 
semantic externalist views. We can distinguish between two kinds of 
such views. According to causal theories of reference, the reference of cer-
tain terms is fixed by the causal history of our use of the term, rather 
than by the dispositions of the speaker. And according to what we might 
call social externalism, the reference of a term as used by a speaker is fixed 
by how the term is used in the speaker’s linguistic community, rather 
than by how it is used by the speaker herself. On both of these views, it 
seems, an individual speaker’s dispositions to use a term need not mat-
ter to the reference of the term, since it does not imply anything about 
the causal history of her use of the term or about the way other speakers 
in her community use the term.  
In this chapter I will consider these two types of semantic externalism 
in turn, discussing the consequences for the challenge from opposite 
intuitions against standard relativism. 
7.2  C aus al  T h e o ry of R ef e r e n c e  
Kripke and Putnam famously argue that the descriptive account of mean-
ing is incorrect for names and natural kind terms like ‘gold’, ‘water’ 
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‘lemon’ and ‘tiger’. That is, they challenge the view that the meaning of 
such terms are given to them by descriptions associated with the terms 
by the speakers and that the reference of the terms are whatever satisfies 
those descriptions. The arguments they give are demonstrations of cases 
about which descriptivism gives the intuitively wrong result but the 
causal theory of reference has the intuitively right implications. Let us 
look at some such arguments to get the picture. 
One of Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism about names is 
known as ‘the modal argument’. We associate different descriptions 
with the name ‘Aristotle’: ‘the writer of the Nichomachean Ethics’, ‘the 
greatest student of Plato’, ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ etc. Can 
these descriptions – either individually, or in a complex disjunction as 
on the cluster theory – constitute the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ and serve to 
determine its referent? If they did, it would be necessary that Aristotle 
had the properties or the disjunctive cluster of them. But it isn’t. Aris-
totle could have died as a child, or moved to another city. If he had, he 
wouldn’t have had any of the properties that we associate with him: but 
he would still have been Aristotle. So it cannot be these descriptions that 
determine the reference of ‘Aristotle’. The point of modal arguments 
like this, then, is that descriptivism has the wrong implications for 
modal claims involving names, such as “Aristotle necessarily is x” or 
“Aristotle possibly is x”. Or, in other words, descriptivism has counter-
intuitive implications about the extension of names in possible worlds 
that are not actual. 
In another example Kripke considers the suggestion that people refer 
to Gödel by the name ‘Gödel’, because they associate the description “the 
man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic” with the name. 
Kripke argues against this:  
Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A man named 
‘Schmidt’ whose body was found in Vienna under Mysterious circumstances 
many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow 
got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel. […] So 
[on the view in question], since the man who discovered the incompleteness 
of arithmetic is Schmidt, we, when we talk about ‘Gödel’, are in fact always re-
ferring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not.227  
This is not a modal argument: the example is not that someone else than 
Gödel could have discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. What 
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Kripke points out is that for all we know a priori, it might be Schmidt 
and not Gödel who actually made the discovery. If the description theory 
is true, and Schmidt is the real discoverer, as it might be for all we know 
a priori, we are actually using ‘Gödel’ to refer to Schmidt. But this is 
intuitively incorrect. 
Here is a corresponding non-modal argument against descriptivism 
for natural kind terms. Kripke is here discussing Kant’s suggestion that 
being yellow is part of the concept of gold: 
Could we discover that gold was not in fact yellow? Suppose that an optical 
illusion were prevalent, due to peculiar properties of the atmosphere in South 
Africa and Russia and certain other areas where gold mines are common. Sup-
pose there were an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be 
yellow; but in fact, once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were re-
moved, we would see that it is actually blue. Maybe a demon even corrupted 
the vision of all those entering the gold mines (obviously their souls were al-
ready corrupt), and thus made them believe that this substance was yellow, 
though it is not. Would there on this basis be an announcement in the news-
papers: ‘It has turned out that there is no gold. Gold does not exist. What we 
took to be gold is not in fact gold.’? Just imagine the world financial crises un-
der these conditions! Here we have an undreamt of source of shakiness in the 
monetary system.  
It seems to me that there would be no such announcement. On the con-
trary, what would be announced would be that though it appeared that gold 
was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but blue.228 
So being yellow is not part of the concept of gold, or the meaning of the 
term ‘gold’. If it were, we would react to the discovery that there is no 
yellow but otherwise goldish substance (which is a genuine possibility, 
for all we know a priori) by saying that there is no gold – but we don’t. 
And similar cases can plausibly be made up for other properties we 
associate with ‘gold’, such as being a metal – that is, cases where we are 
ready to reject that what we judge to be gold has these properties.  
Putnam made the same point through his famous twin-earth example. 
Imagine a planet, twin-earth, which is an exact copy of earth except that 
the transparent and odourless liquid that flows in the rivers and that 
twin-earthlings drink, for short, the watery stuff, is not H2O but XYZ. 
XYZ is just like H2O – e.g. it tastes the same and quenches thirst in the 
same way – except for its underlying chemical structure. Intuitively we 
think that H2O is water and that XYZ is not, that is, that our term ‘water’ 
does not refer to the XYZ-liquid there is on twin-earth (though their 
 
228 Ibid., p. 118. 
Semantic Externalism and Relativism 
183 
word ‘water’ does that), despite the fact that all the descriptions we associate 
with ‘water’ fit XYZ.229 Many of us associate water with being H2O, of 
course, but this is not what makes the difference. Even if we imagine 
earthlings in 1750 (or simply people today) who do not know (or think) 
that water is H2O, we think that the term as they used it would refer to 
H2O and not to XYZ on twin-earth. These associated descriptions cannot 
be what determine the reference, then. Putnam makes this point even 
clearer by having us imagine Oscar1 on Earth and Oscar2, his counter-
part on twin-earth, living in 1750. We can even stipulate that they “were 
in exactly the same psychological state”; yet, the term ‘water’ would have 
different extensions when the two of them use it, H2O for Oscar1, and 
XYZ for Oscar2. The twin-earth example, then, shows that the descrip-
tions that we associate with ‘water’ don’t give the meaning and are not 
what fix the reference of the term.  
If the descriptivist view about meaning and reference is not correct 
for names and natural kind terms, what is the correct view? Examples of 
the kind described above have been thought to support two conclusions 
about these terms. One is that a causal theory of reference holds for the 
terms, and the other is that the terms are rigid designators. Jackson put 
the reasoning that lead up to these as follows:  
[…] we learn two things from Putnam’s story. As has been widely noted, we 
can think of the Twin Earth story in two different ways, depending on 
whether we think of Twin Earth as somewhere remote from Earth but in our, 
the actual, world, or as in another possible world altogether. From the first ver-
sion, we learn the importance of acquaintance in determining the reference 
of the word ‘water’. The reason the water stuff XYZ on Twin Earth – a planet 
located, let’s suppose, in Earth’s orbit but on the opposite side of the Sun – does 
not count as water is that it was not XYZ that we were acquainted with when 
the word ‘water’ and its cognates in other languages were introduced (and 
have continued to be acquainted with). From the second version, we learn 
that the term ‘water’ is a rigid designator. Even if Twin Earth is simply Earth 
(or its counterpart) in another possible world, and in that possible world XYZ is 
both watery and the stuff we – not the Twin Earthians – are acquainted with, 
it does not count as water.230 
When the twin-earth example is construed non-modally, we learn the 
first lesson:  the reference of ‘water’ is fixed along the lines of a causal 
 
229 Not everyone has this intuition unambiguously. For example, Jackson, 1998a, p. 38, 
and Lewis, 1994, p. 424, think that in ordinary language it is indeterminate whether it is 
H2O or XYZ that counts as water on twin-earth. I will ignore this complication in what 
follows. 
230 Jackson, 1998a, p. 39. 
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theory of reference. The difference between XYZ and H2O, which makes 
our term ‘water’ refer to only the latter, is not how well they fit certain 
associated descriptions, but the causal relation we stand in to them 
respectively. H2O is the substance that we, and those who introduced the 
term ‘water’, causally interact with. Similarly for names: the reason that 
‘Gödel’ refers to Gödel is not that Gödel fits the descriptions we associ-
ate with ‘Gödel’ (it is possible that he doesn’t): the reason is that Gödel 
is at the end of a causal chain linking our usage of the term with some 
initial baptism where the specific individual, Gödel, was given the name 
‘Gödel’. According to causal theories of reference, then, we refer to x by 
‘x’ if and only if our use of ‘x’ stands in some special causal relation to 
x.231 
The second lesson from the Putnam/Kripke arguments that Jackson 
refers to ensues when the example is construed modally: the terms in 
question are rigid designators. That is, they keep their reference in every 
possible world – if the watery stuff on earth had been XYZ that would 
not have been water. So water could not have been anything else than 
what it actually is, namely H2O.
232  
What will interest us in the following discussion is the first lesson, 
that a causal theory of reference holds, and not the idea of rigid designa-
tion. As we have seen, these arguments are used as objections against 
descriptivism, and they seem to work equally well against the closely 
related intuition-based view of conceptual analysis put forward in the 
previous chapter. If it is the causal history of our use of a term, and the 
underlying structure of the thing at the end of that causal chain, that 
 
231 See e.g. Putnam, 1975, and Kripke, 1980, e.g. pp. 91-97 for the reference of proper 
names and pp. 138-39 for the reference of natural kind terms. Before one has spelled out 
the “special causal relation”, the view is of course very underspecified. (Kripke says that 
what he has given is not a theory of reference, since he has not specified it enough, but a 
better picture of reference than the descriptive picture.) Different specifications will give 
rise to different versions of the causal theory of reference (for example taking into 
account that the reference of a term can change after the initial baptism (see, e.g. Evans, 
1973)). The differences between these will not matter to us here, however, since my 
objection to founding standard relativism on a causal theory does not depend on any 
specific variant of the view. 
232 It is the combination of these two lessons that leads to the intriguing conclusion 
that certain a posteriori truths, such that “water is H2O”, are necessary truths. It is a 
posteriori and not a priori because we can know that the referent of ‘water’ is H2O only 
through investigating the chemical structure of the watery stuff we are causally 
acquainted with. And it is (metaphysically) necessary because, given that the watery stuff 
we are acquainted with actually is H2O, then this fixes the extension of water for every 
possible world: so there is no possible world in which water is not H2O. 
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matters to the reference of the term, it seems that how we are disposed 
to classify real and possible scenarios using that term really does not 
matter. So it looks like this view might provide a way of meeting the 
challenge from absolutist intuitions (or dispositions) against standard 
relativism: the force of the challenge hinges on the fact that our disposi-
tions do matter to the reference of terms. 
7.2. 1  Two ways of gr oun din g s p ea k er  r elat ivi sm on  a c ausal  
t h eor y  of r efer enc e  
There are at least two ways in which speaker relativism could be argued 
for on the grounds of a causal theory of reference. The first is suggested 
by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ moral twin-earth objection to the 
idea that the reference of moral terms is determined along the lines of a 
causal theory of reference.233  Here is the objection, briefly put. Imagine 
that here on earth, what causally regulates our use of moral terms is 
some consequentialist property. On moral twin-earth, however, even 
though everything else is the same as on earth, what regulates the use is a 
deontological property. If the causal theory of reference were true, then 
moral terms on earth and on moral twin-earth would refer to different 
properties. But, continues the objection, we have the intuition that an 
earthling who utters, “X is wrong” genuinely disagrees with a twin-
earthling who utters, “X is not wrong”. They disagree over what is 
wrong. But this can be so only if the term ‘wrong’ refers (if it refers at 
all) to the same property on both planets. Thus, the reference of moral 
terms cannot be fixed by causal regulation. That is, they use the kind of 
objection from intuitive moral disagreement that I discussed in chapter 
4 to argue against the implications of applying a causal theory of refer-
ence to moral terms. 
In chapter 4 I also argued that relativists have ways of explaining away 
the intuitive appearance of disagreement. For this reason I think that 
Horgan and Timmons’ argument fails.234  Here, however, I am interested 
 
233 Horgan and Timmons, 1991, Horgan and Timmons, 1992, Horgan and Timmons, 
2000, Timmons, 1999. The objection is directed against so called “Cornell Realists” who 
defend a causal theory approach for moral terms. See e.g., Boyd, 1988, Brink, 1989, 
Sturgeon, 1986, Sturgeon, 1988. 
234 There are also other possible explanations of why we think that earthlings and 
moral twin-earthlings refer to the same kind of moral properties. One is that we find it 
hard to accept the crucial premise of the thought experiment – that the uses of the terms 
are governed by different natural properties on the different planets. Spontaneously we 
assume that both uses (if they are like ours) are governed by a non-reducible kind of 
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in the part of the objection that potentially suggests that applying a 
causal theory of reference to moral terms leads to speaker relativism. 
An initial conclusion of the argument is that, as the moral twin-earth 
example is construed, if the reference of terms like ‘morally right’ and 
‘morally wrong’ is causally determined, then these terms refer to different 
properties on earth and moral twin-earth respectively. There are two 
different conclusions one could draw from this. Suppose first that the 
situation is exactly analogous to Putnam’s twin-earth example involving 
‘water’. In that scenario we want to say that the twin-earthlings do not 
make judgements about water, since the substance that regulates the use 
of ‘water’ on twin-earth is XYZ and not H2O (as here on earth). The ana-
logue in the moral case would be to conclude that since the property that 
regulates ‘right’ on moral twin-earth is a deontological property and not 
a consequentialist property (as here on earth), the moral twin-earthlings 
do not count as making moral judgements. This is not a form of moral 
speaker relativism: it does not imply that different people’s moral 
judgements have different truth-values.  
On the other hand, one could hold that the semantics of moral terms 
should be only partly modelled on the semantics of natural kind terms 
like ‘water’. The idea would be that even though the reference of moral 
terms is determined along the lines of a causal theory of reference (like 
in the case of water), ‘morally right’ judgements made by twin-earthlings 
count as moral judgements, despite the difference in reference. On the 
latter view, the meaning of moral terms would not be determined by the 
causal history of their use, only their reference.235  At least one way to 
understand this, is as a version of indexical relativism, though different 
from Dreier’s version. On the present view, the relevant part of the con-
text of utterance is the causal history of the speaker’s use of the term, 
while on Dreier’s view it is the speaker’s motivational set-up. Also, it 
would not be a version of the kind of relativism I have focused on in this 
book – it would not be a form of standard relativism. That is, it would 
not say that the truth-values of moral judgements depend on the 
speaker’s morality.  
To my knowledge, this form of speaker relativism has never been de-
fended, and I will leave to one side in what follows (though I will briefly 
return to the consequences of my argumentation for it later). There is, 
 
moral properties. (Cf. Copp, 2000, Sayre-McCord, 1997a) 
235 See Horgan and Timmons, 2000, pp. 140-41, for their account of this distinction.  
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however, another way in which speaker relativism could be motivated 
by a causal theory of reference, a way which, even if it has not been ex-
plicitly stated by relativists, is suggested by some speaker relativists’ 
formulations. Furthermore, the form of relativism that ensues is a form 
of standard relativism. Let us turn to this. 
Harman makes it very clear that his form of speaker relativism is not 
to be understood as a claim about meaning; it is a claim about how 
things are in the world: 
[…] moral relativism is not by itself a claim about meaning. […] Moral rela-
tivism is a thesis about how things are and a thesis about how things aren’t! 
Moral relativism claims that there is no such thing as objectively absolute 
good, absolute right or absolute justice; there is only what is good, right or just 
in relation to this or that moral framework. What someone takes to be absolute 
rightness is only rightness in relation to (a system of moral coordinates deter-
mined by) that person’s values.236 
In order to make sense of the idea of moral speaker relativism as a view 
about moral properties rather than about the meaning of moral expres-
sions, Harman draws an analogy between moral relativism and the rela-
tivism about physical parameters that follows from Einstein’s relativity 
theory: 
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity does not involve a claim about meaning or 
about what people intend to be claiming when they make judgments about an 
object’s mass. The point is, rather, that the only truth there is in this area is 
relative truth.  
Before Einstein, judgments about mass were not intended as relative judg-
ments. But it would be mean-spirited to invoke an “error theory” and conclude 
that these pre-Einsteinian judgments were all false! Better to suppose that 
such a judgment was true to the extent that an object had the relevant mass 
in relation to a spatio-temporal framework that was conspicuous to the person 
making the judgment, for example, a framework in which that person was at 
rest.  
Similarly, the moral relativism I will argue for is not a claim about what people 
mean by their moral judgments. Moral relativism does not claim that people in-
tend their moral judgments to be “elliptical” in the suggested way; just as rela-
tivism about mass does not claim that people intend their judgments about 
mass to make implicit reference to a spatio-temporal framework.237  
Harman finds this comparison so useful that he returns to it many 
times in a few pages. He compares his moral relativism to relativism in 
 
236 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 17. 
237 Harman, in Ibid., p. 4. 
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physics about for example motion, mass and simultaneity. These theo-
ries make no claims about the meaning of terms, according to Harman: 
The claim is, rather, that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity or ab-
solute mass. There is only simultaneity or mass with respect to one or another 
frame of reference. What someone might take to be absolute magnitudes are 
really relative magnitudes; magnitudes that are relative to that person’s frame 
of reference.238 
Similarly, then, Harman’s moral relativism is the claim that there is no 
such thing as absolute moral rightness or wrongness: 
Moral right and wrong are relative matters. A given act can be right with re-
spect to one system of moral coordinates and wrong with respect to another 
system of coordinates. And nothing is absolutely right or wrong, apart from any 
system of moral coordinates.239 
Dreier makes use of the same kind of analogy: 
Relativists may agree, to some extent [that the linguistic intentions of speakers 
is, often at least, absolutist rather than relativist]. For pre-theoretic moral ideas 
to be all they aspire to be, a relativist might say, there would have to be abso-
lute standards for moral concepts to latch onto. But since there aren’t any, 
relativism suggests, why not make do with the relative standards that we actu-
ally do have? There is no need to abandon moral judgment altogether, so long 
as we are willing to tone down its aspirations.  
Compare common-sense judgments of mass, or length, or duration. For all 
but the more sophisticated folk of the last century or so, all such judgments 
have been absolute on their face. A policeman on the witness stand testifies 
that while staking out the apartment, he saw the defendant enter and then 
leave one hour later. The defense cross-examines: When you say it was one 
hour later, can you provide an inertial frame? “A duration of one hour must, 
officer, be relative to one inertial frame or another, you know.” The policeman 
denies that he meant any such thing. “Just one hour, is all I meant, not 
relative to any of your fancy frames.” In a very straightforward sense, the 
policeman’s intention was to name an absolute duration, of the sort that is 
simply not recognized in relativistic physics. Is the policeman’s testimony 
thereby impeached? Has he said something false? We would not ordinarily say 
so. To put it briefly: the policeman’s judgment had a false presupposition 
behind it. His own conception of the world, adequate and accurate enough for 
his own purposes, is not really correct. But the false presupposition, the 
incorrect theory that the policeman himself would give if carefully questioned, 
does not seem to infect the integrity or veracity of his ordinary, first-order 
judgments. What the policeman said, we believe, is true; only his background 
 
238 Harman, in Ibid., p. 18. 
239 Harman, in Ibid., p. 13. 
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absolutist theory of it is mistaken. So it is with ordinary moral judgment, a 
relativist may say.240 
Both Harman and Dreier use the analogy to avoid a potential problem 
for moral standard relativists, namely the one pointed out in the previ-
ous chapter: at least many people conceive of moral properties as abso-
lute moral properties and seem to intend to refer to such properties. If 
this is so, and if there are no absolute moral properties, as relativists 
like Dreier and Harman claim, should we not draw the conclusion that 
an error-theory holds? People do (some at least), after all, intend their 
moral judgements to be about properties of a kind that doesn’t exist. 
Here comes the analogy to the rescue: this is not the conclusion we draw 
about mass or motion or simultaneity. People, such as Dreier’s police-
man, think of these as absolute properties, and this is what they intend 
to refer to. But we don’t think that an error-theory is correct here, even 
though there are no such things as absolute mass or simultaneity. In-
stead we say that these people’s judgements manage to refer to the rela-
tive physical properties there are, in spite of their mistaken beliefs. So, 
let us say the same thing about moral judgements! 
I will not discuss the metaphysical question of whether there are or 
are not any absolute moral properties. The question I will ask is 
whether, if there are no absolute moral facts, relativists can deny error-
theory and say that relativism is true as a claim about the world.  
Harman and Dreier rely heavily on the analogy with relativism in 
physics to answer this question in the affirmative. So we should ask 
whether the analogy holds at closer examination: Why does it work, if it 
does, to say that people refer to relative physical properties even though 
they intend to speak about absolute properties? And does the answer 
carry over to the moral case? 
Why does it work for physical relativism? The things Harman and 
Dreier say suggest that terms like ‘mass’ and ‘simultaneity’ work much 
like natural kind terms. Dreier’s policeman case is designed to show 
that we can refer to the property in question even though we have a mis-
conception about it. In other words, the descriptions we associate with 
the term – that it stands for an absolute property – can turn out not to fit 
the referent. This is what we could expect if the reference of ‘mass’ and 
‘simultaneity’ is fixed along the lines of a causal theory of reference: no 
matter what intuitions we have, if the property at the other side of the 
 
240 Dreier, 2006, pp. 261-62 
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causal chain is a relational property, then that is the referent. Further-
more, as Harman emphasizes, the discovery that the physical properties 
are relative was a discovery about how the world is, an empirical dis-
covery: like, for example, the discovery that water is H2O.  
This way we could get a form of relativism about simultaneity and 
mass that is founded on a causal theory of reference. We refer to rela-
tions between the object, or the two events, and a frame of reference, 
because these are the kinds of relations our uses of the terms are caus-
ally related to in the relevant way; they are the relations we are ac-
quainted with even though we are wrong about their nature. To make it a 
speaker relativist view about mass and simultaneity we have to add a 
contextualist element: a speaker refers to the relation that pertains be-
tween her frame of reference (a frame of reference somehow salient in 
her situation) and the object, or the two events, in question.  
One could imagine the corresponding view about moral relativism. 
What is out there, and what we, or some of us, conceive of as absolute 
moral properties really are relative moral properties, relations between 
our own moral frameworks and the actions judged. If a causal theory of 
reference holds for moral terms we refer to these relations between our 
own moralities and actions since these are the relations that are causally 
related to our use of moral terms in the right way. This, then, makes it a 
form of standard speaker relativism: the truth-value of each speaker’s 
moral judgements depends on her morality.  
Neither Harman nor Dreier explicitly accepts this way of arguing for 
moral speaker relativism. In fact they say very little about how we are to 
understand the analogy, as they say very little about how we are to un-
derstand the idea that physical relativism holds in spite of peoples abso-
lutist intuitions. But I think that the causal externalist interpretation 
outlined above is at least suggested by the analogy, and I will focus on 
this in the following discussion. I will briefly return to other interpreta-
tions of the analogy later.  
In what follows I will first examine the claim that a causal theory of 
reference holds for, and can make relativism true about, the physical 
terms in question, focusing on the example of ‘simultaneity’. After that I 
consider the same claim for moral terms.  
7.2. 2  R el at iv ism about  s imul tanei t y  as  a claim abou t  t h e  wo rl d  
Normally we think of simultaneity as a relation that pertains between 
two events. But it follows from Einstein’s special theory of relativity 
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that two events cannot be simultaneous absolutely, but only relative to a 
frame of reference:  
Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not 
simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultane-
ity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; 
unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, 
there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event.241 
If this is correct, simultaneity is not a two-place relation but a three-
place relation. As we established above, this does not hold by virtue of 
people’s intentions or dispositions to us the word ‘simultaneity’. The 
question I want to ask here is whether it is plausible to think that it 
holds because the reference of ‘simultaneity’ is fixed along the lines of a 
causal theory of reference. 
The plausibility of a causal theory of reference for natural kind terms 
and names is appreciated through considering possible cases like 
Kripke’s about Aristotle and gold and Putnam’s twin-earth scenario. Can 
a causal theory of reference for ‘simultaneity’ be defended in the same 
way? When we approach this question, I think it is helpful to 
distinguish between different aspects of the intuitions we have about the 
examples with natural kind terms and names, to see if these are present 
also in the case of ‘simultaneity’. I have already discussed two aspects, 
causal reference-fixing and rigid designation. We have seen how for 
example the twin-earth scenario can be construed in two different ways 
to bring out our intuitions that causal reference-fixing and rigid 
designation holds for natural kind terms. Let me introduce a third 
aspect, which will be useful in the following discussion. We can call it 
“conceptual neutrality”. This aspect is brought forward by our willing-
ness to say, in examples like Kripke’s about Gödel and gold, that we 
might be mistaken about the descriptions we associate with the terms. 
Or take the example of water. Supposedly, people used to think that 
water was a simple substance, not a compound substance like H2O. 
Then they found out that the watery stuff in their surrounding was not a 
simple substance. When they did, they did not draw the conclusion that 
the watery stuff was not water, but that water is not a simple substance. 
Why? Part of the answer is that even though they had thought that water 
was a simple substance, they were willing to say that they might be 
wrong about this. In the same way, though we are pretty sure that water 
 
241 Einstein, 1960, p. 26. 
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is H2O, we hold it open that this might not be so. If we did not we would 
not even be able to conceive of a scenario where science discovers that 
water is something else, like XYZ or a simple substance – we would 
think that a discovery that the watery stuff in lakes etc. is not H2O, 
would amount to a discovery that that is not water. This is not the way 
we think. In this way, we hold it open whether the referents of natural 
kind terms have the properties we think they have. This is what I mean 
by the claim that, say, the concept of water, is neutral between water 
being H2O, XYZ or a simple substance: conceptual analysis alone cannot 
tell us whether water is H2O, XYZ or a simple substance. 
If our natural kind concepts were not conceptually neutral in this way, 
then their referents could not be determined along the lines of some 
causal theory of reference. For the causal history of our use of a term to 
play a role in fixing the reference of that term, it cannot be determined 
beforehand, by conceptual analysis, what the reference is. That is, the 
concept needs to be neutral in the manner described above.  
It is indeed possible to imagine a counterfactual situation where, say, 
the word ‘water’ was not used in this manner. Suppose that we all think 
that water is H2O and consider the following scenario: 
Scenario 2: The watery stuff you are acquainted with here on Earth 
is discovered to be a simple substance, not H2O. In fact, there is 
no H2O.  
There are two relevantly different responses: 
Reaction 1: In that case, water is a simple substance.  
Reaction 2: In that case there is no water. For something to be wa-
ter it has to be H2O. 
As noticed above, Reaction 1 is the actual reaction of normal English 
speakers. But it could have been different. Suppose that our response 
had been Reaction 2. If we came to believe that the watery stuff is a sim-
ple substance we would have stopped calling it ‘water’. The difference 
between our actual reaction and this reaction is that while we actually 
hold it (conceptually) open what water is and let empirical investiga-
tions reveal it, in the counterfactual situation we refuse to call some-
thing ‘water’ if it doesn’t have a specific chemical structure.  
If a speaker uses the term ‘water’ in the latter way, she is disposed to 
use the term ‘water’ of something only if it is H2O. So the concept she 
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expresses with this term is not neutral as to whether the referent of the 
term is H2O.
242 The case for the view that a certain concept is neutral is 
built on certain intuitions: we have the intuition, or are disposed to say, 
that whatever the watery stuff is made of, that is water. When we remove 
this disposition – in one speaker or a whole linguistic society – it no 
longer seems correct to say that those speakers use the term ‘water’ to 
express a neutral concept. And in such a case a causal theory of reference 
could not hold for ‘water’: as noted above, the view that the reference of 
‘water’ is determined along the lines of some causal theory of reference 
depends on that the concept of water is neutral between water being, say, 
H2O and XYZ.
243  
In the same manner, the idea that we can apply a causal theory of ref-
erence to ‘simultaneity’, and in this way argue that relativism about 
simultaneity holds, depends on the idea that the concept of simultaneity 
is neutral between simultaneity being a two-place and a three-place rela-
tion. Is it? Imagine that we think of simultaneity as a two-place relation. 
Then someone convinces us that there is no such thing as two-place 
simultaneity. What we experience when we experience two events as 
simultaneous, she explains to us, is that the two events stand in some 
special relation to our frame of reference. And in relation to other 
frames of reference the two events are not related in that way. How 
would we react to this piece of information? History shows that our 
reaction would be to say that, in that case, simultaneity is a three-place 
relation (and not to say that simultaneity does not exist). This suggests 
that the concept of simultaneity is neutral between simultaneity being a 
two-place and a three-place relation. We are willing to say that the three-
place relation counts as simultaneity.  
As I have said, conceptual neutrality is a necessary precondition for a 
causal theory of reference to hold. But it is not a sufficient condition. 
Consider the case of water again. The concept of water is neutral be-
tween water being a simple substance and H2O. This in itself does not 
warrant us to conclude, from the discovery that the watery stuff here on 
earth is H2O, that all water is H2O. Two different conclusions are con-
sistent with the neutrality. Either we say that that the simple substance 
watery stuff (or XYZ) on another planet is also water. Or we say – as the 
 
242 Or if we wish to, we can imagine a linguistic community that use the term in that 
way – remember that we are putting off the discussion of social externalism to later in 
this chapter. 
243 Cf. Joyce, 2001, p. 97 
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non-modal version of the twin-earth story (where twin-earth is thought 
of as another planet in our actual world) showed that we do – that it is 
only that substance which we are acquainted with here on Earth that 
counts as water. It is only in the latter case that “H2O -ism” about water 
holds, that is, that only H2O counts as water. Likewise, that the concept 
of simultaneity is neutral does not guarantee that a causal theory of ref-
erence holds for ‘simultaneity’, and therefore, it seems, does not guaran-
tee relativism about simultaneity: that the term refers only to the three-
place relation we are acquainted with.  
Does a causal theory of reference hold for ‘simultaneity’? If it does, 
and Einstein is correct that what we are acquainted with through our 
simultaneity experiences is a three-place relation and not a two-place 
relation, then ‘simultaneity’ refers to this three-place relation. I’m genu-
inely uncertain if it does hold, however. Imagine, if one can, that in a far 
off corner of our actual universe, the laws of physics are different than 
here. If we travelled there, what we would experience as simultaneity 
would actually be a two-place relation between two events. Is this two-
place relation simultaneity? I’m not sure. (And perhaps there is no fact 
of the matter here; our concept of simultaneity might very well be inde-
terminate in this respect.) 
 The good news for Einstein, however, is that in contrast to “H2O -
ism” about water, this need not matter to the truth of relativism about 
simultaneity. We have established that the concept of simultaneity is 
neutral between simultaneity being a two-place and a three-place rela-
tion. If the causal theory of reference does not hold for ‘simultaneity’, 
this means that the causal history of our use of the word cannot deter-
mine that it refers to a three-place rather than a two-place relation. But 
it seems that physics can do this job by itself. That is, even if the two-
place relation in the far off corner of universe would count as simulta-
neity if it existed, Einstein’s special theory of relativity is plausibly con-
strued as a general theory about the laws of physics in our universe (in 
contrast to the discovery of that water is H2O, which is only a discovery 
about the watery stuff on earth), which means that it is a theory that im-
plies that there are no such far off corners.244 
 
244 Similar considerations seem to hold regarding the question of whether 
‘simultaneity’ is a rigid designator. As we have seen, a term is a rigid designator if it refers 
to the same kind of property in every possible world. This is an intuitively plausible view 
about ‘water’. Is ‘simultaneity’ a rigid designator? My intuitions here are not very clear. 
However, no matter if ‘simultaneity’ is a rigid designator or not, relativism about 
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So, no matter whether the causal theory of reference holds for ‘simul-
taneity’ or not, relativism about simultaneity is true. It is true, not 
(merely) because of conceptual matters, but because of facts about what 
there is and what there isn’t. In the next section we ask if the same can be 
said about moral relativism.  
7.2.3  Mor al  r elat ivi sm as  a claim abou t  t h e  worl d ? 
In this subsection I argue that moral standard relativism cannot be de-
fended as a theory about the world in the way we have seen that rela-
tivism about simultaneity can. I will approach my argument for this 
conclusion through another argument against treating moral terms as 
natural kind terms, given by Eric Gampel.245  
The starting point of this argument is that the causal theory of refer-
ence is plausible for a term only if we have certain referential intentions. 
Two relevant intentions are missing in the case of moral terms, Gampel 
argues. The first is Causal Specification, that is, that “we understand the 
kind largely in terms of its causal role”246. When using moral terms, 
Gampel says, we are not trying to refer to what is “causally responsible 
for the usual features associated with the corresponding kinds”247 . The 
point then is that we are not willing to let facts about what causally gov-
erns our use of moral terms determine the reference of these terms. 
I am not convinced that this is true. It does not seem obviously wrong 
to say that, to the extent that we intend to refer to anything at all when we 
make moral statements, we do try to pick out the objects of, or what is 
causally responsible for, our moral experiences, experiences of right and 
wrong. I will not pursue this line any further here, however. The reason 
for this is that even if the argument succeeded in establishing that the 
causal theory of reference is not applicable to moral terms, this would 
not preclude that moral relativism is true as a claim about how the 
world is. We saw that relativism about simultaneity does not hinge on 
‘simultaneity’ functioning along the lines of the causal theory of refer-
ence, and this seems to hold for moral relativism as well. The thesis that 
 
simultaneity can be said to be a true theory about how the world is. If ‘simultaneity’ is a 
rigid designator, relativism is a theory about what simultaneity necessarily is; if it is not a 
rigid designator, relativism is a theory about what simultaneity actually (but not 
necessarily) is. 
245 Gampel, 1996, Gampel, 1997. 
246 Gampel, 1996, p. 196. 
247 Ibid. 
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there are no absolute moral facts is never construed as a theory that 
holds in some places in our universe but not in all. If it were, it would 
be terribly implausible. If it is an absolute moral fact that my doing a 
specific act, A, is wrong, that is, if it is wrong not only in relation to one 
or another morality but absolutely wrong, then this will be so every-
where. Absolute moral facts are not restricted to one or another loca-
tion in this way. This means that it suffices that the moral concepts are 
neutral between moral properties being absolute or relative moral 
properties for moral relativism to hold, given that there are no absolute 
moral properties. Thus, if one wants to argue that moral relativism does 
not follow from the non-existence of absolute moral properties (and the 
existence of the relevant relative properties), one has to establish that 
concepts of moral properties are not neutral between moral properties 
being absolute and relative moral properties.  
Before we turn to the question of whether they are neutral, let us look 
at the second part of Gampel’s argument. The second referential inten-
tion Gampel claims is missing when we use moral terms is Indexicality: 
when we use natural kind terms  “we aim to pick out what is actually 
causally responsible, not what might be responsible in some far-off 
time or world”248. Gampel’s argument that this aim is missing in moral 
talk is as follows:  
It may be difficult and implausible to suppose that neither I nor anyone before 
me has ever successfully referred to something good. But it is not logically im-
possible. […] [M]aybe no one has ever been genuinely depraved. But to say 
that we’ve never seen or touched water […]? Impossible – given the indexi-
cality in my referential intentions.249 
Gampel is on to something here, but his diagnosis is wrong for two 
reasons. First, our referential intentions (or as I prefer, our disposi-
tions) do not exclude that there is no water; they do not guarantee that 
the concept of water is instantiated. They exclude that water is not the 
watery stuff in our environment, the stuff with which we are acquainted; 
but they cannot guarantee that there is such stuff. Second, given that 
there is such stuff, Indexicality is not what makes it impossible to deny 
the existence of water. That we aim to pick out what is actually causally 
responsible wouldn’t have this consequence if our intentions (or dispo-
sitions) also put further restrictions on what can count as water, such as 
 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid., p. 198. 
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that it is a simple substance or H2O. If ‘water’ referred to the substance 
that is both actually responsible for our use of the term (Indexicality) 
and is a simple substance, then there would be no water (since there is 
no such substance).  
This suggests that what is relevant here is that the concept of water is 
neutral as regards the chemical structure of water. Such conceptual neu-
trality, not Indexicality, is what guarantees that water is whatever watery 
stuff that is causally responsible for our use of the term ‘water’. The 
difference between the concept of water and moral concepts suggested 
(but not explicated) by Gampel’s reasoning thus seems to be that the 
latter ones, but not the former, are neutral. Again, the relevant question, 
it turns out, is whether this is true or false: are moral concepts neutral 
between moral properties being absolute or relative? 
I argued in the last chapter that some people, those I called die-hard 
absolutists, do not have neutral moral concepts; as they are disposed to 
use moral terms, they refer to absolute moral properties. In my argu-
ment I made use of the following scenario: 
Scenario 1. There are no absolute moral properties. What we ex-
perience as absolute moral properties pertaining to actions actu-
ally are relations between these actions and our own mental 
states (such as our moral opinions, desires or motivations).  
I argued that some people, the die-hard absolutists, are disposed to 
think that if Scenario 1 is a fact, that is, if there are no absolute moral 
properties, then there are no moral properties at all. This stands in 
opposition, then, to how we would react to a scenario where the watery 
stuff turns out to be XYZ, the goldish substance turns out to be blue, or 
Gödel turns out not to have proved the incompleteness of arithmetic; in 
these cases we still think that it counts as water and gold and Gödel. 
Die-hard absolutist are not disposed to use moral terms, or intuitively 
conceptualize moral terms, in a way that is structurally similar to that 
which made us conclude that natural kind concepts are neutral. 
This means that moral standard relativism, as a general theory about 
everyone’s moral judgements, is still in trouble; the challenge posed to 
this view by certain speaker’s strong absolutist intuitions cannot be 
solved by founding the theory on a causal theory of reference. (This 
holds also for the form of relativism suggested by Horgan and Tim-
mons’ moral twin-earth scenario: moral properties are relative on this 
view as well, so die-hard absolutists are not ready to count these as moral 
Semantic Externalism and Relativism 
198 
properties.) Absolutism is also still in trouble. Certain speakers, such 
as Harman and Dreier, are ready to say that, at least if there are no abso-
lute moral properties, then the relative properties there are count as 
moral properties. These people do have moral concepts that are neutral 
between moral properties being relative or absolute. So, intuitively, 
what holds for ‘simultaneity’ holds for moral terms as they use them; if 
there are no absolute moral properties, moral relativism is true as a 
claim about how the world is.  
7.2. 4  Objec t ion  an d  r e p l y :  Causal  t h e or y  on  d isposi t ional  
gr oun d s 
An expected objection to my reasoning above is that I contradict the 
insights of Kripke and Putnam. My argument relies on the idea that we 
need to have certain intuitions, or dispositions (or perhaps even associ-
ated descriptions) regarding a certain term for the causal theory of ref-
erence to hold for that term. But on Kripke’s and Putnam’s picture this 
is not so; in fact all of our associated descriptions or beliefs about the 
referents of our terms might be false, since it is the actual nature of the 
kind or object that our use of the term stands in a certain causal relation 
to that matters. So it seems that my objection to the idea that standard 
relativism can be defended through a causal theory of reference works 
just because it assumes things that go against the very idea of causal 
theories of reference. 
The answer to this objection, I think, is that although Kripke and Put-
nam’s arguments did contain new and important insights about how the 
reference of certain terms are fixed, these arguments do not give any 
reason to reject a descriptivist theory, or at least not something like the 
intuition-based view of analysis. Kripke and Putnam’s arguments build, 
after all, on our ability to say what terms like ‘gold’ and ‘water’ refer to 
in certain possible cases. This point is stressed by Jackson: 
Our ability to answer questions about what various words refer to in various 
possible worlds, it should be emphasized, is common ground with critics of the 
description theory. The critics’ writings are full of descriptions (descriptions) of 
possible worlds and claims about what refers, or fails to refer, to what in these 
possible worlds. Indeed, their impact has derived precisely from the intuitive 
plausibility of many of their claims about what refers, or fails to refer, to what 
in various possible worlds. But if speakers can say what refers to what when 
various possible worlds are described to them, description theorists can identify 
the property associated in their minds with, for example, the word ‘water’: it is 
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the disjunction of the properties that guide the speakers in each particular pos-
sible world when they say which stuff, if any, in each world counts as water.250 
The twin-earth scenarios are described to us, and based on these descrip-
tions we are able to tell what our term ‘water’ refers to. So, it seems that 
what guides us in making our judgements about what ‘water’ refers to, 
are these descriptions. Or at least, for all these examples show, this 
might be the case. In the case of water we seem to be thinking roughly; 
water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance here on earth. So, descriptiv-
ists can hold, it is this, or some similar, description we associate with 
‘water’.251  
But it might seem that this misses the point of the objection. Simple 
descriptions of the sort above obviously cannot accurately give ‘water’ 
its meaning. First, we would have to spell out what ‘watery stuff’ means 
exactly. Let’s say that it is spelled out as “the odourless, drinkable sub-
stance that falls in rain, flows in rivers and fills the oceans”. But sup-
pose the substance in rivers and oceans really is not odourless (a demon 
has deceived us): we still want to say that that is water. And what about 
scenarios where there are two different substances, with different 
chemical structure, distributed in the lakes and rivers etc? Or scenarios 
where the watery stuff is no natural kind at all? The original analysis 
gives us no clue to what ‘water’ refers to in such cases. The analysis 
would obviously have to be modified to account for such possible cases, 
taking into consideration our reaction to these cases. But the more such 
complications we find, the less plausible it might be to think that we can 
give a complete analysis free from counter-examples. On inductive 
grounds it might be argued that the fact that every hitherto suggested 
description or analysis fails, there is no accurate analysis; there are 
counter-examples to every analysis. 
This objection can be rebutted as well, however. If we draw the induc-
tive conclusion, we have to reject descriptivism, given that this view is 
understood as claiming that there must be a description in other terms. 
But it is not a reason to reject the intuition-based view of analysis as I 
have construed this. We cannot draw the conclusion that there is no 
specific way in which we are disposed to classify every scenario; it 
 
250 Jackson, 1998b, p. 212 
251 And in order to accommodate the modal version of the twin-earth example we 
should add a modal operator to the description: “the watery stuff we are actually 
acquainted with here on earth”. Cf. Davies and Humberstone, 1980, pp. 18-19, Jackson, 
1992, pp. 483-84 
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might just be that this way is not fully explicable in other terms or con-
cepts we have, which is why none of our descriptions is fully satisfac-
tory as an analysis (even though they may be good approximations of our 
dispositions to classify). (This point was made in the previous chapter 
too.) This means that it is fully compatible with the examples given by 
Kripke and Putnam and our intuitions about these, that it is our disposi-
tions about what counts as being e.g. water, gold or Gödel in possible 
cases that determine the reference of the terms in question. 
This is not to say that the causal history of our use of these terms does 
not matter to their reference. It is an idea about why the causal history 
matters; it does because speakers allow it to matter; because we are (as 
Kripke and Putnam indeed showed) disposed to say that it is that which 
we stand in a certain causal relation to which is water or gold or Gödel. 
The point I have tried to make intuitively here has been given a more 
theoretic underpinning by proponents of so-called two-dimensional 
semantics, most notably by Chalmers and Jackson.252 I will not here be 
able to do justice to the two-dimensional framework with all its techni-
calities or the differences between different forms of the theory. What I 
present is a rough intuitive picture of it that I take to be close to Chalm-
ers’ version, which he calls “epistemic two-dimensional semantics”. 
According to two-dimensionalism, linguistic expressions can be evalu-
ated in relation to two different kinds of possibilities, and these evalua-
tions are connected to two aspects or “dimensions” of meaning, or two 
different kinds of intensions. First, we can evaluate expressions relative 
to (metaphysically) possible worlds. Some terms, for example ’bache-
lor’, have different extensions in different possible worlds: someone 
who actually is a bachelor could have been married. We can define one of 
the intensions associated with expressions, the “secondary intension” in 
Chalmers' words, through this notion of possible worlds; it is a func-
tion from possible worlds to extensions. The secondary intension of 
‘bachelor’, then, tells us what things are bachelors in every possible 
world.  
We can also evaluate expressions relative to another kind of possibili-
ties. Even though ‘water’ has the same reference in every possible world 
no matter how they are constituted (since it is a rigid designator), it does 
not have the same referent no matter how the actual world turns out to be 
constituted. If it turns out that the watery stuff around us is H2O, then 
 
252 Chalmers, 2004, Chalmers and Jackson, 2001, Jackson, 1998a, Jackson, 1998b. 
Semantic Externalism and Relativism 
201 
water is H2O; if it turns out that the watery stuff is XYZ, then water is 
XYZ. In Chalmers' terminology, this is not to say that it is metaphysically 
possible that water is XYZ, because it isn’t (there is no possible world in 
which it is); it is to say that it is epistemically possible (there is a scenario 
where water is XYZ): 
There are two key ideas here. The first is the idea of epistemic space: there are 
many ways the world might turn out to be, and there is a corresponding space 
of epistemic possibilities. The second is the idea of scrutability: once we know 
how the world has turned out, or once we know which epistemic possibility is 
actual, we are in a position to determine the extensions of our expressions. To-
gether, these two ideas suggest than at expression can be associated with a 
function from epistemic possibilities to extensions: an epistemic intension.  
Take the first idea first. There are many ways the world might be, for all we 
know. And there are even more ways the world might be, for all we know a 
priori. The oceans might contain H2O or they might contain XYZ; the eve-
ning star might be identical to the morning star or it might not. These ways 
the world might be correspond to epistemically possible hypotheses, in a broad 
sense. Let us say that a claim is epistemically possible (in the broad sense) 
when it is not ruled out a priori. Then it is epistemically possible that water is 
H2O, and it is epistemically possible that water is XYZ. It is epistemically possi-
ble that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and epistemically possible that Hesperus is 
not Phosphorus.  
Just as one can think of metaphysically possible hypotheses as corresponding 
to an overarching space of metaphysical possibilities, one can think of 
epistemically possible hypotheses as corresponding to an overarching space of 
epistemic possibilities. Some possibilities in the space of metaphysical possibilities 
are maximally specific: these can be thought of as maximal metaphysical pos-
sibilities, or as they are often known, possible worlds. In a similar way, some 
possibilities in the space of epistemic possibilities are maximally specific: these 
can be thought of as maximal epistemic possibilities, or as I will call them, sce-
narios.253  
When we consider a possible case as an epistemic scenario we do not 
consider it as a way the world could have been (this would be to con-
sider it as a possible world), and ask what one of our terms refers to in 
that possible world (holding constant the way the world actually is). 
Instead we are considering the possibility as actual254 and ask what a 
certain term would refer to if the actual world turned out to be in a 
certain way. The epistemic, or primary, intension, associated with a 
term, is a function from scenarios, not possible worlds, to extensions (in 
those scenarios). The primary intension of ‘water’, for example, tells us 
what water refers to in different epistemic scenarios. 
 
253 Chalmers, 2004, pp. 176-77. 
254 Ibid., p. 177. 
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The “non-modal” thought experiments used as arguments for a causal 
theory of reference by Kripke and Putnam, involve such epistemic sce-
narios. So, what we do when we consider these is to investigate the epis-
temic intension of the terms – the function from epistemic scenarios to 
extensions for these terms – and take our dispositions to react to the 
scenarios as a guide to these epistemic intensions. And for some terms, 
it turns out, the dispositions serve to ground an epistemic intension or 
analysis, according to which it is the causal history of the use of the term 
that matters to the extension. 
We can also explicate my notion of conceptual neutrality in terms of 
epistemic possibility. For natural kind terms several different exten-
sions are epistemically possible; otherwise the epistemic intension of 
those terms could not make their extensions in a scenario depend on the 
specifics of the scenario. This is what it means that, say, the concept of 
water is neutral between water being H2O and XYZ; it is both epistemi-
cally possible that water is H2O and that water is XYZ. Other concepts 
are not neutral in this sense: we cannot imagine scenarios in which 
someone counts as a witch without having magical powers. So the epis-
temic intension of ‘witch’ does not allow the causal history of our use of 
‘witch’ to determine whether the term refers to people with or without 
magical powers.255  
I have argued that the same holds for some people’s use of moral 
terms regarding whether these refer to relative or absolute moral prop-
erties. Die-hard absolutists do not see it as an epistemic possibility that 
 
255 We should note one thing about the neutrality of concepts: a concept may be 
neutral in certain respects and not others. Apparently the concept of water is neutral 
between water being H2O or XYZ. But this does not yet make the point that anything 
causally related to our use of the term ‘water’ in the way that H2O supposedly is, would 
count as water. Consider for example a scenario in which what causally regulates our use 
of water is not H2O but stones. A demon has manipulated our experiences so that we 
think it is a liquid that is possible to drink etc. Would we say that if this scenario is actual, 
then water is stones? It is not obvious that we would; perhaps we would rather say that in 
such a scenario there is no water. So even for the typical examples of terms for which a 
causal theory of reference holds, it is not obvious that the causal history of our use of the 
terms trump all other considerations in determining the extension: it might well be that 
as we use the word ‘water’, water cannot be stones. What I have argued for about the die-
hard absolutists’ use of moral terms, then, is not a difference in kind from our use of 
natural kind terms. I have argued that as die-hard absolutists use moral terms, there is 
one respect in which the concepts they express are not neutral. For all I have argued it 
might very well be that die-hard absolutists allow the causal history of moral terms to do 
some job – the job of determining which of different absolute properties the moral terms 
refer to. 
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moral rightness and wrongness are relative moral properties. Other 
people, such as Harman and Dreier, seem to associate a different epis-
temic intension with moral terms; they are disposed to say that if there 
are no absolute moral facts, then moral terms refer to the relative prop-
erties in the area, properties that are in some way dependent on the 
morality of the speaker.  
As we have seen, Harman and Dreier suggest that even though many 
people have an absolutist understanding of moral properties, we can 
accept relativism as a kind of “second best” theory. They try to make this 
move plausible through the analogy with relativism in physics. Many 
people have absolutist understandings of mass and simultaneity, but we 
don’t want to say that the lack of such properties make their judgements 
false. Instead we say that, if there are no such absolute facts, their judge-
ments are made true by the relative facts there are in the area. I have 
argued that this analogy fails. There is a major difference between the 
two cases: those who have an absolutist understanding of mass and 
simultaneity do allow that, if there are no absolute facts of these kinds, 
then simultaneity and mass are relative properties; but many moral 
absolutists do not allow the corresponding move for moral properties. 
They rather say that there are no moral properties at all than relativize 
them.  
7.2.5 O t h er  in t er pr e ta t ions  of t h e  analogy :  r e v i sion ism again  
Neither Harman nor Dreier says that the analogy between moral relativ-
ism and relativism about physical parameters is to be interpreted in the 
causal externalist way I have done here. So perhaps I have misconstrued 
their idea, and perhaps my objections have no bite if their view is con-
strued in other ways.  
Unfortunately, Harman and Dreier give few clues as to how the anal-
ogy is to be interpreted. In some passages, though, Harman seems to 
suggest that it is something like a principle of charity that is in play in 
the case of physical relativism: 
it would be mean-spirited to invoke an “error theory” and conclude that these 
pre-Einsteinian judgments were all false! Better to suppose that such a judg-
ment was true to the extent that an object had the relevant mass in relation 
to a spatio-temporal framework that was conspicuous to the person making 
the judgment […].256 
 
256 Harman, in Harman and Thomson, 1996, p. 4, my italics. 
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It can be discussed whether it really is charitable to ascribe relativist 
content or truth-conditions to the die-hard absolutist’s moral judge-
ments. But this is not really the crucial point for my general argument. 
What I have shown is that there is at least one aspect in which the cases 
are not analogous. In the case of relativism about simultaneity, people 
are ready to say that if there is no two-place simultaneity, then simulta-
neity is the relevant three-place relation. This lends the same intuitive 
plausibility to the idea that physical relativism can be established as a 
thesis about how the world is, as Kripke’s and Putnam’s arguments did 
for natural kind terms and names. In the moral case, on the other hand, 
there are at least some people who are ready to say that if the relative 
properties are all there is, then there are no moral properties at all. So 
the intuitive support is lacking as these speaker’s are disposed to use 
moral terms.  
Of course one can maintain that a causal theory of reference holds for 
moral terms as used by die-hard absolutists. But if one does, the analy-
sis is not compatible with a traditional intuition-based methodology 
and will not have captured the intuitive meaning that moral terms have 
by virtue of the way we are ready to use them. In other words, it will be a 
radically revisionist analysis: an analysis of judgements about moral 
rightness and wrongness that goes against what some people are willing 
to classify as moral properties. 
7.3 S o c i al  Exte r n al is m 
Language is a social phenomenon. We use it to communicate with others 
who share our language, that is, with people in our linguistic commu-
nity. It is also commonly thought that the meaning of the words a 
speaker uses, is not determined wholly by her own use of the words, but 
also by how other competent speakers in her linguistic community use 
them. According to such social externalism, meaning and reference are 
determined non-individually by the linguistic community the term is 
used in. This opens up for a certain way in which the individual speaker 
might be mistaken about the meaning or reference of the terms she uses: 
she might simply be mistaken about how other people in her society 
uses them. This way, social externalism might be taken to provide a 
possible way for standard relativists to answer the challenge from abso-
lutist intuitions. It might also be taken to provide a safeguard against the 
challenge from opposite intuitions against the single analysis assump-
tion; if it is not how individual speakers use terms that determines the 
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reference of the terms as used by those speakers, then the fact that the 
different speakers (are disposed to) use moral terms differently is no 
reason to think that they refer to different properties by using them. Let 
us investigate these claims.  
7.3.1  Ar gum e n ts  for  soc ial  ext er nalism 
After presenting his case that a causal theory of reference holds for natu-
ral kind terms through the twin-earth scenario, Putnam introduces his 
idea of the division of linguistic labour. He uses the following example to 
illustrate and argue for the idea:  
Suppose you are like me and cannot tell an elm from a beech tree. We still say 
that the extension of ‘elm’ in my idiolect is the same as the extension of ‘elm’ 
in anyone else’s, viz., the set of all elm trees, and that the set of all beech trees 
is the extension of ‘beech’ in both of our dialects.257  
How can it be that we can use a term, like ‘elm’, to pick out certain 
things, like elms, without having the slightest idea about what tells these 
things from certain other things, such as beeches? What makes this 
possible, according to Putnam, is the division of linguistic labour. Some 
people in our linguistic community know how to tell elms from 
beeches and the rest of us depend on these “experts” when we use the 
terms to refer to what they do. From examples like these he formulates 
his conjecture: 
HYPOTHESIS OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE DIVISION OF LINGUISTIC 
LABOR: Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of division of linguis-
tic labor just described: that is, possesses at least some terms whose associated 
‘criteria’ are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms, 
and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation 
between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets.258 
Tyler Burge has argued that social externalism (or “non-individualism”) 
holds for mental content as well as linguistic meaning, using similar 
thought experiments. Burge asks us to imagine an ordinary English-
speaking person, we can call him Art, who thinks that he has arthritis in 
his thigh. When he says, “I have arthritis in my thigh” he expresses the 
belief that he has arthritis in his thigh. But unknowingly to Art, arthritis 
is a condition of the joints only. One cannot have arthritis in the thighs, 
so Art’s statement and the belief it expresses are false. Now we are to 
 
257 Putnam, 1975, p. 226. 
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imagine a counterfactual situation, which is exactly like the original one 
– Art has learnt the words in the same way and is disposed to use them 
in the same way, he has “the same physiological history, the same dis-
eases, the same internal physical occurrences”259 etc. – except for that in 
the community where Art grew up and lives, ‘arthritis’ is used more 
inclusively, it is used to apply to rheumatoid conditions of the thighs as 
well as of the joints. In the counterfactual situation, Art utters the same 
words: “I have arthritis in my thigh”. In this situation, it seems that his 
statement and the belief it expresses are true. 
The point of this thought experiment is that intuitively we want to say 
that in the counterfactual situation, Art’s statement and the belief it 
expresses are not about arthritis, they are about another condition, we 
can call it ‘tharthritis’, that can be had in the thighs. The difference be-
tween the two situations is not that Art has different dispositions to use 
‘arthritis’. The only difference is how other speakers in Art’s linguistic 
community use the word. So, it seems, at least for some words, the 
meaning and reference of a term (and the content of the concepts and 
beliefs expressed with this word) as used by a speaker, does not depend 
on how this individual speaker is disposed to use the term, but on how 
the term is used by others in the speaker’s linguistic community.  
In the examples above it seems reasonable to say that it is the experts, 
botanists and medical experts respectively, that are the relevant speakers 
in the linguistic community, those we should turn to when we want to 
know what kinds of things the terms we use refer to. But as Timothy 
Williamson points out, it need not be so for all terms: 
Even where we cannot sensibly divide the linguistic community into experts 
and non-experts, the picture of a natural language as a cluster of causally in-
terrelated but constitutively independent idiolects is still wrong, because it 
ignores the way in which individual speakers defer to the linguistic community 
as a whole. They use a word as a word of a public language, allowing its refer-
ence in their mouths to be fixed by its use over the whole community. Such 
verbal interactions between speakers can hold a linguistic practice together 
even in the absence of a common creed which they are all required to en-
dorse.260 
The idea here – that the meaning and reference of our terms is given to 
them by linguistic conventions in our community or by the knowledge 
of experts – seems plausible enough. It is, after all, a common phenome-
 
259 Burge, 1979, p. 78. 
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non that we are wrong or (partially) ignorant about the correct applica-
tion of a term (and the concept it expresses), in relation to how that term 
is used in our linguistic community. We do not want to say in those 
situations (not in all of them, at least) that the mistaken speaker uses the 
term with another meaning; she is plainly mistaken about the meaning 
the term has as it is used in her community.  
For this reason, it seems, it would be premature to conclude from the 
fact that some speakers think that moral properties are absolute moral 
properties that moral terms, when used by these speakers, refer to abso-
lute moral properties. It might simply be that the absolutists are mis-
taken about the nature of moral properties, just like Art is mistaken 
about the nature of arthritis.  
7.3.2  S o c ial  ext er nalism on  d is posi t ional  gr oun ds  
Putnam’s and Burge’s arguments for social externalism rely on our in-
tuitions about possible cases in the same way as the arguments for 
causal theories of reference do. Burge’s arthritis-example can be con-
strued as a twin-earth scenario with the two linguistic communities 
residing on earth and twin-earth respectively. In this scenario, the con-
ventions or use of terms in the linguistic communities of the speakers 
in question play the same role as the nature of the stuff the speakers are 
causally acquainted with in the original example; it serves to determine 
the meaning and reference of the terms in question so that these are 
different on earth and twin-earth. Just as the two forms of semantic 
externalism and the arguments for them are structurally identical in this 
way, so are my objections to the idea that any of them can be used by 
relativists to answer the challenge from absolutist intuitions. Die-hard 
absolutists are just as reluctant to let linguistic conventions determine 
whether moral properties are absolute or relative, as they are to let it be 
determined by the nature of the properties they are causally related to.  
One premise in this objection is that the intuitive plausibility of so-
cial externalism for a term depends on that the speakers allow that the 
use of other speakers in the linguistic community, either the community 
as a whole or some group of experts, determine the reference. Let me 
make this point through considering yet another example, one William-
son uses to argue in favour of a social externalist view. Williamson has 
us considering two people, Stephen and Peter, who deny (and thus are 
disposed to deny) the following sentence: “every vixen is a female fox”. 
The reason that they do so is not that they have a deviant use of ‘vixen’, 
‘female’ or ‘fox’. (Indeed, they reject the sentence, “every vixen is a vixen” 
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as well.) The reason is instead that they accept elaborate philosophical 
theories about the logic of ‘every’ that implicate that “every vixen is a 
female fox” need not be true. We can further assume that these theories 
are false, at least as theories about what people in general use ‘every’ to 
say; used in this way, “every vixen is a female fox” is true. We don’t have 
to go into what their theories are; it suffices to say that they are accept-
ing these theories on what seems to be good grounds:  
When Peter and Stephen are challenged on their logical deviations, they de-
fend themselves fluently. In fact, both have published widely read articles on 
the issues in leading refereed journals of philosophy, in English. They appear to 
be like most philosophers, thoroughly competent in their native language, a bit 
odd in some of their views.261 
So Peter and Stephen are not madmen without any understanding of the 
word ‘every’ whatsoever. Williamson argues further that what we 
should say in this case is that Peter and Stephen do not use the word 
‘every’ with a different meaning than other people because of their devi-
ating disposition to use the term: 
Peter and Stephen learned English in the normal way. They acquired their 
non-standard views as adults. At least before that, nothing in their use of Eng-
lish suggested semantic deviation. Surely they understood (1) [“Every vixen is a 
vixen”] and its constituent words and modes of construction with their ordi-
nary meanings then. But the process by which they acquired their eccentrici-
ties did not involve forgetting their previous semantic understanding. For ex-
ample, on their present understanding of (1), they have no difficulty in 
remembering why they used to assent to it. They were young and foolish then, 
with a tendency to accept claims on the basis of insufficient reflection. By 
ordinary standards, Peter and Stephen understand (1) perfectly well. Although 
their rejection of (1) might on first acquaintance give an observer a defeasible 
reason to deny that they understood it, any such reason is defeated by closer 
observation of them. They genuinely doubt that every vixen is a vixen. Peter 
and Stephen are not marginal cases of understanding: their linguistic compe-
tence is far more secure than that of young children or native speakers of 
other languages who are in the process of learning English. If some partici-
pants in a debate have an imperfect linguistic understanding of one of the key 
words with which it is conducted, they need to have its meaning explained to 
them before the debate can properly continue. But to stop our logical debate 
with Peter and Stephen in order to explain to them what the word ‘every’ 
means in English would be irrelevant and gratuitously patronizing. The under-
standing which they lack is logical, not semantic. Their attitudes to (1) mani-
fest only some deviant patterns of belief.262 
 
261 Ibid., p. 12. 
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If these considerations make it reasonable to think that Peter and Ste-
phen use ‘every’ with the same meaning as people in general in spite of 
their deviating dispositions to accept sentences involving the term, then 
we seem to have a reason to accept social externalism about this word. 
The fact, if it is a fact, that when they say, “every vixen is a female fox” 
this is true, does not depend on their own dispositions to use the word, 
but on how the word is used in their linguistic community.  
I think that we are indeed inclined to think that Peter and Stephen use 
the word with the same meaning as the rest of us. But I think we are thus 
inclined only because we make certain additional assumptions; namely 
those Williamson spells out in the following passage, where he argues 
against the idea that Peter and Stephen use the word ‘every’ in non-stan-
dard senses: 
Peter and Stephen are emphatic that they intend their words to be understood 
as words of our common language, with their standard English senses. They 
use ‘every’ and the other words in (1) as words of that public language. Each of 
them believes that his semantic theory is correct for English as spoken by oth-
ers, not just by himself, and that if it turned out to be (heaven forbid!) incor-
rect for English as spoken by others, it would equally turn out to be incorrect 
for English as spoken by himself.263 
That is, Peter and Stephen allow that the reference of the term, as they use 
it, is fixed by how the term is used more generally in their linguistic 
community. As it is sometimes expressed, they defer to the linguistic 
community. If we explicitly change this bit of the story, the conclusion 
that they use the word with the same meaning as the rest of us becomes 
implausible. Peter and Stephen reject the sentence “every vixen is a fe-
male fox” and similar constructions involving ‘every’. Now we are to 
imagine that they react to the suggestion that as most people use the 
term the sentences they reject are true, by saying something like; “well, 
in that case I use the term to refer to something other than most people 
do”. (And perhaps, since they are intelligent people they would also 
think; “it might be best that I change my use of ‘every’ so that it con-
forms with other people’s use, and reserve another term to say what I 
have said up to now with ‘every’”.) In other words, in this scenario, Peter 
and Stephen do not defer to the linguistic community, they do not allow 
the conventions or use in the community in general to fix the reference 
of the term as they use it. If this is the case, the intuitively correct con-
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clusion to draw is that Peter and Stephen do not use ‘every’ to refer to 
the same thing as the rest of us do. 
The same thing holds for Art who thinks that it is possible to suffer 
from arthritis in the thighs. If his reaction when he is informed that 
experts in the field say that arthritis is a condition of the joints only, is, 
as we might expect, to say roughly “well, in that case I guess I was mis-
taken about what arthritis is and that it is not arthritis I have in my 
thighs but something else”, then we should draw Burge’s conclusion: 
Art used ‘arthritis’ to refer to arthritis, the condition that the rest of us 
and the medical experts call ‘arthritis’. But on the other hand, Art’s re-
sponse could be something like; “oh, do they use the term in that way: I 
use it for any rheumatoid condition”. In that case it is not at all as obvi-
ous that we should say that Art’s utterance of “I have arthritis is my 
thigh” is false. 
Perhaps it is hard to imagine someone reacting like Art in the latter 
case, because for many terms, of which ‘arthritis’ is one, deference to the 
community’s or the experts’ use is deeply entrenched in our thinking. It 
is less entrenched for other terms. Imagine that someone convinces you 
that as people in general use the word ‘chair’, the word refers to ears. It 
would for sure be hard to believe such a thing, but we are now assuming 
that you are convinced that it is the case. What would you say, (1) or (2)? 
(1) Oh, in that case I was mistaken about the nature of chairs, I 
thought they were things to sit on, not ears. I guess that most of 
my statements and beliefs about chairs have been false. 
(2) Oh, I use the word ‘chair’ to talk about things we sit on (or at 
least I have used it so up to now, maybe I should change my use). 
As I have used the term it was indeed correct to say things like 
“some chairs have legs” (even though it is obviously false to say 
“some ears have legs”). 
The reactions in (1) are analogous to the standard response about ‘ar-
thritis’ and to Peter and Stephen’s responses about ‘every’. Now, as 
regards the example we are considering now, it is obvious that we would 
respond in line with (2). We would not be willing to say that basically 
all statements which we have used the term ‘chair’ to make (and the 
beliefs we have expressed) are false and indeed absurd, in the way they 
would be if ‘chair’ in those statements had referred to ears. (“I think we 
should buy new chairs for our kitchen. Maybe the chairs we saw at IKEA 
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last week.”) Rather, the correct thing to say in such a scenario is that we 
have been using ‘chair’ with a meaning that deviates from the meaning it 
has in our linguistic community.  
In some cases, then, we are not willing to defer to the community. To 
be clear, I am not arguing here that we are not in any way sensitive to 
other people’s use of the term in question also in those cases. Since we 
want to be able to communicate with people in our linguistic commu-
nity – this is the whole point of having a language – we will tend to 
change our use of a word when we find out that it is deviant from the use 
of the word in society in general. The difference is that we are not will-
ing to let the use of others determine what we have been referring to all 
along. We are only prepared to change our terminology, in order to be 
able to communicate with others. 
The conclusion to draw from this is that the reference of a term as a 
speaker uses it, is determined by the use of experts or the linguistic 
community, only in case the speaker is willing to let the experts or 
community do that job. Actually, this conclusion might be something 
Williamson is ready to accept. Remember the quote above, where he 
said that individualism is wrong “because it ignores the way in which 
individual speakers defer to the linguistic community as a whole. They 
use a word as a word of a public language, allowing its reference in their 
mouths to be fixed by its use over the whole community.” 
We can also describe our conclusion in the terminology we intro-
duced in the discussion about causal theories of reference. We can say 
that, even if we happen to think that arthritis can be had in the thighs, we 
see it as an epistemic possibility that arthritis is a condition of the joints 
only. Our concept of arthritis is neutral between these two possibilities. 
But we do not see it as an epistemic possibility that all chairs are ears. 
Our concept of chairs is not neutral between chairs being things to sit 
on or bodily organs we hear with! 
7.3.3  U ps h o t  for  t h e  meanin g of  moral  ter ms 
Is it reasonable to say that moral absolutists (or relativists) can be mis-
taken about the nature of moral properties in the way that Art is about 
arthritis in Burge’s example? This depends on whether they are willing 
to let the use of moral terms in their linguistic community determine 
the reference of the terms as they use them, like Art is about ‘arthritis’, 
or if they react more like we do about the scenario involving the term 
‘chair’ above.  
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I think the latter is true for most absolutists and relativists. Die-hard 
absolutists would not say: “Well, if it is indeed correct that most people 
use the term ‘morally wrong’ to refer to relative properties, then I have 
been wrong about the nature of moral properties”. They are not willing 
to let other people’s use of these terms determine what they are and have 
been referring to by the term. Rather, they would say: “I understand that 
others might use terms like ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’ differ-
ently than I do. But as I use the terms, they apply to absolute properties, 
not to relative ones. The beliefs I have and express when I use these 
words is about absolute moral properties. I cannot see that anything but 
absolute properties could count as moral properties.” (Perhaps they 
would be prepared to change their terminology, however. But that, as I 
said above, says nothing about what they refer to before (or unless) such 
a change in terminology actually occurs.)  
 The same holds, I think, for moral relativists. It is unlikely that rela-
tivists like Harman and Dreier would say: “Well, if it is true that most 
people use the term ‘morally wrong’ to refer only to absolute properties, 
then I was wrong about the nature of moral properties. In that case rela-
tive properties cannot count as moral properties.” We have indeed seen 
that they think that moral properties can be relative properties even 
though most people have absolutist linguistic intentions. 
Even though I think that this is true, we can notice that the point I 
wish to make here – that social externalism cannot help answer the 
challenge from opposite intuitions – requires less than I have argued for 
this far. In the scenarios above, as in the one with the word ‘chair’, an 
individual speaker reacts to the fact that her use of a word deviates from 
the use in the rest of her linguistic community. Some people are proba-
bly reluctant to accept my conclusions about such cases. But we can 
modify the ‘chair’ scenario as follows. Suppose that about half of the 
people in your society use the term ‘chair’ to refer to ears (for some 
reason the difference in use has escaped you). In this case it is even more 
obvious than in the original scenario that we would not react by saying: 
“In that case I have been mistaken about the nature of chairs – chairs, 
then, are ears”. We would rather say something like: “In that case they 
use ‘chair’ to refer to something else than I do – I use it to refer to things 
to sit on”.  
Such a scenario is more like the actual situation we have with diverse 
intuitions about the nature of moral properties. Neither moral die-hard 
absolutists nor relativists are alone as individual speakers in having the 
intuitions or dispositions they have. It is true that we don’t know the 
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actual exact size of the different groups; but this doesn’t matter, since it 
is plausible to think that they both constitute rather large groups. So the 
relevant test is what they would say about a scenario like this: Suppose 
that a large group of people in our society use ‘morally right’ to refer to 
absolute properties and another large group use it refer to relative prop-
erties. We can be pretty certain that most absolutists and relativists are 
not willing to think: “In that case I have been mistaken about the nature 
of moral properties – they are after all relative/absolute properties”. In 
other words, they would not be ready to accept the other group as ex-
perts in the relevant sense here. Rather they would say something like: 
“This does not change my view on the nature of moral properties – I 
still think that moral properties cannot be something else than absolute 
moral properties/I still think that moral properties can be relative”. So 
absolutists and relativists are not ready to defer to each other in this 
matter.  
Consequently, social externalism cannot be used to clear away the 
challenge from opposite intuitions. People (at least many) do not allow 
the dispositions to use moral terms of other people in their linguistic 
community to decide whether moral properties are relative or absolute. 
This means that the only way to use a social externalist semantic theory 
to ground standard relativism would be to construe it as a radically 
revisionist analysis. That is, to let the use of moral terms of a subgroup 
of speakers in the linguistic community determine what the correct 
analysis of moral judgements is, even though other speakers in that 
community are not ready to accept that analysis as giving a correct pic-
ture of moral properties, and are not willing to accept the subgroup’s 
use as a guide to the correct analysis. 
7.4  C o n clusi o n 
The challenge from opposite intuitions remains unanswered. If we are 
after a non-revisionist analysis of moral terms, then we have to let our 
analysis take account of how people are disposed to use the terms. For 
the terms about which we intuitively think that semantic externalism 
holds, we do that because we are willing to let external matters trump 
our own understanding of the referent. It is true that some people are 
willing to let the fact of whether it is relative or absolute properties that 
cause our moral experiences and judgements determine whether moral 
properties are relative or absolute. But other people – die-hard absolut-
ists – are not. I have also argued that, plausibly, neither of these groups 
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of people is ready to defer to the usage of moral terms in society at large, 
so that external matters about the usage of moral terms in the other 
group could trump their own understanding of what can and cannot 
count as moral properties.  
 
  
Chapter 8 
Analysis Pluralism 
8.1  Intr oducti o n  
In the last two chapters I have argued that different people require dif-
ferent things (are disposed to think that different things have to hold) 
for an act to be morally right or wrong. Die-hard absolutists require that 
the act has an absolute moral property. Modest absolutists think that mor-
ally right actions have an absolute moral property but, contrary to die-
hard absolutists, they think that if there are no absolute properties of 
the relevant kind, then moral properties are relative. Modest relativists 
say that if there were absolute properties of a certain kind, then these 
would be the moral properties; but since there are no such absolute 
moral properties, moral properties are relative. The modest relativist 
requirement is structurally identical to the modest absolutist require-
ment; what differs is their view on the ontological question of whether 
there are any absolute properties of the relevant kind.264 Perhaps, but 
this is not something I have argued for, there are also die-hard relativists; 
 
264 Perhaps, standard relativists may also say that if there are absolute properties of a 
certain kind, both these and the relative properties count as moral properties. There are 
also different possible reactions to the scenario where absolute properties of the relevant 
kind do not exist. Firstly, relativists might say that moral terms refer only to the relative 
properties, since they refer to the properties we are causally connected to. Or they may 
say that both the absolute properties in question and the relative properties count as 
moral properties, but that only properties of one of the kinds exist. 
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relativists who hold that nothing but relative properties could count as 
moral properties. 
In my discussion I have focused on die-hard absolutists and argued 
that their existence is a problem for standard relativism. Or at least, this 
is so if we use the traditional methodological approach to analysing 
moral judgements: that is, if we want an analysis that is non-revisionist 
in the sense that it does not conflict with what some people are and are 
not disposed to classify as moral properties. As die-hard absolutists are 
disposed to use moral terms, these refer (only) to absolute moral prop-
erties; that is, an absolutist analysis holds for their judgements. I have 
also argued that there is a potential problem for absolutists. First, if 
there are die-hard relativists, they are disposed to use moral terms so 
that these refer only to relative moral properties. Second, even if there 
are no die-hard relativists, modest absolutists and relativists pose a 
potential problem for absolutism. Which analysis holds for their moral 
judgements, depends on which scenario we take to be a correct descrip-
tion of the world. If there are absolute facts of the kind that they are 
ready to classify as absolute moral properties, then they refer to abso-
lute moral properties and an absolutist analysis holds for their judge-
ments. If this is the case, an absolutist analysis holds for everyone’s 
moral judgements. If, on the other hand, there are no absolute properties 
that the modest relativists or absolutists are ready to classify as moral 
properties, then a standard relativist analysis holds for their moral 
judgements. If absolutism is to be defended as a general theory, then, 
there has to be absolute properties and facts that standard relativists are 
ready to classify as moral properties. Since this might seem improbable, 
there is a real threat to absolutism as well (even assuming that there are 
no die-hard relativists). In this chapter I want to investigate what further 
conclusions to draw if both standard relativism and absolutism are in 
trouble in this way. 
One consequence would be that every cognitivist analysis of moral 
judgements is in trouble, since the standard relativist and the absolutist 
analyses of moral judgements together exhaust the possible general 
analyses: either moral properties are relative or they are absolute. This 
is a negative thesis – certain theories do not hold. 
Does it imply a positive thesis? As long as we use an intuition-based 
view of analysis, and as long as we assume that cognitivism is right, what 
it suggests is that we should reject the single analysis assumption – the 
presupposition in metaethics that moral judgements should be analysed 
in the same way no matter who makes them. Instead we should accept 
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analysis pluralism – when we make moral judgements, some of us refer 
to absolute moral properties and others to relative moral properties.  
We should note that in one sense, analysis pluralism seems to be the 
consequence even if there are no die-hard relativists and there are abso-
lute properties that modest absolutists and relativists acknowledge as 
moral properties. Even if, in that case, an absolutist analysis holds for 
everyone’s moral statements, there are two different kinds of absolutist 
analyses. The absolutist analysis that holds for moral judgements made 
by die-hard relativists’ holds solely by virtue of their dispositions; so if 
there were no absolute moral properties, an error-theory would hold 
for them. The absolutist analysis that holds for modest absolutists and 
relativists, holds partly because of how the world turns out to be; their 
moral judgements are analysed so that they would be true even if there 
were no absolute moral properties. 
In this chapter I will argue that analysis pluralism can be spelled out 
and sustained as a coherent and plausible position. I argue for analysis 
pluralism on the grounds that an absolutist analysis holds for some 
people’s moral judgements, while a relativist or non-absolutist analysis 
holds for judgements made by others. But there can also be differences 
along other dimensions. It might, for example, be that a non-naturalist 
analysis holds for some speaker’s moral judgements while a naturalist 
analysis holds for others. This is not something I argue for here how-
ever – the focus is on the relativism vs. absolutism aspect of our moral 
concepts. 
Analysis pluralism is a thesis strictly about what moral judgements 
are about. It is not an ontological thesis, since it does not take a stand on 
whether the properties moral judgements are about exist or not. It might 
be worth noting, however, that analysis pluralism potentially involves 
an interesting position regarding this matter – a partial error-theory. 
Some people’s moral judgements are about absolute moral facts, and if 
such facts don’t exist, then all of their positive moral judgements are 
false. Other people’s moral judgements might still be true, though. Since 
it is possible that different absolutists refer to different sorts of abso-
lute properties, e.g. non-natural and natural properties respectively, it is 
also possible that some absolutists’ moral judgements can be true while 
others’ cannot. I will not discuss this matter further here, however. 
As noted, the route to analysis pluralism seems to rest on two 
assumptions; the intuition-based view of analysis and cognitivism. 
These can be questioned. First, it might be thought that the analysis 
pluralist conclusion constitutes a reductio ad absurdum against the intui-
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tion-based view of analysis. If this methodology cannot deliver a uni-
form analysis of moral judgements, then we should give it up. In section 
8.2 through 8.4 I discuss objections to analysis pluralism that can be 
understood in this way and argue that they fail. Second, it might be 
argued that, if we do not give up this methodology, the real conclusion to 
draw is that cognitivism fails: if no single cognitivist analysis can ac-
count for moral judgements, non-cognitivism can. So analysis pluralism 
really collapses into non-cognitivism. I discuss and reject objections to 
this effect in section 8.5. I end the chapter, in 8.6, by pointing to the abil-
ity of analysis pluralism to explain metaethical disagreement.  
8 .2  T h e  S a m e - But- D iffe r e nt P r o bl e m f o r A n alysis  
Plur alism 
According to analysis pluralism, moral judgements made by different 
people may be about different sorts of properties, for example absolute 
and relative properties respectively. Consequently, the same moral sen-
tence uttered by different speakers can have different truth-values. So 
analysis pluralism is a form of speaker relativism. It is not a form of 
standard speaker relativism, however, since it does not say that the 
truth-value is relative to the speakers’ moralities (although this might be 
so for some speakers’ moral judgements). 
In this section I want to point to a predicament for every form of 
moral truth-value relativism which might seem to be problematic for 
analysis pluralism in a way it is not for standard relativism. Let me first 
describe the predicament for standard relativists and how they can han-
dle it.  
According to some forms of standard relativism the contents of 
moral judgements depend on the morality of the one who makes the 
judgements. Moral terms have different referents depending on who 
uses them. This seems to have the following consequence. Imagine two 
people with relevantly different moralities; say, a utilitarian and a Kan-
tian. They are such that moral terms have different referents when they 
use them respectively. This means that the utilitarian cannot accurately 
say, “the Kantian’s utterance of “x is right” is a statement about (the) 
rightness (of x)”. ‘Rightness’ in the mouth of the utilitarian, does not 
refer to the property referred to when the Kantian uses the term ‘right’. 
However, for standard relativists this problem can be handled. First 
they can be assessor relativists, in the manner of Kölbel or MacFarlane, 
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holding that everyone refers to the same property, but that this is a 
property that has different extensions relative to different contexts.  
Second, the problem can be handled also on speaker relativism, if the 
position is formulated carefully enough. We saw one example of this in 
chapter 2. We said there that indexical relativism (the view that moral 
terms are indexicals) should not be modelled on simple indexical terms 
like ‘I’ and ‘here’, since this gives the wrong result for moral terms in 
intentional contexts. If P says “Q believes/says that it is here”, the refer-
ent of ‘here’ depends on the location of P, not that of Q. By contrast, a 
plausible speaker relativism has to imply that, if P says “Q believes/says 
that x is morally right”, then the referent of ‘morally right’ depends on 
the morality of Q. But there are other, more “complex”, indexical ex-
pressions that speaker relativism can be modelled on. One example we 
used in chapter 2 was ‘local’. In a sentence like “this is a local bar”, at 
least sometimes ‘local’ refers to the property of being located in an area 
close to the speaker. When put in an intentional context it does not (al-
ways) work like simple indexicals however: 
(1) Niklas thinks/says that Majornas krog is a local pub. 
At least on one natural reading, (1) ascribes to Niklas the be-
lief/statement that Majornas krog is a pub that lies close to him (not 
close to the speaker or believer of (1)). Now we can also consider:  
(2) Niklas’s belief/statement is a belief/statement about (the) lo-
calness (of pubs).  
In a sense, the grammatical surface structure of the expression ‘be-
lief/statement about localness’ in (2) is misleading. The expression does 
not refer to beliefs or statements that are about something special, 
statements that have a certain content. It refers to statements with a 
certain character. Moral speaker relativists can claim that this holds for 
‘statement about rightness’ as well.  
The fact that standard relativists can hold that statements about right-
ness have a character in common makes it possible for them to say that 
it is this character that is referred to when we say, “that is a statement 
about rightness”. This means that there is no “same-but-different prob-
lem” for standard relativists: they can say that what makes some judge-
ments with different truth-conditions count as the same moral judge-
ment, is that they have a common character. But according to analysis 
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pluralism, judgements about rightness made by different speakers do 
not have a common character. Different analyses of moral judgements 
hold for moral judgements made by different speakers. 
The following analogy suggests that for this reason there is indeed a 
pressing same-but-different problem for analysis pluralism. Suppose 
we find that there are two groups (in our otherwise quite uniform lin-
guistic community) in which the term ‘chair’ is used very differently. In 
one group, the word is used just about chairs, and in the other it is used 
so as to apply to human ears. You and I belong, I suspect, to the first 
group. In such a situation we would say that the word ‘chair’ refers to 
different things when different speakers use it. And we would also say 
that the others don’t use the term to make judgements about chairs – they 
use it to talk about ears. (And they would say corresponding things 
about us). This means that we would not think of the situation as one 
where analysis pluralism about judgements about chairs holds.  
So this seems to be what we should say if I have been correct about 
moral terms like ’moral rightness’ as well. If one group uses the term to 
refer to absolute properties and the other group uses it to refer to rela-
tive properties, members of neither group should say that members of 
the other group use the term to make judgements about rightness (or 
more generally, moral judgements). So it seems that analysis pluralism 
about judgements about moral rightness (or moral judgements) is not a 
viable alternative. Members of each group should say: “They use terms 
like ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’ to say other things than we do; 
only we use the terms to make moral judgements”. This suggests that, if 
we accept the conclusion from the previous two chapters – i.e. that expres-
sions like ‘morally wrong’ should be analysed differently when different 
speakers use them – then we should say that when some speakers use 
the expression they don’t use it to make moral claims. (Who you should 
say does and does not use it to make moral claims depends on which 
group of speakers you belong to.) Instead of analysis pluralism about 
moral judgements we have a position we might call “exclusive analysis 
monism”: all moral judgements should be analysed in the same way, not 
because all judgements that intuitively are moral judgements should be 
analysed the same way, but because all judgements that are not to be 
analysed in one specific way are excluded from being moral judgements. 
But exclusive analysis monism is also problematic: it maintains the 
single analysis assumption only because it construes the concept of 
moral judgements too exclusively. Whichever group of speakers one 
excludes – saying that those speakers do not make moral judgements – 
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the result is that speakers who we intuitively think of as making moral 
judgements are excluded. In this way this view goes against how we actu-
ally ascribe moral judgements, in a way that construes the concept of 
moral judgement in a counterintuitively narrow way. When we attribute 
moral beliefs to people, we do so irrespectively of their metaethical 
views. We don’t say that someone fails to master the concepts of right-
ness and wrongness because they have what we take to be false intuitions 
or beliefs about the nature of rightness and wrongness.  
If neither analysis pluralism nor exclusive monism is feasible, we 
seem to have a reductio ad absurdum against my conclusion in the previ-
ous chapters – that different analyses hold for moral judgements made 
by different speakers. And if this conclusion follows from the intuition-
based view of analysis, as I have argued, it is a reductio against using this 
methodology. We should choose another methodological approach. 
This will involve construing what I have called a revisionist analysis, an 
analysis that conflicts with what (some) people are ready to acknowl-
edge as moral rightness and wrongness; only this way can we reach the 
result that the same analysis holds for all (or most) judgements that we 
intuitively include in the class of for example judgements about moral 
rightness. 
I think that it is indeed true that if we want to give one analysis of all 
intuitive moral judgements, then we have to opt for a revisionist analysis 
in this sense. And giving such analyses is a fully legitimate enterprise, as 
long as it is made clear that it is not supposed to be analyses that are 
consistent with what everyone is ready to classify as, for example moral 
rightness. What I will argue in what follows, however, is that we need 
not give up the intuition-based view of analysis: analysis pluralism can 
handle the same-but-different problem set out above. 
8 .3 S ol v i ng the P r o bl e m  a nd Explic ati ng An alysis  
Plur alism 
8.3.1  A str uc t ur e  of  a sol u t ion  
In chapter 2 I presented and discussed the view that Tresan calls “de 
dicto internalism”. It has been thought that in order to accommodate the 
idea that moral judgements necessarily motivate (at least in normal 
circumstances), cognitivists have to argue that moral judgements have a 
special content or character by virtue of which this connection to moti-
vation holds. De dicto internalism is the idea that it can be true that it 
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necessarily holds that moral beliefs motivate even though they don’t 
have such a special content or character. It is not the content or character 
of moral judgements which guarantees the necessary connection. The 
necessity comes from the concept of moral judgements: for something 
to count as a moral judgement it has to be accompanied by motivation. 
What makes this possible is the idea that something is a moral judge-
ment, or a moral belief, not just by virtue of the meaning it has, or what 
it is about. Of two beliefs with the same meaning one can be a moral 
belief and the other is not: having a certain content (or character) is not 
sufficient for being a moral judgement. The general trick, then, is to dis-
connect what makes something count as a moral judgement from what 
meaning it has.  
This trick can be taken one step further than de dicto internalism re-
quires. We can say that having a certain content (or character) is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to be a moral judgement. What makes something 
a moral judgement are other things than the meaning, for example that it 
is (in normal circumstances) necessarily accompanied by motivation. If 
this is so – if what makes a judgement belong to the class of moral 
judgements are other things than the meaning of the judgement – it 
opens up for the possibility that different members of this class have 
different meaning. It opens up for the possibility of analysis pluralism. 
This involves a similar manoeuvre as the one we saw that indexical 
relativists can use. Analysis pluralism has to involve the claim that the 
grammatical surface form of expressions like ‘statements about moral 
rightness’ is in a sense misleading. This expression does not pick out 
statements on basis of their content (what they are about). Neither does 
it refer to statements by virtue of their character (as indexical relativists 
can say) or their meaning generally. Statements about moral rightness 
have something else in common than their meaning.  
The idea sketched in this subsection – that what unites moral judge-
ments are other things than their meaning – is only a structure of an 
answer to the problem. We have to substantiate and make plausible the 
idea. 
8 .3.2  Charac t erist ic s  of moral  ju dg e me n t s  
In the previous subsection I suggested that the following might be the 
case: 
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Negative thesis about the class of moral judgements: What makes 
something a moral judgement (or more specifically, a judgement 
about moral rightness etc.) is not its meaning. 
One might think that to defend this negative thesis I have to argue about 
some set of characteristics that it can fill the role of x: 
Positive thesis about the class of moral judgements: What makes 
something a moral judgement (or more specifically, a judgement 
about moral rightness etc.) is that it is x. X is such that judge-
ments with different meaning can be x. Specifically, both judge-
ments about absolute and relative properties can be x.  
It is outside the possible scope of this text to give a comprehensive an-
swer to the question of what x is, that is, the question of what makes 
something a moral judgement. In what follows I will point to some 
characteristics of the way we classify judgements as being moral judge-
ments that are central to my argument. After that, in the next subsection, 
I will argue that what I have said is enough to argue that both judgements 
about relative and about absolute moral properties can count as moral 
judgements.  
We can begin by noticing that to a large extent we seem to agree about 
which of the discussions we are involved in that concern moral ques-
tions and in our identifications of moral statements among other sorts 
of statements. We seem to intuitively pick out roughly the same judge-
ments in our everyday life as being moral judgements.  
This is also something that is more or less taken for granted in 
metaethics, and moral philosophy at large. In one sense, of course, phi-
losophers do not agree about which the moral judgements are; we dis-
agree about whether they express beliefs or not (or, if they do, beliefs 
with what content), we disagree about whether any of them are true, we 
disagree about how they are connected to motivation and rationality etc 
etc. But the discussion presupposes that even though we do not agree 
about how moral judgements are to be described in these terms, we do 
have (roughly) the same class of judgements in mind – we do indeed 
think that metaethical disagreement is disagreement about the nature of 
that class of judgements we are familiar with and have in mind. In other 
words, when we discuss the nature of moral judgements we assume that 
we have an understanding of which judgements we are discussing, and 
take it that we disagree about that class of judgements. And as I said 
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above, it seems reasonable to think that this is roughly right; we do 
point out roughly the same judgements and questions and discussions in 
our everyday life as being moral judgements, questions and discussions. 
Let me call this class of judgements the intuitive (everyday) class of moral 
judgements. 
So we pick out roughly the same judgements as moral judgements in 
our everyday discussions and take it that moral judgements are judge-
ments like that. But when we are to describe what it is to be like that, 
what it is that characterises judgements that are like that, we quickly end 
up in philosophical disagreement. Indeed, I find it doubtful that there is 
one description of what characterises moral judgements that fits every 
person’s way of classifying certain judgements as moral judgements. A 
more realistic picture, I think, is that different people’s concepts of 
moral judgements differ in certain respects from one another, and that 
what they have in common might be just that they pick out the intuitive 
everyday class of moral judgements as being moral judgements. Let me 
explain. 
We might hope to capture at least part of the answer to what it is to be 
a moral judgement through the connection between moral judgements 
and motivation. As we saw in chapter 2, probably the most common 
view regarding this connection among philosophers today is conditional 
internalism, the view that moral judgements necessarily motivate in 
normal circumstances. As non-normal cases count for example cases 
where the person making the judgement is depressed or listless. As we 
have seen, de dicto internalism provides a means to argue that there can 
be such a connection even if this is not guaranteed by the meaning (con-
tent or character) of moral judgements or by the nature of the attitudes 
they express. Instead, the connection holds because of our concept of 
moral judgements. According to (conditional) de dicto internalism our 
concept of moral judgements is such that something counts as a moral 
judgement just in so far as it is accompanied by motivation in the be-
liever or speaker, at least in normal cases. This suggests that the connec-
tion to motivation might be one thing that makes something count as a 
moral judgement. 
There is one problem with this view, however. In chapter 2 I argued 
that one advantage of the de dicto approach to accounting for the connec-
tion between moral judgements and motivation, is that it admits of the 
possibility to say that different people have somewhat different concepts 
of moral judgements regarding how strong the connection to motivation 
is. Not all people are conditional internalists. Some people, non-condi-
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tional motivational internalists, intuitively think that a judgement that is 
not accompanied by motivation can never be a moral judgement. While 
conditional internalists think that it suffices to be disposed to be moti-
vated under certain circumstances, non-conditional internalists think 
that the disposition has to be manifest. Yet others are willing to say that 
judgements can count as moral judgements even if they are not (or were 
not) accompanied by motivation even in normal circumstances. These 
are motivational externalists. Traditionally it is thought that we have to 
say that at most one of these theories truly describe the nature of the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation. If this is so, the 
intuitions that go against the true theory have to be explained away. But 
the de dicto approach to moral motivation gives us the possibility to say 
that people who have different intuitions here simply have somewhat 
different concepts of moral judgements: different in that these concepts 
give rise to differently strong connections between moral judgements 
and motivation.  
I find this a very appealing consequence of (or possibility given by) the 
de dicto approach. We – everyone – can agree that being accompanied by 
motivation is a salient feature of moral judgements. As we have noticed, 
it is central for moral practice in terms of the evolutionary and social 
function of moral judgements – if we had not tended to be motivated in 
accordance with our moral judgements then having such judgements 
could not have served to facilitate cooperation in light of conflicting 
interests. And being followed by motivation is indeed a striking feature 
of practically all real-life moral judgements we encounter – the intuitive 
everyday class of moral judgements. But this gives us no reason to expect 
that everyone ties moral judgements to motivation in the same way. It is 
not a reason to think that everyone holds that being accompanied by 
motivation in a certain way is necessary for being a moral judgement. 
Why expect that people’s concepts of moral judgements are exactly alike 
in this respect? Given the way that people react to amoralist-type exam-
ples, it seems reasonable to say that according the concept of moral 
judgements that most of us have, motivation is necessarily connected to 
moral judgements under certain conditions. According to other people’s 
concepts, however, there is either an unconditional necessary connec-
tion, or no necessary connection to motivation at all.265 
 
265 This holds, of course, only given that we are after the intuitive meaning of ‘moral 
judgement’ or the intuitive concept of moral judgement; that is, if we ask for an analysis 
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If I am correct that people have somewhat different concepts of moral 
judgements, concepts that to a certain extent count different judgements 
as being moral judgements, then we can give up on finding a correct 
account of our concept of moral judgements. But I think it is still possi-
ble to identify a core class of judgements that we do not question 
whether they are moral judgements, even though we do disagree about 
how this class can be extended. As we have noted, the absolute majority 
of the judgements in our everyday life that pass for moral judgements are 
accompanied by at least some motivation in the judge. Discussing 
Stocker’s examples of people who are not motivated in accordance with 
their moral judgements, Dreier puts this point as follows: 
What Stocker wants to describe is a radically disaffected person, one lacking 
altogether the motivation associated with the moral judgment. Thus, he char-
acterizes his politician as overcome by “tiredness,” “accidie,” “despair.” In such 
extreme forms, these conative states are, it seems to me, highly abnormal. We 
are to imagine a man who would not lift a finger, as it were, to achieve what 
he believes to be good – for if he would make even some minimal effort, then 
the relevant motivation is exposed.266 
Even motivational externalists should agree that among the real, as op-
posed to merely hypothetical, cases of moral judgements, almost every 
one is accompanied by motivation in the speaker. These, then, are 
judgements that externalists as well as internalists of different sorts can 
agree are moral judgements.  
Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that it is (at least partly) because 
the exception cases are so uncommon that people can have so different 
views about the nature of the connection between moral judgements and 
motivation, and, as a consequence of this, different concepts of moral 
judgements in this respect. Suppose that unconditional internalists, 
conditional internalists and externalists picked out very different sub-
classes of the various judgements we actually encounter as being moral 
judgements. Then we could expect large communicative difficulties and 
therefore a pressure towards conceptual convergence. But since people’s 
different concepts of moral judgements pick out roughly the same 
judgements among the judgements that we actually encounter as moral 
judgements, there is no such pressure.  
 
(or analyses) that is constrained by what people are ready to classify as moral judgements. 
The claim is that there is little reason to expect that a certain connection between moral 
judgements and motivation is such that everyone will be ready to intuitively agree to it. 
266 Dreier, 1990, p. 12. 
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I think similar things hold for other characteristics of moral judge-
ments. It is common in metaethics to think that there are limitations on 
the content of moral judgements; what can a moral judgement be about? 
Some of these limitations might be uncontroversial and shared by eve-
ryone. Someone who sees no problem in applying the term ‘morally 
wrong’ to actions she thinks are morally right probably doesn’t use that 
term to make moral judgements. And we would hardly say that someone 
who never uses ‘morally right’ about actions but only about, say, stones, 
uses the term to make moral judgements (at least not judgements about 
moral rightness).267  
There are other, more controversial, constraints regarding what con-
tent a principle or rule can have if it is to count as a moral principle, 
however. One example of constraints of this kind is stressed by Philippa 
Foot268 and many others have accepted it269. Judgements that concern 
moral principles and rules must, according to these writers, have a social 
concern. They should somehow be concerned with contributing to the 
well-being of other people. This might be thought to be what (or one of 
the things that) demarcates moral reasons from for example reasons of 
self-interest; the former has to take account of the interests of other 
people. I think that this is certainly in general true about the moral 
judgements we encounter in our everyday lives. (Perhaps this has an 
explanation in the evolutionary and social function of moral judge-
ments: if in forming our moral judgements we took account only of our 
own interest, these judgements would not be able to serve as effectively 
as a basis for facilitating cooperation.) But I also think that different 
people may have somewhat different concepts of moral judgements 
regarding the “content constraints”. Some speakers are, I think, ready to 
accept that an entirely egoistic principle might count as a moral principle 
or even that people might have strange moral views according to which it 
is morally right to counteract rather than promote the well-being of 
other people. Others will say that this disqualifies these principles from 
being moral principles.270 But here, like in the internalism/externalism 
case, it seems that such disagreements (which I think is a reason to say 
that people have different concepts of moral judgements) do not prevent 
 
267 Cf. Tersman, 2006, p. 111. 
268 Foot, 1958. 
269 See e.g. Smith, 1994, p. 40, Dreier, 1990, p. 24. 
270 Cf. Nichols, 2004, pp. 6-7. Nichols refers to empirical evidence that different 
people draw the line between moral and conventional rules at different places.  
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us from agreeing about a core class of moral judgements. Almost all of 
the moral judgements we encounter do in fact have a social concern of 
some sort, so we can all agree that these are moral judgements. 
 Other characteristics might be more or less the same according to 
everyone’s concept of moral judgements. One such feature is the super-
venience of moral properties on natural properties: if two actions are 
exactly alike in every natural property, then they must also have exactly 
the same moral properties. Under such circumstances it cannot be that 
one of the actions is morally right and the other morally wrong. The 
supervenience of moral properties on natural properties can be seen as a 
part of our concept(s) of moral judgements: for someone to count as 
making moral judgements with expressions like “x is morally right” she 
must not be disposed to apply the term ‘morally right’ to one but not the 
other of two actions that she takes to be exactly alike in other respects. If 
she does, she does not express a moral concept with the term, she does 
not use it to make moral judgements. 
No doubt, the characteristics I have brought up are insufficient to 
pinpoint what is special about moral judgements. And as I said above, I 
will not take on the task of doing so here. The point of the discussion 
has been the following. Even though it seems that different speakers have 
concepts of moral judgements that diverge on some points (and are the 
same on others) we can speak of a class of judgements that all of us iden-
tify as being moral judgements. So, although according to some people’s 
concepts of moral judgements there is no necessary connection between 
moral judgements and motivation and moral judgements are not neces-
sarily concerned with the well-being of others, even these people can 
admit that the main bulk of moral judgements that we in fact encounter 
are in fact accompanied by motivation and are concerned with the well-
being of others. Even though we have been unable to specify a set of char-
acteristics that make us all see these as moral judgements, we know that 
we all see these standard examples as being moral judgements. I will 
now argue that we can use this conclusion in our argument for the idea 
that judgements with different meaning – e.g. judgements about absolute 
as well as judgements about relative properties – can count as moral 
judgements. 
8 .3.3 Disposi t ions  to  c l assify ju d ge m e n ts  as moral  ju dg e me n ts  
What I have said about a widely accepted core class of moral judgements 
seems to hold for both standard relativists and for absolutists. They 
both hold that at least those judgements, the large bulk of standard exam-
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ples, are moral judgements, but they disagree about how to analyse them. 
Standard relativists and absolutists alike think of their respective views 
as views about that class of judgements. So they seem to agree to the 
following condition of when something is a moral judgement: 
Shared Intuitive Condition: If J belongs to the intuitive everyday 
class of moral judgements then J is a moral judgement. 
But standard relativists and absolutists also have other ideas about what 
makes something count as a moral judgement. Standard relativists ac-
cept: 
Standard Relativist Condition: Moral judgements are about relative 
properties, so J is a moral judgement only if it ascribes a relative 
property. 
And absolutists accept: 
Absolutist Condition: Moral judgements are about absolute proper-
ties, so J is a moral judgement only if it ascribes an absolute 
property. 
Both standard relativists and absolutists seem to accept two different 
conditions for when something is a moral judgement, then. They can do 
this since they think that all of the judgements that belong to the intui-
tive everyday class of moral judgements (those that satisfy the shared 
intuitive condition) are about relative and absolute properties respec-
tively (they satisfy the specific relativist or absolutist condition). But it 
is possible to imagine scenarios where the shared intuitive condition 
comes in conflict with the other conditions. We can for example ask an 
absolutist to imagine the following scenario.  
Scenario 3. Imagine that it turns out that many of the judgements 
in the intuitive everyday class of moral judgements – that is, the 
actual judgements we all single out as moral judgements – are not 
about absolute moral properties. When some people – perhaps 
around 50 percent of us – make such judgements, they refer to 
relative properties. These judgements are just like the rest of the 
judgements (those that are about absolute properties); there is no 
difference in how they are connected to motivation, or in how the 
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speakers argue for their judgements, or in which kinds of actions 
they judge to be morally right or wrong (that differs in the same 
way in both groups) etc. That is, all the usual candidates for char-
acteristics of moral judgements are had to the same extent by 
judgements made by speakers in both groups. The only difference 
is that speakers in the different groups have different strongly 
held metaethical convictions about the nature of moral judge-
ments; this is what makes moral terms refer to different kinds of 
properties when they use it respectively.  
The question to the absolutists is: would you say that these judgements 
that are about relative properties are moral judgements? Perhaps some 
absolutists think that the case is unrealistic: if the judgements in ques-
tion have the usual characteristics of moral judgements, they might say, 
then they are about absolute moral properties. But that would be a 
rather unimaginative response. Surely we are able to imagine that it 
might turn out that we are wrong about what some people use a certain 
term to refer to; maybe we have missed something in their use of the 
term, or perhaps we have had a slightly false picture of what it is that 
determines the reference of terms in general. So, let us suppose that our 
absolutist agrees to do the imaginative exercise. She tries to imagine that 
it turns out that she is wrong about the content of some peoples puta-
tively moral statements; it turns out that they refer to relative proper-
ties, even though their statements display all the features that normally 
make us classify them as moral judgements, whatever those are. What 
possible responses are there? 
(1) In that case, it would turn out that half of those we thought of 
as making moral judgements, were not doing that. Those who re-
fer to the relative properties do not make moral judgements, 
since something is a moral judgement only if it is about absolute 
properties.  
(2) In that case, what turns out is that some moral judgements are 
not about absolute moral properties. Half of those who make 
moral judgements refer to relative properties.  
I think that (2) is the more likely response here. We are confident that 
those judgements that we do classify as moral judgements in our every-
day life actually are moral judgements (even though we are ready to ad-
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mit that there can be some mistakes). This is the class of judgements 
that standard relativists as well as absolutists have in mind when they 
defend their views. So reasonably, if the analysis does not fit (all or most 
of) these judgements, one should admit that the theory is incorrect. 
What I’m trying to show here is not, of course, that standard relativ-
ists and absolutists think that their own analyses are wrong. I argue that 
they are ready to say that under certain circumstances – which they think 
do not actually obtain – their analyses would be wrong. More specifi-
cally, and this is really quite trivial, both standard relativists and abso-
lutists think that if their respective analyses were not a fitting analysis of 
the class of judgements we all identify as being moral judgements, then it 
would be mistaken. That is, even though standard relativists and absolut-
ists have their respective theories about what moral judgements are 
about, their concepts of moral judgements are neutral between moral 
beliefs being about relative and absolute moral properties. This is what 
makes moral analysis pluralism possible: both judgements about rela-
tive properties and judgements about absolute properties can count as 
moral properties. 
I don’t want to push this point too hard, however. I think there might 
be a genuine tension here in our concept(s) of moral judgements. The 
most probable reaction from our absolutist above might be uncertainty 
and vacillation. Perhaps some absolutists are tempted to say that in one 
sense, moral relativists make moral judgements (since they think and 
behave just like everyone else who makes moral judgements, except for 
their metaethical convictions), but in another sense they don’t make 
moral judgements (since they do not speak about absolute moral prop-
erties). If this is the case we have two different ways of classifying 
judgements as moral judgements (or one confused way). What analysis 
pluralism does, in that case, is to focus on the more inclusive classifica-
tion. Partly, I think that this is where our strongest intuition is, but 
more crucially, I think that this is the most interesting and important of 
the two classifications. It construes the class of moral judgements in a 
way that makes it possible for us to see all of us as speaking moral lan-
guage and as participating in the same moral practice. 
8 .3.4  T h e meanin g of  moral  ju d g em e n ts  an d  t h e  m eaning of  
‘moral  ju dg e me n t '  
Let me sum up the reasoning above and further explain how it connects 
to the arguments in previous chapters. To understand moral practice 
and our way of conceptualizing this, it is crucial to separate two differ-
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ent things. First, there are the meanings of moral judgements and terms. 
To investigate this we ask under which conditions people are ready to 
classify acts as morally right acts, morally wrong acts, etc. Second, we 
have the meaning of the expression ‘moral judgement’ and more specifi-
cally expressions like ‘judgement about moral rightness’ and ‘judge-
ments that an action is morally wrong’. Here we look at what we are 
ready to classify as being such judgements. To make this distinction is to 
point to the possibility that what makes something a moral judgement 
might be something other than what gives it the meaning it has. 
It is when we distinguish these two matters that we see that analysis 
pluralism is possible and plausible. In chapters 6 and 7 I argued that 
moral judgements have different meanings, or should be analysed differ-
ently, when different people use them, since different speakers are ready 
to classify acts as morally right and wrong under different circum-
stances. In this chapter I have argued that due to the meaning(s) of ex-
pressions such as ‘judgement about moral rightness’ and ‘judgement 
about moral wrongness’, the judgements with different meaning all 
count as judgements about moral rightness and wrongness. The content 
of moral judgements is underdetermined by the facts that make them 
count as moral judgements, whatever those are. The result is that moral 
terms and moral sentences can have different meaning when different 
people use them, and still be recognisably moral terms and moral sen-
tences. 
This puts us in a position to deal with the objection from the analogy 
between moral judgements and judgements about chairs. If a speaker 
uses the term ‘chair’ in another way than we do (for example to refer to 
ears) then she does not make judgements about chairs when she uses 
this term. By analogy it seemed we should be committed to this: if a 
speaker uses ‘right’ in a fundamentally different way than we do, then 
she does not make judgements about moral rightness when she uses this 
term. Now we can see why the analogy fails. Judgements about chairs are 
judgements about chairs only if they are about chairs. For moral judge-
ments, on the other hand, something other than the content matters to 
whether they are moral judgements. Moral judgements are moral judge-
ments irrespectively of whether they are about for example relative 
properties or about absolute properties, as long as they conform to the 
characteristics that make us classify them as moral statements. This, 
then, solves the same-but-different problem for analysis pluralism. 
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8.4  Oth e r O b j e cti o ns a nd R epli es  
In this section I state some other potential problems with analysis plu-
ralism and argue that they can be solved as well.  
8 .4. 1  Ex plaining d isagr eem e n t  
Analysis pluralism is a form of speaker relativism. It implies that the 
truth-values of moral sentences vary depending on who the speaker is. 
This means that this view can be objected to on the same ground as other 
forms of speaker relativism: it clashes with the intuitions most of us 
have that moral disputes – situations where one person says “x is right” 
and another says “x is not right” – are real disagreements. In such situa-
tions we think that both parties cannot be right at the same time; but 
speaker relativism implies that they can.  
In chapter 4 I argued, however, that speaker relativists can answer this 
objection. We experience moral disputes as we typically experience dis-
putes over absolute matters, because this has helped moral judgements 
serve their evolutionary function of furthering cooperation. Therefore, 
standard relativists can say, even if standard relativism is true we can 
expect us to have these intuitions.  
We are now in a position to add an element to this explanation. The 
social function of moral discussion explains why we all have that abso-
lutist intuition about disagreement. But it is compatible with this that 
for different people, the absolutist intuition has been connected with 
different strength to their views of the nature of moral properties. As I 
have argued in the previous two chapters, some people, such as Smith 
and Mackie, make a strong connection, while others, such as Dreier and 
Harman, do not see the absolute intuitions as that central. Even though 
they might have the intuition that moral disputes are disagreements in 
the absolutist sense, they think that there can be moral properties even if 
it turns out that there are no absolute moral properties. So, it is fully 
consistent with the analysis pluralist view I am defending – the view that 
some people’s moral judgements refer to absolute properties while 
moral judgements made by others refer to relative properties – that we 
all have the absolutist disagreement intuition.  
8 .4. 2  Ex plaining t h e  s in gl e  anal ysis  assum p tion  
There is one thing that the explanation of disagreement cannot account 
for, however. Some people do give up the thought that moral disputes 
are disagreements in the absolutist sense and become standard relativ-
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ists or non-cognitivists instead – but they still hold on to the single 
analysis assumption. If it is true, as I have argued, that different analyses 
hold for moral judgements made by different people, why do philoso-
phers (and others?) assume that all moral judgements should be ana-
lysed in the same way? Should we not have been able to see through this? 
But perhaps the prevalence of the single analysis assumption is not so 
strange, even though it is mistaken. On the face of it, moral practice is a 
practice that seems to “keep together”: we interact in conversations with 
moral words without problem. It doesn’t seem like we speak past each 
other or that we misunderstand each other. So it seems quite natural 
that we suppose that it is a unified practice in the sense that everyone’s 
moral judgements should be analysed in the same way. 
More specifically it seems that moral absolutists and relativists can 
engage in moral discussions with each other without (more than a usual 
amount of) misunderstanding. In moral discussions the relative or ab-
solute nature of moral properties is not at issue – it is normative mat-
ters, over the rightness and wrongness of actions, that stand in focus. 
And relativists and absolutists seem to be able to – and indeed do – take 
the same standpoints in such matters. So people can participate in nor-
mative discussions and debates with each other even if they refer to dif-
ferent properties (absolute and relative properties respectively), since 
this will not affect what they say or think in normative moral matters 
and need not matter to how they behave in moral discussions. (Indeed, 
some of the things I have argued for may serve as explanations of why it 
need not matter. I have argued that both relativists and absolutists see 
moral disputes as we typically think of disagreements over absolute 
matters – it is only that die-hard absolutists have incorporated this in 
their moral concepts. I have also argued that it is consistent with abso-
lutism that moral judgements are caused by emotions or motivational 
states and that they are necessarily connected to these; thus it is not 
strange, as it might seem, that also moral judgements made by people 
with absolutist moral concepts mirror their subjective emotions and 
motivational states.) This, then, would be an answer to why we make the 
single analysis assumption, even though it is false; people behave just the 
same in moral discussions, regardless of their metaethical convictions.  
People do not behave the same in metaethical discussions however. 
This is what we have seen; some people are willing to accept relative 
properties as moral properties while other people are not. So they have 
different premises in their metaethical reasoning. This is the reason I 
have given to accept analysis pluralism. But why do metaethicists, who 
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are aware of these differences between people’s metaethical convictions, 
still accept the single analysis assumption? The best explanation I can 
think of is the same as that above; the fact that people do behave the 
same in moral discussions makes it a reasonable prima facie assump-
tion.  
So we have an explanation of why we make the single analysis assump-
tion. People do behave the same in normative moral debates, and what 
makes this possible is that their strong convictions about the absolute 
or relative nature of moral practice do not affect the way they behave in 
moral debates.  
8 .4.3  Does i t  ma k e  t h e  qu es t ion  of  r elat ivi sm vs . absol u t i sm 
u nim por tan t ? 
It might seem that one consequence of the reasoning in the previous 
subsection is that the discussion over relativism and absolutism is not a 
central issue when it comes to moral discourse. After all, the point of 
moral judgements is their use in normative moral discussions and 
thinking. So if the commitment to speaker relativism or absolutism is 
not something that affects how people behave in normative moral prac-
tice – how we behave in moral discussions – why would it be an inter-
esting aspect in analysing moral judgements at all? 
There are a few different things to say in response. First, I think it has 
at least potential relevance to normative moral thought and discussion. 
Die-hard absolutists are disposed to think that, if there are no absolute 
moral properties, then there are no moral properties at all. So if they 
actually came to believe that there are no such properties, they would 
reject every positive moral judgement, which would have implications 
for their normative moral discussions. The reason that we do not see 
this as an actual effect is, first, that almost all absolutists believe that 
there are absolute moral facts and, as I argued in 6.3.3, error-theorists 
forget their scepticism about their existence when they are in morally 
loaded situations. 
Second, even if this is an unimportant distinction in normative ethics, 
the idea of whether moral terms refer to absolute or relative properties 
is something that metaethicists do take an interest in. And as long as we 
do that we have to attend to people’s intuitions about the relative or 
absolute nature of moral properties; and doing this should make us 
conclude that some refer to absolute properties while others refer to 
relative properties. Or that is what I have argued anyway. 
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The third answer grants more to the objection under consideration. If 
we put the two first answers to one side for a moment, I think that we 
should recognise that there is something to the objection. Perhaps it 
points to something that can be considered an important aspect of 
meaning. Loosely stated, the idea would be that some aspect of people’s 
use of a term matters to the meaning of the term (and the concept 
expressed), if and only if the aspect is significant to communication 
involving the term (or thoughts involving the concept). So if the relativ-
ist/absolutist aspect of our use of moral terms is not significant for 
moral communication and thinking, then the absolutist and relativist 
dispositions do not go into meaning. 
If this is a reasonable idea about meaning, and if we think that the ab-
solutist/relativist aspect of use is not significant, then it seems we have a 
tension between two different aspects of meaning. On the one hand we 
have this significance-to-communication criterion. On the other hand 
we have the aspect I have emphasized, connected to traditional philoso-
phical methodology: what matters to the correct analysis of a certain 
concept is what things people are ready to recognise as being in the ex-
tension of the concept. The latter view makes people’s strong absolutist 
and relativist dispositions relevant to the correct analysis of moral 
judgements, while the first doesn’t.  
What I want to emphasize here is that if we focus on the significance-
to-communication criterion and therefore disregard the strong absolut-
ist and relativist intuitions some people have, we will get what I have 
called a revisionist analysis of moral judgements. It will be an analysis 
that conflicts with what some people are ready to count as moral prop-
erties. This is not to say that it is a bad analysis, as long as it captures 
some other aspect of meaning. But neither is the possibility of giving 
such analyses a threat to analysis pluralism as a thesis about the correct 
non-revisionist analyses of moral judgements.271 
8 .5 An alysis  Plur alism a nd N o n - C og n iti v is m 
I have now argued that analysis pluralism is a coherent and plausible 
upshot of analysing moral judgements from an intuition-based method-
 
271 It also possible that the tension between the different aspects of meaning, as well as 
the divergence in people´s intuitions about what can count as a moral property, is part of 
the explanation of metaethical disagreement. 
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ology. This means that this methodology does not have to be abandoned 
– analysing moral judgements this way is one thing we can do, and the 
result is analysis pluralism. But there might be another worry. Analysis 
pluralism shares the following view with non-cognitivism: it is not 
having a certain content or character, or expressing a certain kind of 
belief, that makes something a moral statement; and it is not being a 
belief with a certain content or character that makes something a moral 
conviction. It may be argued that, in effect, this makes analysis pluralism 
collapse into a form of non-cognitivism. In the first subsection below I 
argue that this is not so, through answering three possible suggestions 
to the effect that non-cognitivism has the better explanation of the con-
siderations behind analysis pluralism. In the subsection after that I 
make concessions to non-cognitivism: my arguments for analysis plu-
ralism do not suffice to exclude non-cognitivism or certain non-cogni-
tivist elements, but leave open such possibilities for further research. 
8 .5.1  Non -c o g n i t iv i st  objec t ions  
(i) As we saw in chapter 3, one of the main arguments for non-cognitiv-
ism is that among the people we want to say use terms like ‘right’, 
‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to make moral statements, there is a significant 
difference in which actions and things they apply these terms to. That, 
for example, is how Hare sets up his famous example where missionar-
ies and cannibals apply these words to different things.272  Hare con-
cludes that insofar as the moral terms have descriptive meaning, the 
descriptive meaning is different in the different groups. So it must be 
something other than their descriptive meaning that makes them moral 
statements: non-cognitivists say that it is that they express something 
other than beliefs. 
Folke Tersman has formulated the probably most elaborated argu-
ment of this kind. Tersman focuses on the question of under which 
conditions it is plausible to attribute moral convictions to someone. He 
argues for something he calls “the latitude idea”. Tersman notes that 
since moral realism implies absolutism, it implies that we could cor-
rectly translate someone else’s sentence with our own moral sentence 
only if that sentence had the same cognitive content as ours. But this is 
not plausible for moral expressions. Here we allow for more latitude: 
“according to the latitude idea, we should require less agreement, and 
 
272 Hare, 1952, p. 148. 
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allow for more error and idiosyncratic views in the case of ethics as 
compared with other subject matters.”273  It is not cognitive content that 
matters to whether we do or should attribute a moral conviction to 
someone. When it comes to moral sentences we do and should allow 
sentences with different cognitive content as translations of each other 
(even though there are some constraints on the cognitive content of 
moral statements, such as Foot’s idea, mentioned above, that moral 
requirements concern people’s well-being in some way). Instead, Ters-
man argues, the correct constraint on when to attribute moral convic-
tions (except for the well-being kind of constraints just mentioned) has 
to do with motivation. We should attribute a moral conviction that it is 
morally right to do X to people only if they “(in general) have some ten-
dency or motivation to perform X”.274  Tersman takes this to suggest that 
we should accept some form of non-cognitivism (even though he does 
not take on the task of developing which form this would be).275  
So far, this is inconclusive as an argument for non-cognitivism. As we 
saw in chapter 3, standard relativists can agree that the argument shows 
that moral convictions are not beliefs with a special cognitive content, 
but still maintain that they are beliefs – beliefs with a certain (motiva-
tional) character. So the argument by itself cannot be used by non-cogni-
tivists to rule out standard relativism. Tersman notes this, and says that, 
even though he thinks that some form of non-cognitivism is the best 
explanation of the latitude-idea in the end, his main thesis is that the 
considerations about attribution of moral judgements speak against 
moral realism and that this is consistent with some form of relativ-
ism.276 
But here, it seems, non-cognitivists could appeal to the reasoning 
underlying analysis pluralism. What I have argued is that standard rela-
 
273 Tersman, 2006, p. 111. 
274 Ibid., p. 117. 
275 Ibid., p. 131. 
276 At one place Tersman gives, in one sentence, an argument against standard 
relativism; ”by committing themselves to an idea about the nature of a moral 
disagreement that is neither prompted by nor justifiable in terms of the idea that moral 
judgments consist of beliefs, this would leave them with little reason for remaining 
cognitivists.” (Ibid., p. 106) Tersman acknowledges, however, that this is short of being a 
developed objection to standard relativism in a footnote attached to the comment: “Of 
course, there are other reasons for being a cognitivist. […] notice that the main aim of 
this book to [sic!] is to explore whether moral disagreement undermines realism. 
Whether it also undermines relativist forms of cognitivism is an issue of secondary 
importance.” (Tersman, 2006, p. 106, fn. 33). 
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tivism is not true as an analysis of everyone’s moral judgements. So, 
non-cognitivists can say, since judgements about moral rightness do not 
have in common that they are beliefs with the same content nor that they 
are beliefs with the same character, the only remaining alternative is that 
what they have in common is that they are something other than beliefs, 
such as some desire-like attitudes. Or, expressed in terms of moral 
statements: if what makes a statement a moral statement is not that it 
expresses a certain kind of belief, it must be that it expresses something 
else, such as desires. 
Reply. We should agree with Tersman that the latitude-idea in itself 
does not rule out standard relativism, and we should extend this to hold 
for analysis pluralism as well. The fact that we do not attribute moral 
judgments on the ground of their cognitive content can be fully accom-
modated by the view that moral convictions are beliefs but that two 
beliefs with different content and character can count as the same moral 
conviction (and that moral statements are expressions of beliefs but that 
two statements can express beliefs with different content and character 
and still be the same moral statement). So the latitude-idea does not 
suggest non-cognitivism rather than cognitivist analysis pluralism. And 
it gives us no reason to think that the latter collapses into the former. 
(ii) It might also be thought that non-cognitivists can refer to the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary functions of moral statements 
in this context. Some non-cognitivists acknowledge that it makes good 
sense to hold that moral statements can express beliefs. It is just that 
doing so cannot be their primary function; their primary function is to 
express some non-cognitive attitude.277  One way of cashing out the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary functions is in terms of what 
makes something a moral statement. It is the primary function of moral 
statements to express desires if this is what they express in virtue of the 
facts that make them moral statements.278  Using this idea, what Hare’s 
scenario shows, is that even if moral judgements made by the cannibals 
and missionaries express beliefs, this is not their primary function. 
What makes their judgements moral judgements is not facts that make 
them express certain beliefs; so their primary function must be some-
thing else. And this seems to be the consequence of analysis pluralism as 
 
277 See e.g. Hare, 1952, pp. 121-26. 
278 Cf. Tersman, 2006, p. 10. It should be noted that Tersman does not use this idea to 
make the argument I discuss.  
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well; the facts that make some judgements moral judgements are not 
facts by virtue of which a certain cognitive analysis holds for them. So 
their primary function must be to express desires rather than beliefs. 
Thus, analysis pluralism really amounts to non-cognitivism. 
Reply. The objection simply assumes that the facts which make moral 
judgements moral judgements are facts that make them express some-
thing. This assumption is questioned by analysis pluralism (and de 
dicto internalism). What these ideas point to is exactly the possibility 
that that which holds together the class of moral judgements is not that 
they express something special. They provide a way of maintaining that 
moral judgements are beliefs, even though it might hold necessarily that 
moral judgements are accompanied by motivation and emotions.  
 (iii) It might be thought that this response does not take the connec-
tion between meaning and communication seriously enough. Linguistic 
meaning or content, it seems, is that which is communicated by words to 
others. Consequently, since according to analysis pluralism, what is 
communicated (in the sense of being what (all) others pick up from the 
utterance) by someone’s utterance of “abortion is morally wrong” can be 
neither that abortion has an absolute property nor that it has a relative 
property, this cannot be part of the meaning or content of the utterance. 
What is communicated in this sense has to be something that different 
speakers of moral judgements share in their understanding of moral 
properties. And that cannot be the cognitive content: some people un-
derstand moral properties to be relative and others think of them as 
absolute. As a consequence, must we not say that it is something other 
than the cognitive content that is communicated? 
Reply. The negative thesis that the intuitive cognitive meaning is not 
communicated in this sense, does not imply the positive thesis that 
some non-cognitive state is communicated or expressed. It doesn’t since 
it is possible that moral practice is special in the following sense; even 
though it seems that something is communicated – in the sense that 
what is said by a moral judgement is something that is picked up by 
someone as long as he masters moral language – this is not so. In this 
sense we talk past each other – some speak of absolute properties, oth-
ers don’t.  
This is indeed a counterintuitive result. But it is an explicable coun-
terintuitivity: I argued in 8.4.2 that we can explain why we make the 
single analysis assumption even though, on closer examination, it is 
mistaken. Furthermore, that we talk past each other in this way does not 
exclude that we are involved in an important and meaningful activity. 
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Moral discussions are indeed important to us – both at a social level to 
further coordination and cooperation, and at an individual level because 
moral questions are something we care about.  
This reply should be tempered. What analysis pluralism implies is 
that the non-revisionist meaning of moral judgements, or meaning as 
given by an intuition-based methodology, is not (always) communicated. 
It is this meaning that is not always transferred in moral conversations. 
It is consistent with this that non-cognitivists (or standard relativists) 
are right that what is picked up in moral discussions is that the other 
accepts a certain norm or has a certain motivational attitude. The result 
is that an analysis which focuses on what is communicated in this sense, 
will be a revisionist analysis; since some people are disposed to say that 
nothing but absolute moral properties can count as moral properties 
such as moral rightness, the analysis will be out of sync with their con-
cepts of moral properties. 
8 .5.2  Conc essions  to  no n - c o g n i t iv i sm 
I have argued that analysis pluralism does not collapse into non-cogni-
tivism: the underlying considerations do not force us to accept that 
moral judgements express desires, rather than just different beliefs for 
different people. From what we have seen this far, however, it is clear 
that they are very similar. Both reject the idea that it is being a belief 
with a certain content or character that makes something a moral 
judgement, and claim that it is something else that keeps together the 
class of moral judgements.279  So how should we decide between the 
views? 
We might think that analysis pluralism has an advantage, in that cog-
nitivism is prima facie plausible. This is why non-cognitivists take great 
pains to accommodate their view to the belief-like features of moral 
judgements.280 Through analysis pluralism we can take this belief-
likeness at face value, at the same time as we can accept what is plausible 
about non-cognitivism. Indeed, as I have argued in chapter 2 and in this 
chapter, analysis pluralists can accept all of the following, without 
 
279 It might also be that, because they are so similar, analysis pluralism will have to 
deal with some of the objections often directed at non-cognitivism, such as the Frege-
Geach problem. I will have to postpone discussion of these matters to another occasion.  
280 This is an essential part of modern variants of non-cognitivism, such as Blackburn’s 
and Gibbard’s views. See e.g., Blackburn, 1993, Blackburn, 1998, Gibbard, 2003. 
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committing to the claim that moral judgements express something other 
than beliefs:  
That it has been crucial that moral judgements are accompanied 
by motivation for them to play the coordination and cooperation 
fostering role they play.281 
That (therefore) emotions/affections may be crucially involved in 
the production of (most) moral judgements. 
That (therefore) nearly all moral judgements we come across are 
accompanied by at least a bit of motivation. 
That being accompanied by motivation (at least under normal 
conditions) is necessary to be a moral judgement (at least on 
many people’s concept of moral judgements). 
Given the prima facie plausibility of cognitivism, we might think, giving 
up cognitivism for non-cognitivism would be justified only if there were 
no way for cognitivists to accommodate such claims.282 But as I have 
argued, there is.  
However, this is a real advantage of analysis pluralism over non-cog-
nitivism only if moral non-cognitivists do not succeed in accounting for 
the belief-like features of moral judgements. This question – and more 
generally questions about where the difference between the two views 
lies, if there is a difference – hinges at least in part on questions about 
what determines what kind of attitude a judgement expresses. Why say 
that moral judgements express desires, rather than saying that they are 
necessarily accompanied by desires? I cannot settle this interesting 
question here, but will leave it for future investigation. This means that 
the arguments I have given do not exclude non-cognitivism or mixed 
theories according to which both beliefs and desire-like states are ex-
pressed.  
 
281 Cf. Joyce, 2001, pp. 14-15, Joyce, 2006, pp. 175-76. Joyce argues that the cooperative 
function of morality does not necessarily speak in favour of non-cognitivism. 
282 This comes close, I think, to a claim Dreier makes (which he borrows from Tresan): 
“As Jon Tresan says in a different context, if a cognitivist theory can account for 
everything in normative language that is accounted for by expressivism, we may be less 
inclined to take expressivism seriously.” Dreier, 1999, p. 569 
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There is also another way in which my argumentation leaves room for 
non-cognitivist elements. So far, I have assumed that analysis pluralism 
is a purely cognitivist view. But it could be that some people’s moral 
statements do not express beliefs but desires (and their moral convic-
tions are desires rather than beliefs). This position is consistent with 
the overall analysis pluralist framework. Whether we should accept 
such a mixed pluralism or a pure cognitivist pluralism will, again, de-
pend on questions of the sort I have said that I cannot discuss here – 
questions about what determines whether a statement expresses a desire 
or a belief. 
In this section I have pointed to possibilities for non-cognitivism and 
non-cognitivist elements that are not excluded by my argumentation for 
analysis pluralism. What I have sought to establish, however, is the pos-
sibility and consistency of a purely cognitivist analysis pluralism, and 
that such a view is made plausible by features commonly thought to 
support non-cognitivism. 
8 .6  Explai n i ng M et a eth i c al  Dis ag r e e m e nt 
In the previous sections I have pointed to several merits of analysis plu-
ralism. The main merit is the ability to account for the diversity in peo-
ple’s strong intuitions about the relative or absolute nature of moral 
properties, given a traditional methodology taking these intuitions seri-
ously. Other features that I have argued analysis pluralism can account 
for are: 
The belief-like features of moral judgements – they are beliefs. 
The non-cognitivist view that it is not expressing beliefs with cer-
tain contents or characters that makes a judgement a moral 
judgement. 
That moral judgements, even though they are beliefs, are strongly 
connected to motivation, and even, according to many people’s 
concept of moral judgements, necessarily connected to motiva-
tion. 
That people have different intuitions about the nature of the con-
nection between moral judgements and motivation – the nature 
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of the connection is different on different people’s concepts of 
moral judgements. 
I would like to end by considering another merit of analysis pluralism; 
that it can account for the disagreement there is over how moral judge-
ments should be analysed. I think there are at least four different causes 
of this metaethical disagreement. Everyone can acknowledge the two 
first of these. The first is that people have different methodological 
approaches. I have defended analysis pluralism given the assumption 
that in giving an analysis of moral judgements we are after a non-revi-
sionist analysis in the sense that it doesn’t conflict with what some peo-
ple are ready to count as moral properties. I have been careful to point 
out that if we have other purposes with giving an analysis we might 
reach different results.  
Another cause of the existing disagreement over the correct analysis of 
moral judgements is found in the fact that the argumentative chain lead-
ing up to any such analysis is bound to involve explicitly or implicitly 
taking a stand on many controversial philosophical questions. No doubt 
this is true for my argument for analysis pluralism as well. On one im-
portant point however, I have already taken such matters into account in 
my argument. I have argued that, as long as we are after a non-revisionist 
analysis, it does not matter which theory of meaning we invoke: the 
difference between people’s strong convictions about the absolute or 
relative nature of moral properties makes it impossible for one analysis 
to fit everyone’s moral judgements, whether we think that moral judge-
ments should be analysed along the lines of an internalist, a social exter-
nalist or a causal theory of reference. 
What I want to argue in this section is that analysis pluralism – as an 
account of the non-revisionist meaning(s) of moral terms – has the abil-
ity to explain the portion of metaethical disagreement that remains after 
taking these things into account. It can do so through pointing to two 
ways in which people who have tried to account for the meaning of 
moral expressions have started from mistaken assumptions. 
First, consider Smith’s explanation of metaethical disagreement. That 
metaethicists come to so different conclusions can, according to Smith, 
be ascribed to the fact that there is a built in tension between the differ-
ent characteristic features of moral practice. On the one hand moral 
judgements appear to be beliefs. On the other hand, moral judgements 
are necessarily connected to motivation, which is something we could 
expect if they were desires rather than beliefs.  
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As I have argued in chapter 2 and the present chapter, it is possible to 
dissolve this tension. The solution lies in the idea – embedded in de 
dicto internalism and analysis pluralism – that we should distinguish 
between the meaning of moral judgements and the meaning of ‘moral 
judgement’ (or, in other words, that we should distinguish between 
moral concepts and the concept of moral judgements). Even if moral 
judgements have descriptive meanings and are beliefs, there can be a 
necessary connection between being a moral judgement and being ac-
companied by motivation by virtue of the meaning of ‘moral judgement’. 
If we get rid of the misapprehension that the necessary connection be-
tween moral judgements and motivation has to be accounted for by the 
content, character or nature of the mental state expressed by moral 
judgements, then there will no longer be a pressure to choose one of the 
two characteristic features of moral judgements to take seriously. (This 
is something that other, analysis monistic, forms of cognitivists can say 
as well, if they explain the connection to motivation in the de dicto way.) 
There is also another way in which analysis pluralism implies that 
metaethicists in general have been mistaken: they have made the single 
analysis assumption. This can also account for some amount of 
metaethical disagreement. It is partly because people (metaethicists) 
have thought that everyone has the same moral concepts, that moral 
judgements mean the same when all people use them, that they keep 
disagreeing. They take their own strong intuitions about the nature of 
moral properties and think that this says something about how every-
one’s moral judgements should be analysed. Absolutists think of their 
unwillingness, and relativists of their willingness, to say that relative 
properties can be moral properties, in this way; they both think that it is 
an intuition that says something about moral concepts in general. If they 
instead realised that their intuitions say something only about the con-
cepts they themselves and people who share their intuitions have, then 
some amount of disagreement could be avoided. We can borrow, and 
develop, a picture from Smith to illustrate this point: 
There are many different theories about the nature and content of moral 
judgement that aspire to explain and capture the truth embodied in internal-
ism, and these theories share little in common beyond that aspiration. 
Worse still, as I will argue in what follows, these theories are perhaps best 
thought of as lying around the perimeter of a wheel, much like Fortune’s 
Wheel, with each theory that lies further on along the perimeter representing 
itself as motivated by difficulties that beset the theory that precedes it. The 
mere existence of Internalism’s Wheel need not pose a problem for internal-
ists, of course. They may believe that the truth about ethics lies wherever 
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Internalism’s Wheel stops spinning. But a problem evidently does arise if 
Internalism’s Wheel is in perpetual motion, for then the truth about ethics 
presumably lies nowhere at all on Internalism’s Wheel.283  
I will not try to do justice to Smith’s picture as he intends it, but use it 
very freely for my own purposes. What I want to focus on in this picture 
of a metaethical wheel is the worry that there is no end to the spinning 
of the wheel. There would be hope to avoid this worry if there were one 
theory that is not beset by problems that make the wheel spin to the next 
theory. However, because of people’s diverging strong intuitions about 
what can count as moral properties, I think that this is a futile hope, as 
long as we do not change the picture.  
If we think of it as there being only one metaethical wheel, of course it 
is hard to get it to stop spinning. There are many people, with different 
strongly held intuitions about the nature of moral properties, who want 
to have their say about where the wheel is to stop. As soon as one person 
(say, an absolutist) lets the wheel stop at one theory, someone else (say, a 
relativist) comes and spins the wheel to the next, and so on. (This is not 
Smith’s idea: in his picture it is generally accepted, but seemingly con-
flicting, characteristics that make the wheel spin.) But we can revise the 
picture. On the analysis pluralist picture, there is not one wheel but 
many. And each wheel stops in a specific place, on a specific theory. But 
the different wheels stop spinning at different theories. Remodelling the 
picture in this way has consequences for metaethical disagreement: we 
don’t have to disagree over whether relativism or absolutism is correct 
– a relativist analysis holds for some people’s moral judgements, while 
an absolutist analysis holds for moral judgements made by others. 
It should be stressed that one prerequisite for this explanation to 
work, and for analysis pluralism to be possible in the first place, is my 
conclusion in part 1: that the common arguments in favour of either 
standard relativism and absolutism fail. The conclusion in chapter 2, 
that absolutism can explain moral motivation through de dicto internal-
ism has already been referred to frequently in the present chapter. In 
chapter 3 I argued that arguments from diversity of moral opinions for 
standard relativism do not as they stand suffice to preclude absolutism. 
I said that they have to be supplemented with arguments to the effect that 
we can disregard certain people’s strong absolutist intuitions – which is 
exactly what I argued in chapters 6 and 7 that we cannot. I argued in chap-
 
283 Smith, 1996, pp. 69-70. 
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ter 4 that standard relativism implies that we do not genuinely disagree 
over moral matters in the sense that we intuitively think we do. But I 
also argued that this is no reason to disregard standard relativist analy-
ses; standard relativists can explain why we have these intuitions about 
disagreement even if they are mistaken. That these common arguments 
in favour of standard relativism and absolutism do not settle the battle 
between standard relativist and absolutist analyses, made it possible to 
argue that one kind of analysis holds for some people’s moral judge-
ments and the other for moral judgements made by other people. 
As I said above, I realise that the case for the analysis pluralist concep-
tion of moral practice in this book is bound to rest on a lot of contro-
versial philosophical issues. It is, however, not necessary to accept this 
theory as a whole to appreciate that some of the ideas behind it can serve 
as a partial explanation of metaethical disagreement. One premise in the 
argument for analysis pluralism is that people have different strongly 
held intuitions regarding the relative or absolute nature of moral prop-
erties. It is indeed possible to accept this without drawing the further 
conclusion that people actually refer to different properties (even 
though I have argued that the further conclusion follows as long as we 
are after a non-revisionist account of the meaning of moral judgements). 
And this premise – about the diverging strong intuitions – is an explana-
tion of why there is no analysis – absolutist or relativist – that will be 
accepted by everyone. This is something metaethicists have to take into 
account when they seek to analyse moral judgements: if one argues for, 
say, a relativist analysis, then some people will not accept it as an analy-
sis of what intuitively counts as moral rightness or wrongness.  
If we want our theory of moral judgements to account for such intui-
tions, this is a reason to take the extra step to analysis pluralism. This 
way we will reach a stable resting point in metaethics. We will have a 
metaethics that is no longer held captive by strongly held but divergent 
intuitions about moral practice – instead we will have one that accounts 
for them. 
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